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The outstanding feature of today’s march is that we have seen new land to the South 
never seen by human eyes before great snow clad heights [which] we did not see on our 
journey South on the last Expedition for we were too close to the land or rather foothills 
and now at the great distance we are out they can plainly be seen.  
-Ernest Shackleton, 
“Heart of the Atlantic”, 22 November 1908 
 
 





As an incredibly brilliant, handsome man once said; to be the man, you gotta beat the 






In science it often happens that scientists say, "You know that's a really good argument; 
my position is mistaken," and then they would actually change their minds and you never 
hear that old view from them again. They really do it. It doesn't happen as often as it 
should, because scientists are human and change is sometimes painful. But it happens 
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Malcontents within international relations are small states that signal the decline of the 
hegemonic state. While not the direct cause of a hegemonic state‘s downfall, the 
malcontent is a sign that the hegemon is becoming weaker and the more malcontents is a 
symbol of the dwindling power of a hegemon. This work takes combines hegemonic 
theory and international relations theory to form a typology of malcontents. In addition 
this work introduces a futures analysis methodology that helps to quantify the impact that 
malcontents have on the hegemonic future of the United States. This typology divides 
malcontents into three specific categories, revolutionary, benign, and passive aggressive 
according to their approach to achieving their national goals. The futures analysis 
exercise gives results that show how malcontents are a part of a much larger decline in 
general. Malcontents help to demonstrate how weak the hegemon really is, further 
hastening its decline. The use of force against hegemonic malcontents is often the only 















The genesis for this project came when I was working on my Master‘s degree at Bowling 
Green State University in 2002-2003. My professor and advisor there, Dr. Neal Jesse, 
was finishing up a project with his co-authors and moving on to another project. This new 
project was going to examine ―hegemonic chafing‖, that is, small states that chafe under 
the influence of the hegemonic power. The term was switched a short time later to 
hegemonic malcontents. Not only was this relatively new territory but also a chance for 
me to undertake a project that combined both political theory and international relations, 
something I had been searching for. When I came to Tennessee in 2004 the project never 
left me and when the need for a dissertation proposal arose I went back to it. Through the 
examination of Marxist thought, International Relations literature, and other works I 
began to formulate the idea to produce a typology of malcontents, something that has 
both a practical purpose as well as a possible contribution to the literature. 
 I was fortunate to have a class with Dr. Bruce Tonn that introduced his 
methodology for the organization of futures analysis. This type of work appealed to me 
and I believed it to be quite useful in my own field, that of International Relations. The 
ability to predict the future has always been a coveted goal of humanity and while 
certainly not perfect the futures analysis methodology Tonn composed would dovetail 
perfectly with my malcontent project. I had theory and a tool for predicting where the 
malcontents would take the American hegemonic order.  
 vii 
 This work is meant to be useful to both scholars and policy makers. Whether it 
will achieve that lofty goal, I do not know. But I am confidant that it will provide a 
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Tensions between a large power and smaller powers are a universal aspect of 
international relations. Rome dealt with Gaul, the Celts, the Germans and numerous other 
barbarian tribes. Spain had to deal with England in order to maintain her network of gold 
and silver ships. Great Britain sent troops to deal with any number of native rulers who 
stood in the way of European civilization and trade. In the early 21st century we see the 
United States maintaining tensions with Iran and Pakistan in a war waged against 
homeless terrorists who seemingly threaten the American mainland. Whatever the 
dominant power there will always be small powers who feels that it is ―under the thumb‖ 
so to speak of the larger power and just want to be free to pursue goals that are purely 
national, without outside interference.  
 The modern age is not the first time a hegemon has had to deal with troublesome 
smaller powers, nor will it be the last. These smaller powers are what I call malcontents. 
And because they are dissatisfied with the order that exists around them they constantly 
seek to test and probe the power of the hegemon. Hegemony is a word that will be used 
frequently in this work. Essentially it is the rule of a single, dominant power by consent 
of the ruled. Coercion, that is the stick, will always be in the background. But the 
hegemonic power long ago realized that an empire by consent was far more beneficial to 
peace and prosperity. This is the hegemonic order that surrounds and benefits everyone 
within it, centering of course on the hegemon itself. To nourish and grow the hegemonic 
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order limits are necessarily in place on the course of action a hegemonic power can take.  
History shows us that no matter the method of rule, a dominant power will eventually 
decline. When a hegemonic power is in its golden age it finds that the need for overt 
military action will be low, for consent is easy when things are prosperous. But when the 
decline sets in there will be more and more small powers that want to set out on their 
own, away from the decaying mass that is the hegemonic order.  
 This study concentrates on the malcontents of hegemony, those small states that 
seek to pursue their own national policy away from the prying eyes of hegemon. 
Malcontents do not cause the decline and fall of a hegemonic power. However they will 
play a role in the decline and fall of a hegemon and will most assuredly take advantage of 
a weakening hegemonic power. A typical malcontent will be a small state that exists on 
the periphery of the hegemonic order and is unable to pursue the national goals it deems 
necessary because of hegemonic influence. As the hegemon become unable to fully 
enforce its order the malcontent will see an opening to challenge the power of the 
hegemon by whatever number of means. This is the point at which the hegemon and the 
malcontent will collide, if the hegemon chooses to try to enforce the order. Enforcing the 
order will be a complicated matter. If the hegemon is able to exercise soft power, that is 
power based on economic and political power, effectively the conflict may be minimal 
and the order restored. If soft power does not work, then the hegemon will very possibly 
resort to military power. This use of power can be a very tricky proposition within the 
framework of hegemonic rule.  
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 Hegemonic rule has been explored by a multitude of scholars. However there 
exists a gap in the literature in regards to the hegemonic malcontent. A study of 
malcontents is important, especially in relation to the hegemon at the end of its life cycle. 
For a malcontent to break off from the hegemonic order is part of a most important signal 
of decline. We can take a cue from the end of the Roman Empire that malcontents will 
not be able to assume any sort of power within the order. The barbarian powers that 
brought Rome to her knees were unable to fill the void demonstrating that no one small 
power can take over what a hegemon has left behind.  
 Malcontents of hegemony exist at the limits of hegemonic power. The hegemonic 
state will rarely know where their power stops. Consequently the hegemonic state 
discovers this when it is attempting to enforce the order. The reasons for the decline of 
the hegemonic state are many and much of this is rooted in domestic factors. Economic 
decline, elite desires to remain in power, public opinion, and a desire to open new 
economic routes all can be counted among reasons for hegemonic decline. Malcontents 
come into being at the point where the hegemon loses power.  
 This study will proceed in three major parts. The first chapter will explore 
hegemony in political and social theory. The modern concept of hegemony stems from 
Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci saw hegemony as an interpretation of Marxism that 
concentrated more on power difference and dynamics that avoided the strict positivist 
view of history that Marx used in his economic interpretation. Gramsci sought to 
construct a pragmatic theory of revolution that emphasized power through the consent of 
the masses as a way to empower the proletariat. As such the first chapter is based on how 
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hegemons gather power based on consent. Power based on consent of the governed is a 
driving force in the construction of hegemony. Such a concept is necessary in building 
strong class (or international) relationships. Empires built on force last only as long as the 
stick can be effectively wielded towards the masses. Hegemonic orders built on consent 
from will last as long as the masses are willing to keep supporting the hegemonic power.  
 The second part of this work will plug the theoretical concepts of hegemony into 
the context of international relations. Hegemons are able to form because they have 
precisely the attributes that make other smaller powers want to follow them. Hegemonies 
are often able to fill a vacuum in world affairs at a particular point in history, whether the 
US at the end of the Second World War or Great Britain at the conclusion of the 
Napoleonic wars. In some cases war can result in the emergence of hegemons as one or 
more states have been able to build themselves into powers that can be identified as 
leaders- countries willing to conduct a munificent rule for the powers that support it. To 
illustrate how hegemons operate this section constructs a life cycle for the hegemonic 
power. There is no strict time line for the rise and decline of a hegemon. Perhaps the 
modern world has sped the process somewhat but the cycle will still persist. It is at end of 
this cycle when we see malcontents begin to rise. During the closing stages the hegemon 
begins to use force and it is this use of force that contributes to the end of the order that 
the hegemon has built.  
  The third part of this work considers the malcontent itself. Within the context of 
hegemony we see three roles for other powers to fill. The first is the hegemonic follower, 
that power that accepts the order and benefits from it. The second is the challenger; a 
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power that exists outside the hegemonic order and feels it is strong enough to challenge 
the hegemonic order and the power of the hegemonic state. The final role is that of the 
malcontent. Malcontents can be former followers or simply small powers that desire to 
break out from under the hegemonic order. Good followership is essential for a strong 
order. An examination of the followers of the hegemon will give the interested observer a 
better idea of just how effective the hegemon is. The same idea goes for the malcontents. 
We can see just how weak the order is by examining the malcontents. This work divides 
the malcontent into three types: revolutionary, passive aggressive, and benign. The ways 
each of these three types will respond to the hegemon are different. But no matter the 
type the same end exists: to distance itself from the interference of the hegemonic state.  
 The final part of this project is a futures analysis. Futures analysis is, 
appropriately enough, an analysis of the future with planning for uncertainties that exist. 
This analysis uses a mix of quantitative methodology and narrative to give a possible 
picture of the future out to 20 years. This picture of the future is based on current events 
through the use of leads culled from various sources including mainstream media, 
academic and trade journals, think tank assessments, technology based sources, internet 
blogs, and any other reputable source of information. These leads are then assigned an 
impact score and numbers reflecting the uncertainty that exists with the impact score. 
These numbers are aggregated into a systems model that utilizes components that 
represent parts of the future we are trying to see. In the end a final set of scores will be 
produced for the systems model. From here we can analyze the future. After the final 
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numbers are calculated I then take these numbers and write a narrative scenario that gives 
one possible future.  
 My hope for this work is that it is universal in conception and particular in 
execution. The futures analysis methodology has not been applied to the field of 
international relations before. I hope I have wielded it effectively, and I would like to 
think it could be used again as an effective predictor. Malcontents of hegemony are a 
little studied phenomenon in a field that concentrates on the hegemons and challengers. 
This work will provide some structure to the theory of malcontents within the hegemonic 
order and how they can hasten the decline of that order. The use of force comes into play 
when a hegemon decides to use the stick to put a wayward small power in its place. Such 
use of strength signals that the rest of the options have been exhausted; that the political 
and economic might of hegemony is too feeble to work effectively. The use of force 
















The Britons watched the last of Rome‘s legions leave the isles around 400 C.E. This 
development was long in coming but nothing could prepare the Romano-British for the 
trepidation they certainly felt as Rome pulled back her borders. Britain had been made 
Roman through the force of arms but had adapted willingly to the culture and politics of 
the Empire. The legions provided defense against enemies outside the isles and the 
occasional, though rare, uprising within the isles. For all intents and purposed Britain was 
a full Romanized province; an integral and important part of the Empire. The Romano-
British had consented to Roman rule for the benefits it brought. The legions provided 
security; trade was made with the rest of the Empire and the culture of Rome spread 
throughout the islands.  
 Though Rome is characterized as an Empire, the rule over Britain was hegemonic 
in that the British largely consented and there was little need for physical force. This is 
the essence of hegemony, the rule of subordinate groups through their consent. Of course 
the interest of the ruler is first, but in order to rule effectively it is necessary to ensure that 
all groups, or at least the groups with the capacity to resist effectively, within the 
hegemonic order are satisfied as to the direction things are taking. The power of the 
hegemonic order comes from below, from the support and consent of the subordinate 
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groups within the order. The hegemon may need to make adjustments and enforce 
compliance on occasion. However the way that this is carried out must rely not on force 
but on the ability of the hegemonic group to punish the offender though methods that 
utilize economic and political pressure. Force is the last resort of a hegemon. The use of 
force by a hegemon is a signal that other means of enforcement, namely economic, 
cultural and political, have not been effective. In ancient times force may have been a key 
element to enforcing the will of the ruling group. But in the modern world that same use 
of force is a hindrance to the continuation of the hegemonic order.    
 In this chapter I explore the idea of hegemony as power through consent. The next 
chapter will explore hegemony within the context of International Relations and chapter 3 
will expound on the primary subject of this work; Hegemonic Malcontents.  The 
conception of hegemony comes from the Greeks, who passed it to, eventually, Antonio 
Gramsci. Through Gramsci hegemony became an alternate form of Marxist thought, 
detached from the strictly economic realm. For my work, Gramsci‘s hegemony adds a 
dimension of the cultural as an important element of hegemonic rule. Here I demonstrate 
that hegemony is based within civil society and herein its strongest roots lie. Civil 
Society is the element of the state that is crucial to political process yet is separate from 
the state. Religion, civic groups, and any multitude of organizations that exist in the 
modern state are part of civil society; it is these elements that feed the political side of the 
state and thus, the state itself.  It is within civil society that the forces of the hegemonic 
group and the native group clash; it is this battlefield where the idea of hegemonic 
malcontent comes from. The hegemonic malcontent, as will be expounded upon in 
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chapter 3, is a state or non-state group that is dissatisfied with the hegemonic order and, 
consequently, the hegemon. Though they take on various guises, malcontents feel that 
they need freedom from the hegemon to pursue national goals that satisfy the self-interest 
they have.  Hegemony is power through consent, and I intend to demonstrate how that 
consent is manufactured and perpetuated. Through this we can begin to understand why 
malcontents arise and what their specific problems are.      
  
Power through Consent 
 
 
Power is a most important idea within the theory of hegemony. Humans accumulate 
power as long as they believe in their own competence to handle the business in question. 
When they know themselves to be incompetent these people will follow a leader1. Of 
course, some men may be quite competent but the charisma and prestige of the leader 
may convince these people to fall in behind that leader. These men want that particular 
leader to show them the way, to lead them to whatever common interest they have. They 
invest power in a leader because they believe that leader will work in the benefit of all. 
Bertrand Russell makes the argument that for the law to be truly effective than it must 
have the support of the people2. If the people support the hegemon and the law that is 
spawned then there is what Russell terms traditional power and what De Jourenel stresses 
                                                 
1 Russell, Bertrand, Power: The Role of Man’s will to Power in the World’s Economic and Political Affairs, 
Norton and Company, New York, 1969. p. 19  
2 Russell, p. 38 
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as habit3.  It is this form of power that is created by consent and generates obedience to a 
particular leader to leaders. Force can establish power but only consent in the long-term 
can retain it.    
Consent is the crux of the concept of hegemony. Put simply hegemony is the 
dominance of one group over all other groups. The dominant group must persuade the 
subordinate groups to accept, adopt and internalize its values and norms. Hegemony 
implies that consent has been given, no matter how that consent is obtained. The most 
effective hegemonies in history are built with coercion as an implied tool, rarely used. An 
initial use of force to demonstrate its effectiveness is not unheard of and contributes to 
the implied threat. More commonly, however, other means to obtain consent are utilized 
including money payments, perhaps a cut of the rich economic pie, a defensive alliance, 
or spreading of the dominant culture to encapsulate the subordinate group.  
 There are two levels of hegemony employed in this work; one level is within the 
individual state, the other on the scale of the international. The state is composed of two 
major parts, political society and civil society. To achieve hegemony the dominant group 
must rise to power within civil society and then subsequently assume power in political 
society. Political society is the machine of the state, the bureaucracy, appointed offices, 
the budget; in short the ability to rule over the territory and people with the state. On the 
stage of world politics hegemony is similar. The dominant group must obtain consent 
from whatever means will enable long-term power to be established. Many concepts and 
ideas spread across both levels but on different scales.  
                                                 
3 Russell, p. 38 and De Jouenel, Bertrand, On Power: It’s Nature and the History of it’s Growth, The 
Viking Press, 1949. p. 25 
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The Greek Way 
 
 
The Greeks were the originators of the formal, scholarly concept of hegemony. Greek 
authors applied hegemony to both international relations and to society at large. Plato, 
writing in The Republic, believed the state to be all encompassing with the primary 
function it performed being the education of the people in the highest sense of the word4. 
It is impossible, writes Plato, to cut cloth from a poorly formed pattern5. From poor 
education comes a citizenry that is bereft of justice and knowledge to be efficient 
members of the polis.  Power in Plato‘s state was by consent of the people but rule was 
given to the philosophers, for only the philosophers were possessed of the knowledge and 
wisdom to rule in the best interests of the people. The individual was unimportant as 
compared to the whole. Consent was generated through keeping the whole happy through 
an educated, efficient, and therefore just, state6.  Plato was the genesis of the theory that 
hegemony is the dominance of one group over all others but with the interest of all in 
mind. This ideal would be changed in later centuries, sometimes to extremes that Plato 
could have little thought.       
Plato‘s student, Aristotle, wrote about two forms of rule, despotic and political. 
Despotic rule was servile; work is done for the master and there exists a sharp distinction 
between ruler and ruled7. Political, or constitutional, rule is just the opposite. In other 
                                                 
4 Wayper, C.L., Political Thought, Philosophical Library, New York, 1954. p. 22-23 
5 Wayper, p. 24 
6 Wayper, p. 29 
7 Aristotle (translated with an introduction by T.A. Sinclar), The Politics, Penguin Books, Suffolk, 1969. p. 
109. 
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words the ruler must first be ruled, only then is he fit to rule. This, in Aristotle‘s opinion, 
makes a good citizen; through this he understands the governing of free men by free 
men8. Political rule is Aristotle‘s version of hegemony; a leadership of equals in the 
interest of all9. Isocrates, the Greek orator, added to this with the belief that hegemony 
was closely interwoven with the generation and formulation of moral, cultural, 
intellectual, and educational ideas10. Free men, men brought up in democratic setting with 
a free exchange of ideas, rule hegemons. The very idea of democracy in the Greek 
tradition is a reflection of this. 
Plato, Aristotle and Isocrates represent a view of hegemony that is designed to 
encourage and continue democracy within the polis through the free exchange of ideas 
and words. Thucydides and his classic study of international politics, The Peloponnesian 
Wars represent the other side. The war between Athens and Sparta can easily be 
classified as a war between competing hegemonic states. Athens was an upstart naval 
power with a democratic system and an economy to match its expansive interests. As 
Athens expanded it came into conflict with the interests of Sparta, the traditional leader 
of Greece. Sparta was a fearsome opponent, with an economy based on slave labor and 
the most powerful land-based military presence on the Greek peninsula. Sparta was ready 
to defend her interests against Athenian encroachment. The resulting war, which lasted 
from 431 BCE to 404 BCE saw the defeat of Athens and the destruction of the hegemony 
                                                 
8 Aristotle, p. 109-110 
9 Fontanna, Benedetto, ―Hegemony in Gramsci‖, in Hegemony and Power, Hayward and Letner, eds. 2006, 
p, 25 
10 Fontanna, p. 25 
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that it had built. Sparta won but the war ultimately opened the door to Phillip the II of 
Macedon and his son, Alexander, to invade and conquer the Greeks.  
 Thucydides, in his examination of the war, believed that humans were driven by 
three fundamental passions, interest, pride and, above all else, fear11. All three of these 
come into play during the Peloponnesian War; indeed, all three passions were important 
to starting the Peloponnesian War. Sparta was the dominant power on the peninsula; after 
all, they had played a major role in organizing the defense against the Persians in the year 
preceding the Peloponnesian War.  The Persian War (490-478 BCE) had allowed Athens 
to catch up to Spartan dominance with leaps in military, technical and economic matters. 
The radically different domestic models of the two states (democracy versus despotism, 
naval versus land) meant that Athenian expansion would inevitably come into conflict 
with Spartan holdings. This conflict occurred because for Sparta to survive the ideas and 
culture Athens offered would have to stop from spreading to subordinate states. In short, 
Sparta saw a rising power that conflicted with their philosophy of rule and the base of 
power that made Sparta strong. The war saw both Athens and Sparta trade blows on both 
land and sea. It was only the ability of the Spartans to adapt to the sea and superb 
leadership that Athens was defeated.    
 The war ended the 5th century B.C.E. ―golden age‖ of Greece as well as the power 
of Athens. Sparta emerged as the dominant hegemonic state on the Greek peninsula, and 
was able to change the basis of power that characterized Greek politics from sea power 
and trade to land forces and slavery. The hegemonic war, as Robert Gilpin puts it, had 
                                                 
11 Gilpin, Robert, ―The Theory of Hegemonic War‖, in Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, 
(Spring, 1988), pp. 591-613. p. 593 
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given birth to a decisive outcome12. The Peloponnesian War illustrates what might 
happen when two competing and powerful hegemonies engage each other. The outcome 
radically restructured relations on the Greek peninsula and ended one of the most 
intellectually prosperous periods the world had known.  
 




Plato‘s all encompassing state is a utopia, not a practical means for governance in a world 
ruled by military force and realistic bent on the practice of politics. Instead the concept of 
the state is something more of an outgrowth of the community, more in the sprit of 
Locke‘s social contract13. With Locke the state is a machine constructed by man that 
takes man out his state of nature and into a situation where the consent of the community 
is needed to rule; otherwise the state will wither and die14. Grotius and Althusius were 
early advocates of the theory that power came from the community15. Grotius in 
particular believed that ultimate authority rested with the community. He later clarified 
this point by noting that this ultimate authority continues to exist even if the ruling 
Prince‘s line dies or power lost and even if, as commonly happens, another line takes its 
place16. However, the power of the Prince is recognized to be an outgrowth of the 
                                                 
12 Gilpin, p. 597 
13 Wayper, Political Thought… p. 71 
14 Wayper, p. 71 
15 Krabbe, H. The Modern Idea of the State, D. Appleton and Company, London, 1930. p. 18-20 
16 Krabbe, p. 20 
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organization of the community. In this way Grotius saw a separation between the 
sovereign/state and the community17.   
The exclusive use of force, that is the right to utilize violence as a tool to achieve 
goals, is a hallmark of the modern state and many ancient ones.  This monopoly on 
coercion through force is used to enforce the state‘s desires and goals. However the use 
of force is a measure of last resort. The state, which is born from political society, is only 
one part of a modern nation-state, the other being civil society. Civil society is the 
foundation of society through education, religion, academia, community groups, and 
many others. Civil society is those organizations that have no direct ties to the state 
through money or other direct influence. It must not be forgotten though the 
organizations and people within civil society exist within the boundaries of the state and 
therefore often permeated by the ideals and operations of the state whether they want to 
be or not. Nonetheless, civil society is still regarded as a separate entity from both the 
political and the state and to build any hegemony a power-seeker must ideally come from 
the web of organizations and people that are civil society.   
 Gibbon noted in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire that peace could not 
be secured without armies. This is very true. But securing peace and maintaining peace 
are two very different matters. Coercion often brings out the worst in how people act. If 
the people see a dominant group within society intervening through military measures 
there is a better chance that maintaining an effective and productive peace will fail as the 
people will want to resist such violent measures. This is how the concept of hegemony 
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fully comes into play. Instead of using force to come to power the dominant group 
instead generates the consent of the other groups to achieve power18. Force is only a last 
resort, a sparingly used tool that rarely achieves the desired result. Consent from below is 
given spontaneously to the general direction of social life imposed by the dominant 
fundamental group by all other groups within society19. This spontaneous consent is 
given because of the prestige the dominant group enjoys within the society it inhabits20. 
The dominant group‘s war for consent is an ongoing phenomenon that involves the 
production, reproduction and mobilization of popular consciousness towards the society 
that the dominant group envisions21.  
 Political society is the result of the dominant group‘s creation of hegemony. 
Political society is intertwined with the state, for all of the elements of political society 
are funded and cultivated by the state22. The civil service, the welfare system, and the 
military are examples of political society23. Building and maintaining hegemony within 
political society is easy for the dominant group controls the state and can produce and 
maintain its culture in state funded and controlled entities. The realization of hegemony 
will give the state an official culture, one that is endorsed and maintained by the 
dominant social group and is consented to by the majority of other elements in society. 
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Maintaining hegemony over political society is an easy matter; if an element strays from 
the official party line then the state can simply cut support from that rogue component.  
 Civil Society is where hegemony is realized far more fully by the dominant group. 
Civil society is comprised of other organizations within the social formation that are 
neither part of the processes of material production, meaning the labor and the economic 
infrastructure of society, nor part of any state funding24. These are long-lasting 
institutions that are supported and ran by people outside of the state. The largest 
organizations within the civil sphere are generally religious institutions and media outlets 
not controlled or funded by the state. In many states there exists a close relationship 
between the secular and the religious, state sponsorship of religion. In this case, the 
church would not be part of civil society. Civil society is the space where consent is 
generated through the complex construction of political projects and social alliances25. 
The hegemony of a social group over the whole national society is exercised in part 
through the private organizations.  
 Political and civil society creates structures that are connected through hegemony 
and the groups that realize that hegemony through the obtaining of consent from other 
elements in society26. Hegemony is not created but realized through a dominant social 
group with enough prestige and consent to generate acceptance with the populace in 
general. Once in a position of power the dominant group must keep that consent in order 
to achieve whatever goals it has set. Certain projects will, of course, be less popular than 
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others. In order to complete these projects the dominant social group must generate 
consent throughout society. Within civil society consent it made through political projects 
and social alliances. Other groups and individuals will be regularly co-opted into the 
official culture to ensure continued interpenetration between political and civil society. 
Without a proper relationship between the state, political society and civil society there is 
only one method of generating consent left to the dominant group; that of force.  
 
Gramsci and Croce 
 
 
Antonio Gramsci was a sickly, hunchbacked Italian born into a working class family in 
1891 on the island of Sardinia. Swept up in the Italian Communist movement during the 
First World War he quickly rose to the leadership of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in 
the 1920s. The Fascists tolerated the PCI and other socialists in the early ‗20s; this 
quickly changed and Gramsci was imprisoned while other communists and socialists fled 
or suffered a similar fate. His already fragile health was put in serious jeopardy while in 
Mussolini‘s prisons; it was during this time, however, that he wrote some of his additions 
to the theories of Marxism.  
 Gramsci took the concept of hegemony and greatly expanded it. Under Gramsci 
hegemony was sculpted so as to represent an alternative method of revolution for the 
proletariat. Karl Marx based his original ideas of socialism on economics. Relations 
between the working and ruling classes, to Marx, are based on who controlled the mode 
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of production. Economics were the base, the foundation on which everything else was 
built. Marx‘s progression of history was based entirely on the relationship of the social 
classes within the means and mode of production. The capitalists owned the means of 
production and therefore could exercise control of the working class. The class 
consciousness that the worker possess will, in Marx‘s work, lead to a revolution and the 
next stage of history; that of communism.  
 Control of the economics, that is the mode of production, would lead to control of 
society, whether it is socialism, capitalism or communism. The concept of hegemony as 
articulated by Gramsci took this into an entirely different direction. Gramsci sought to 
find a new sociopolitical order within a fragmented Italian and European reality27. He 
concentrated on the power differences and power dynamics within society and how 
power persists and develops over time. Gramsci sought to distance himself from the 
positivist view of history, which is the examination of history through strict scientific 
method, through this examination of power28.  With this firmly in mind Gramsci was 
adding a new dimension to the Marxist base of theory instead of a strict economic 
relationship the idea that culture could move history along was brought in.  
 The effect Gramsci had on Marx‘s idea of ideology was five fold, the first being 
the shift from the intellectual plane of philosophical systems to the formation of popular 
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consciousness or common sense29. Second was a de-emphasis on the Marxist idea of 
ideology as a coherent and integrated system. Thirdly Gramsci took the ideological 
struggle and began to view it as a practical engagement to bring about shifts and 
modifications in common sense or popular consciousness. Fourth was the concept that 
ideologies are an active process that organizes the masses and help create political terrain 
in which men can maneuver while they acquire popular consciousness and struggle to 
bring about change. Finally Gramsci tried to bring about a more positive view of 
ideology versus Marx‘s rather negative view of such.  
 The case of Benedetto Croce serves as a good example of the concept of 
hegemony as elaborated by Gramsci. Croce was an idealist philosopher, politician and 
critic and through these outlets created an intellectual hegemony that came to dominate 
Italian culture in the mid-20th century30. Croce sought to buck what he called the ―official 
culture‖, that is the culture within Italian Universities and other centers dominated by the 
state. He sought to build an intellectual culture on what he called the laity, the men of 
letters outside of the official bastions of learning. This was part of Risorgimento, the 
continuing Italian unification into the 20th century. Croce‘s aim was to open a cultural 
front in conjunction with the political and economic front. To this end Croce founded the 
magazine of La Critica which he was a major contributor to, to ensure that it would have 
a definite direction31. The magazine was a weapon of war in Croce‘s battle against his 
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primary foes, ―naturalists, free masons, and positivists‖. His goal was to construct a 
culture that espoused his own ideas of the superiority of art over the natural sciences and 
his conception of history as the only conceptual and genuine form of knowledge, against 
the ―false liberalism‖ within Italy that was based off a positivist view of the world32.  
 Croce was successful in is endeavor for in addition to La Critica he started a 
publishing house to further his intellectual views. No less than guiding a disoriented 
culture into a determinate point of view, Croce‘s view that is, was Croce‘s ultimate goal. 
And, to a large extent, he succeeded. The philosophers he sponsored and encouraged, 
Giambattista Vico, Francesco de Sanctis, and Silvio and Betrando Spaventa, all became 
well known and indeed, these men are some of the well known idealist philosophers in 
Italy even well in the second half of the 20th century33. Croce‘s publishing house and La 
Critica became the voice of Southern Italy for the intellectuals. The idea of hegemony 
implies a certain hostility to a free marketplace of ideas. In Croce‘s case there was, quite 
simply, no other intellectual outlet in Southern Italy with the impact and size of what he 
had created. This success illustrates how Croce‘s viewpoint became part of the 
mainstream culture of the Italian intellectual community.  
 Croce‘s idea of intellectual hegemony illustrates how a culture, with a singular 
viewpoint and drive, can come to dominate other cultures. Gramsci based some of his 
work upon Croce and was, seemingly, envious of Croce‘s success. Gramsci noted in the 
South there exists only the publishing house of Laterza (Croce‘s aforementioned 
publishing house) and the journal La Critica; there are academies and cultural groups of 
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great erudition34. By viewing Croce‘s success we can perhaps see the consequences of 
Gramsci‘s theoretical musings. However Gramsci took the concept of hegemony above 
and beyond what the Greeks and Croce had ever thought.  
 Gramsci believed that most every person, whether worker or peasant, has the 
capacity to be an intellectual. Some people, however, are greater organizers and 
possessed of a higher sense of social elaboration than others35. This higher sense is what 
makes the average man capable of forming hegemony. There are, according to Gramsci, 
historically formed specialized categories for the expression of intellectual function36. 
Croce exploited this by his diffusion of Italian philosophy and thought to the select 
intellectuals outside of the official culture of the time. Because of this he was able to 
form a powerful voice based around the ideas he wished to spread.  
 Gramsci and Croce represent the Italian roots of the concept of hegemony as it is 
currently understood. Born in a time of political turmoil following the end of the First 
World War, hegemony helped to describe what Gramsci saw occurring in Europe. The 
old rule was brought down and in its place were a thousand little groups struggling for 
dominance. The fascists became textbook cases of a rise to power through consent. Their 
power was not through gangs of toughs in colored shirts but through their ability to 
appeal directly to the masses and the individual suffering through the Great Depression. 
The power of the fascists came through the consent they obtained from the rest of the 
nation.  
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Marx believed that power came from an economic base or, more commonly, the means of 
production37. As Gramsci and Croce demonstrated through theory and practice this notion 
was not entirely true. The desire for power and glory can be separated from commodities 
and economic self-interest38. Power relationships are asymmetrical in that the power 
holder will always exercise greater control over the behavior of the power subject39. The 
means of power is important, but the end is almost always described as the same; the 
common good. The submissiveness of those subject to the power of the dominant group 
is based on seeking out and deferring to whomever is most likely to achieve the common 
good40.  
 Power relations can be divided into three attributes, breadth, comprehensiveness 
and intensity41.  An extensive power relationship asks the question ―how many rule how 
many?‖. The comprehensive aspect is based on the total conduct and life activity the 
power holder controls in the existence of the power subject. The intensity of a power 
aspect is the range of effective options open to the power holder within each and every 
scope of life of the power subject over which power is wielded42. George Orwell‘s 1984 
provides us with an example of a society that has very extensive, comprehensive and 
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intense control over the power subjects by an small and unknown body of power holders. 
Big Brother is ever present, all seeing and in total, absolute control of Oceania. 1984 is 
used as an example of a totalitarian state. Civil liberties represent a roadblock to the 
comprehensiveness and intensity of power, a roadblock that is absent in Orwell‘s 
dystopian fantasy.  
 Both Russell and Wrong advance different divisions of power43. Both agree on 
force as a major division. Force, both physical and biological, is the creation of physical 
obstacles that restrict the freedom of another. The actual use of force is different, 
however, from the threat of force. Military and police power fall in this category. 
Manipulation is Wrong‘s second category44. Manipulation is where the power holder 
conceals his intent from the subject he is trying to manipulate. Wrong believes that the 
subject cannot resist this form of power, yet he also maintains this is the weakest of his 
three categories. Russell uses a similar idea: that of rewards and punishments as 
inducements to for one to subject themselves to the power holders wishes. However this 
is not conducted exclusively without the power subject‘s knowledge. Finally both authors 
categorize persuasion as a final aspect of power. Here the use of arguments, appeals and 
exhortations are used in conjunction with the subject‘s goals and values to produce a 
desired result45. Persuasion relies on the subject‘s free acceptance and choice and thus 
can be limited in how extensive it can be.    
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 The rise of Hitler in the 1930s illustrates just how a power holder comes to 
supremacy using the three elements of power. The Nazi program generated persuasion 
among the general populace with inducements that gained the consent of the nation. The 
use of the existing party of Social Democrats under Hindenburg was a ready-made flock 
of sheep, according to Russell, that followed their leader towards the acceptance of 
Hitler46. The victims of the concentration camps, not just Jews but also political 
dissidents and others deemed unrecoverable by the Nazi hierarchy, represented the use of 
force. Finally the manipulation of the educational system helped to generate consent for 
the Nazis in many other aspects of German life. Their economic situation was improved, 
education was regulated and any vocal opposition was removed often with the proper 
justification, through democratic and legal means, secured and common interest as the 
reason.    
  
The Generation of Consent 
 
 
Machiavelli, in his seminal work The Prince, emphasized the need for the ruler to remain 
within the good graces of his people. In particular he cites the story of Oliverotto de 
Fermo47. Oliverotto de Fermo plotted and schemed to kill his uncle, then Prince of the 
city of Fermo in central Italy. After he had his uncle and other powerful men in Fermo 
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killed, Oliverotto ruled his new domain through unspecified doses of what Machiavelli 
calls ―fear and violence‖48. He made sure to not only kill the chief citizens but also any 
and all malcontents to his rule as well as strengthening civil and military ordinances to 
his own benefit. Despite his use of fear through force and coercion Oliverotto was 
strangled to death by a group of angered citizenry almost one year to the day after he took 
power. The message Machiavelli sought to impart in his royal readers was that odious 
Princes do not stay in power long. They are not safe from threats that exist both within 
and without. A Prince, to be truly successful in Machiavelli‘s mind, must both be loved 
and feared and take special care to avoid arousing the hatred of his people49. Having 
proper justification to utilize violence and leaving the property of potential supporters 
untouched were, in Machiavelli‘s mind, essential to maintaining power. People have a 
―zone of acceptance‖ that places limits how intense and how comprehensive power 
relationships are50. 
  Dominant groups enjoy power through the generation and maintenance of 
consent. Here we can reinforce the notion that consent is the crux of the entire concept of 
hegemony. For a hegemon to exist at all a significant amount of consent must be 
generated from the masses. Generating consent can be difficult and depends on the 
popularity of the course of action that the state wants to take. An example would be the 
initiation of an unpopular action by the state. In advance a suitable public opinion is 
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created and through this certain elements of civil society are brought into the unpopular 
action and persuaded to support it51.  
 Mobilizing this consent is often done through the media. When Gramsci wrote 
about hegemony he mentioned radio and the ―yellow‖ press, both powerful forces in the 
early and mid-twentieth century52. This is much the same today, except that radio has 
been regulated to a third position behind television and the internet. The media in modern 
society is a force that plays an important role in the generation of consent.  
 As the First World War raged on in 1917 the majority of the American people 
were against entering what was, to them, an obviously European matter. The job of 
convincing Americans into throwing their lot in with the Allies fell to a man named 
George Creel. Creel was a publisher and head of the Committee for Public Information 
and in his book, How We Advertised America; Creel described his efforts in generating 
consent for the war against Germany53. His success in selling the First World War to 
America caused considerable interest among other parties, most notably Adolph Hitler. 
Techniques like using phrases to create public opinion can help win the masses, for 
example Harry Truman‘s labeling of the Korean Conflict as a ―Police Action‖ and 
Hitler‘s definition Russia as ―The Red Menace‖ both fit into this category54. The use of 
persuasion and propaganda is not the only method of generating consent. However it is a 
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telling example of just how the state can generate support for action when such action is 
unpopular.  
 Pratkins and Aronson55 use the example of Imelda Marcos‘s shoes as a shining 
example of how the news media will often employ vivid imagery versus thoughtful 
discussion. The racks upon racks of shoes that the wife of the deposed Philippine dictator 
owned entered the American consciousness as an example of the excesses of a regime 
that few in the general public knew anything else about. The focus upon such a visual 
symbol is an example of the selectivity of the news media. There must be a barrier, such 
as the media, between the masses and the event in order to establish some form of 
propaganda. This barrier filters and manipulates information as it is passed down to civil 
society. The news media, whether it is conscious of it or not, represents the frontline of 
establishing consent to a certain point of view, whether that view is of the dominant 
group within society or simply the editor of the paper with an agenda. If a group is 
actively seeking a foothold with the masses the establishment of publishing houses and 
other sources of news are essential. Benedetto Croce established himself as the reigning 
intellectual because of his publishing house and magazine. Hitler helped to establish the 
Third Reich because of his publishing houses and rewards to journalists willing to 
cooperate with the Nazi regime56.   
 Gramsci noted that the Government can often mobilize the support of the mass 
media and other associated ideological instruments partly because various elites share 
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similar worldviews and life styles57.  It can be argued that the same dominant group that 
controls the government will also have at least a foothold in the media. However the 
media is an integral part of civil society and some of the most controversial media 
sources are often pitted against the dominant group in charge of the state. In today‘s 
highly technological world, where news is delivered quickly, the government must be 
adept at handling the media. As noted above, the media is very good at presenting 
compelling visual images. Instead of asking serious questions about the support of the 
Marcos regime in the Philippines and how they received support from the west, the media 
focused on the ostentatious wealth of the regime that helped to bring about its downfall.  
 Consent breeds power, as Adolph Hitler knew only too well. So did Mussolini 
and so does any other dictator brought to power through popular means, such as an 
election. In modern western democracies consent is needed to accomplish any number of 
tasks that the government deems necessary. The United State‘s involvement in the 
Republic of Vietnam is an example of generating and ultimately losing consent. The 
Vietnam conflict was supposed to be an example in Eisenhower‘s domino theory of 
communist aggression. If one small country fell to communism, the theory went, and then 
the region would soon fall to communism. The fall of French Indo-China in 1954 with 
the battle of Dien Bien Phu led to a situation where there was a split nation, the 
communist North Vietnam and the democratic South. The United States soon began 
sending advisors, then contingents of troops to the South to bolster a corrupt government 
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and a flagging military effort. By the time the United States left in 1975 very few people 
were convinced that any involvement had been necessary.  
In the early 1960s the war in Vietnam was pitched the American people as a 
needed effort to forestall communism in Asia. The Commander of MACV (Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam), William Westmoreland, was confident that the conflict 
in Vietnam would be won in 1968. As the local New Year approached the North 
Vietnamese launched the ―Tet Offensive‖ of January 1968 catching the Americans and 
South Vietnamese forces unprepared and off guard. The North‘s offensive was a military 
failure, with every major objective Northern forces captured quickly taken back. The 
Revolutionary Forces, commonly known as the Viet Cong, were nearly destroyed. In a 
conventional military sense the Tet offensive proved a costly failure. But in the context of 
the Vietnam War it was an absolute, utter victory. Why? The American government had 
labored long and hard to convince the American people of the necessity of the war. Part 
of this convincing was the presence of hard dates for a victory and subsequent withdrawal 
for American forces. Tet caught the American military so off guard that it appeared 
obvious that any deadline for victory was arbitrary. Walter Cronkite, in his position as 
anchor of CBS evening news, pronounced the war as ―unwinnable‖. This pronouncement 
by the mainstream media effectively sealed the fate of the American effort. Richard 
Nixon‘s 1968 Presidential campaign was based on ―peace with honor‖ and American 
withdrawal. The power of the American effort was eroded to the point where a policy of 
―Vietnamization‖, in other words handing responsibility over to an ill-prepared and 
corrupt South Vietnam, was perceived as the only way to end the war. 
 31 




We can look at two examples to demonstrate how resources do not equate with power in 
hegemony. The Persians were possessed of both resources and the power to govern over 
states and cities that acquiesced to their rule. Xerxes had power; the power to persuade 
Greek city states to come under his rule without a fight, the power to rule a vast and 
varied empire such as Persia58. Though the invasion of Greece was a failure the simple 
fact is that Xerxes still possessed enough power to both rule his kingdom and lose his war 
against the Greeks without any ill effects, save for prestige. In fact Xerxes ruled for 15 
more years until deposed by his nobles. The American effort in Vietnam is a different 
example with a distinctly different outcome. Despite seemingly limitless resources and 
massive troop numbers the war was lost against an enemy who was far less 
technologically sophisticated. In the American example the fallout from the war and 
backlash from an angry public helped end a Presidency and hurt the morale of the US 
armed forces until the early 1980s.  
 Resources, however limitless, do not equal power to accomplish policy goals or to 
govern59. Discourses other than coercion help to ensure that power is not essentially tied 
to military strength, or more simply, force to enable goals to be achieved. Hegemony is a 
concept that is dependant on the force of consent to achieve what the state wants. Both 
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economics and coercion are not the ends of the hegemony. Instead we can look at what is 
called a language of discourse60. This shared discourse helps to write people into a mode 
of interpretation that reinforces particular relations of dominance61.  
 This discourse can be used to create counter hegemony against the dominant 
group. Society within the state is a marriage between the dominant group and the 
subordinate groups that share a common will and material resources. A discourse among 
select elements of this society will help to create certain ideas. For example discourse 
among a number of elements of a state may begin to ideas of nationalism and modernity. 
Ireland in the late 19th and 20th centuries is a good example of this. Despite Britain‘s 
ability to govern huge territories like India with surprisingly tiny numbers, the discourse 
of Irish nationals proved overwhelming for the colonial government. In response Britain 
used coercion in the form of such things like the notorious ―Black and Tans‖ to break up 
any ideas of Irish nationalism. Despite the resources available the British failed and 
granted independence to Ireland in 1922.      
 The British effort to keep Ireland within the Empire proves a very important point 
about the nature of power and the ability to maintain hegemony. Power, that is the power 
to maintain hegemony, will decrease through the use of violence62. Power is a non-zero 
sum game and within this game power will wither through the use of violence. Violence 
is easy for a society possessed of superior physical resources. In the short-term using 
coercion and, consequently, violence to achieve goals is a perfectly feasible idea. In the 
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long run such usage of aggression becomes dangerous. The Royal Irish Constabulary 
Reserve (unofficially known as the Black and Tans) mentioned above were groups of 
men, many former British soldiers in the First World War, who were assigned to bolster 
the Royal Irish Constabulary in the fight against the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Many 
Irish viewed the Black and Tans as an occupation force in the wake of the failed 1916 
Easter Uprising. The tactics used by the RICR were harsh, including the burning and 
sacking of small Irish towns as reprisals for Irish Republican activities. These were tough 
men who used tactics ill suited to keeping public opinion high. Indeed the actions taken 
by the Black and Tans contributed to British concessions ultimately ending in Irish 
independence. Instead of coercing the Irish, the RICR‘s methods incited more nationals 
to fight the colonial forces. The tough tactics employed hardened the Irish further and 
ultimately helped to fuel the fires of independence from Britain.   
 The use of the means of violence is a hallmark of the state. Gramsci described the 
state as the outer defense of civil society63. The means of violence is there to protect the 
state and all that it contained. If the state chooses to turn the means of violence inward, 
against civil society, then obviously there is an issue with the hegemony of the dominant 
class. Whatever the problem the discourse that spawned the use of coercion was a signal 
that the historic bloc, which is the fusing of the dominant class and subordinate classes by 
a common ideology, will, and material resources, is possibly at an end. The more 
violence is used the more gap appears and thus, the better the chance that the counter-
hegemony will win.  
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 If a power is to adequately govern a people, group or territory that is not wholly 
fused into the hegemon then that group must have minimal national discourse amongst 
itself. National discourse is the dialogue among groups of people who consider 
themselves united, either by religion, like Israel, or by ethnicity, like the Kurds.  Nations 
within states, such as the Quebecois in Canada and Chechnya within Russia, are often 
able to find their national voice and express their discontent with the current state of the 
political society in their state. Chechnya and Quebec have taken two very divergent 
routes in their quest to break off from their respective states. Quebec is on the edge of 
finding their national voice yet not quite ready to take the plunge as a separate entity. The 
history and democratic nature of Canada seemingly ensures that if such a choice is for 
separation then that choice will be honored by the state. The desire for a nation within 
Chechnya is an altogether different matter with violence being used to squelch the desire 
to move away from Russia. This has had very mixed and almost entirely negative results 
for both Chechnya and Russia. Russia has possessed little power to actually govern 
Chechnya yet has been able to amass the physical resources to force them back into the 
Russian state. Here violence, overwhelming, devastating physical violence, has proven to 








Real, long term power comes through the consent of the subordinate groups within 
society. Hegemony is built through the dominant group‘s efforts to instill its wants, 
needs, fears and desires into the rest of the community. This enables a strong, unified 
state that is created through the building of an extensive trench network of civil society 
surrounded by the outer defenses of the state. Without the consent of civil society the 
lifespan of the dominant group will be, to borrow from Hobbes, short, nasty and brutish 
as violence is used to keep power in lieu of the consent of the rest of society. The power 
to govern and rule is made through consent, not the proliferation of resources and the 
ability to manage violence.  
 Hegemony is a fickle force within social theory. There is a certain inevitability to 
the dissolution of hegemony. The ability to rule is finite, as many kings, presidents, 
dictators and parliaments have discovered. Ruling through the obtaining of consent will 
help to guarantee a stronger and more stable rule. The need to have the support of the 
people without the overt and continued use of violence is essential to a prosperous and 










In the world of declining American hegemony the phenomenon of hegemonic 
malcontents is on the rise. The hegemonic malcontent is a subordinate power that has 
consciously decided to exercise its own national goals apart from the order of the 
reigning hegemon. Most often time malcontents exist under the hegemonic order with a 
certain degree of unwillingness. They may have been compelled into the order through 
military force or economic necessity. Whatever the reason the malcontent has always had 
the thought of breaking out from what they view as an oppressive existence. Other 
malcontents may be former followers of the hegemon. The followers may have 
experienced an internal change of government or simply may seek to find their fortune 
elsewhere.  
 Malcontents of hegemony are often among the reasons for the decline of 
hegemonic order. Their activity both outside the order and against the order will help to 
underline the developing weakness of hegemony leading other subordinate powers to 
begin pursuing their destiny elsewhere. Not every malcontent will succeed, of course. 
Many times the hegemon is able to punish the malcontent and keep the status quo within 
their order. Most hegemons are able to do this through political and economic means 
while they are at the peak of their power. As that power declines the economic and 
political power to keep troublesome subordinates in line is sapped. Without other means, 
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physical force in the form of military action can be used against the malcontent. Military 
action is the most effective act of keeping order, but also the most damaging to the 
hegemon and the order it maintains. Military force signals that a decline may be 
happening based on the lack of effective options in the economic and political realms. 
Physical force also impacts the other subordinate powers, it outrages them that such 
means would be used; it also demonstrates that the hegemon is willing to resort to such 
measures to enforce compliance.  
The first chapter of this work outlined a theoretical discussion of hegemony. This 
chapter will build on that by talking about hegemony and hegemonic malcontents within 
the context of International Relations. The initial part of this chapter will build a 
framework of hegemony within the context of international relations. Ensconced in this 
framework will be three models of malcontents, which will be discussed in the following 
chapter. Each of these models will portray a different kind of malcontent, from the overt 
revolution to the subtle distancing.   
Hegemonies that wish to maintain their world order effectively must be prepared 
to wage battle in every sense of the word. If I may slip into a more Gramscian 
phraseology, hegemonies must fight on both cultural and ideological fronts as well as the 
material and economic fronts. Incorporating other groups, nations and states into the 
hegemonic world order is a task that must be undertaken with determination and with an 
eye towards the definition of hegemony. Inevitably there will be a group that resents such 
intrusion into their own goals. They will seek to exercise these goals when they believe 
the time is right. A weakness in the centaur of hegemony will become the impetus for 
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these malcontents to exercise their particular goal. The methods that the hegemon uses to 
deal with them will help the rest of the world to determine how healthy and stable the 
hegemony is. The use of force against hegemonic malcontents is a sign of weakness and 
often the start of a decline.  
 
The Social Construction of International Relations 
 
 
Hegemonies are able to form precisely because they have qualities that make other 
groups within the system want to follow them. These traits include nearly all the 
dimensions of power that make following such a dominant group an easy decision for 
most. When a state creates hegemony it does so because it has been able to fill a vacuum 
in world politics. This leads to the first question that we must answer, namely how do 
hegemonies emerge from the great morass of nations and states? Hegemonies generally 
emerge in periods of unstable relations. Here the hegemon is experiencing an 
encroachment on the hierarchy of power by other, smaller powers due to a number of 
factors. This translates into the undermining of the position of the hegemonic state64. 
Major wars cause dramatic shifts in economic, military and political power65. Whether 
these wars come from the erosion of hegemony or from a balance of power situation the 
end result is usually a new set of major power(s) on the world stage.  
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 What kind of environment does this change take place in? Classical theories of 
international politics, like E.H. Carr‘s realism and utopianism, have been supplemented 
with a slew of other ideas. Hegemons do not develop in a vacuum of states randomly 
bumping into each other, like a demolition derby at a rural county fair. There are no 
systematic sets of rules that dictate world politics. To be fair we must strike a balance 
between these two extremes in order to explain why hegemonies rise and how they 
accumulate followers.   
  Theorists like Carr believe that international politics is a great anarchical arena, 
where historical cause and effect dictate how players will act66. The primary actors are 
states, sovereign and free who interact with each other but on the assumption that the end 
result of whatever is done will be in the national interest. Non-state actors are not seen as 
important within the arena of states. Security and self-interest is the primary 
consideration of the statesman in the world of the realist. Power is the primary aspect of 
hegemony, power through the consent of the followers. Taking a cue from the classical 
realists we can say that, perhaps, the followers in a hegemonic system follow the biggest 
kid on the block for he can provide a measure of protection, economic stability and fair 
hand to settle arguments among the followers. The absence of any central political 
authority on the international stage can be seen as to dictate such behavior among states. 
After all, one must look out for themselves if they are to survive and, perhaps, prosper.  
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 Revisions of this theory have taken place. Neorealism has reconfigured the 
anarchical stage into an anarchical system that has little sympathy for states that do not 
seek to help themselves67. But some authors argue that the anarchy of realism is a 
creation of states within the system. The creation and perpetration of identity helps to 
drive willing states towards an anarchical system68. If a state develops itself in a 
particular identity, say that of a crusader for democracy, then that conception of itself will 
help to shape its interests69. The social context that a state or non-state actor exists in will 
help to define reaction to situations they will face. Interests are defined in the process of 
defining situations70.  If a factory worker in a Ford plant near Detroit has an interest in 
assembling car doors, possessing Union membership or cleaning up at the end of work 
day we are saying that the worker has to define certain situations as calling for certain 
actions. This does not mean that the worker will necessarily do so, but if they do not then 
they will not get promotion and perhaps lose their job71.  The concept of identity is 
perhaps the key to Wendt‘s theory of politics.  
 In a more international relations role we can see this idea in the end of the Cold 
War. When the Soviet Union collapsed the United States lost the environment of threats 
and hostility that helped to generate the identity of a democratic nation against the forces 
of communism and totalitarianism. Without a situation to build an identity off of the 
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United States began to become unsure of exactly how to define itself, and its interests, in 
a post-Cold War world. Without a situation that can help define interests the ability for a 
player to form an identity is hindered. The United States kept preparing for the Cold War 
for years after the Soviet Union was gone. The massive investment in weapons was 
geared towards the kind of apocalyptic conflict that was almost counted upon to occur in 
Europe against the forces of Communism. A new world emerged after the demise of the 
Soviet Union but without a concrete environment to base a new identity off of the United 
States was a superpower without a cause; only the events of the terrorist attack on the 
World Trade Center changed this. Of course this leans both ways; the start of the 21st 
century has seen Russia begin to construct a new identity as well, one based on 
resurrecting the Cold War and, presumably, the glory and achievement that the former 
Soviets believe surrounded it.  
 Institutions represent a set of structures that are relatively stable in form72. 
Combining both identities and interests, institutions often have these formalized into rules 
and norms. The stability of such institutions is dependant on the willingness of the people 
involved to participate in collective knowledge and their level of socialization. 
Institutions represent what the actors within them collectively ―know‖ about the world73. 
Institutionalization is a process whereby the actors within internalize new identities and 
interests. A choice thus exists for institutions viewed as such; they can be cooperative or 
conflictual. This idea places the concept of institutions outside of the norm in that 
traditionally most institutions with international relations are seen as cooperative entities. 
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Institutions play a crucial part in the creation of hegemony through their tying of the 
order together into the hegemon‘s political and civil society. This helps create the 
structure that binds the hegemonic order together.  
    Institutions as described here are not organizations like the United Nations or 
Amnesty International. Instead institutions are geared more toward concepts like the 
above idea of ―self-help‖ within a primarily anarchical stage. Various structures of 
identity and interest exist under anarchy, the primary one being self-preservation and/or 
security. Within the institution of ―self-help‖ states treat security as the responsibility of 
each other. Politics, and the manipulation of power, will be to satisfy self-regarding 
interests in such institutions. This is contrasted with cooperative institutions of collective 
security, where the security of each is accorded to the responsibility of all74. The use of 
power depends on what type of institution is being formed. The world situation in 1939 
was very much a ―self-help‖ situation where states sought power and security as the 
primary motivation for action. The Russo-Finnish war of 1939-1940 was based on such a 
fear. Stalin was convinced that Finland was going to ally with Germany, the only power 
able to realistically threaten the Soviet Union at the time. The diplomatic maneuvers 
broke down because the Finns would not give in to any Soviet demands. Stalin saw this 
as suspicious and added it to an already large amount of evidence he believed he had. 
This prompted the invasion of Finland and after a hard fight by the Finnish army the 
Soviets eventually gained the upper hand and were able to dictate the terms on which the 
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war ended75. Stalin knew that to preserve the Soviet Union and to ensure the best security 
if war did occur with Germany he had to eliminate the threat he perceived coming from 
the nearest potential German ally, Finland. In the atmosphere of pre-World War II 
Europe Stalin‘s actions were thoroughly grounded in the identity of the Soviet Union as a 
direct competitor to Germany and consequently Finland, who had flirted with fascism, 
was seen as a danger to Soviet interests.  
 Interaction is dependant on the dynamic normative interpretation of the above 
material world76. The international stage is not trans-historically given to us but instead is 
socially constructed by humans through actions and words77. Anarchy, which Waltz takes 
for granted, is just as artificial as Morgenthau‘s power politics. Both ideas are constructed 
institutions by the players within. There is an a priori reality within this theory that serves 
as base for the meaning that is generated by human actions and words. Action is only 
meaningful though when placed in an intersubjectively shared context78. Words can be 
used either in place of or as an addition to deeds and action to help construct the social 
world79.  
 The constructivist argument does share one trait with other theories of 
International Relations, namely the state-centric attitude. States are the primary movers 
and shakers in the arena in world politics by most accounts. However when discussing 
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hegemony and malcontents thereof we must also expand the definition of ―actor‖ when 
discussing international relations. Changes in the collective identity of societal actors 
transform the interest of relevant collective actors that constitute the system80. Members 
help to condition the group interests, with respect to the groupings within society and, 
especially, within the state81. The identity of individuals is partly defined by their 
collective identity82. States form a society, but the individual will only partly identify 
with the state. He will have other identities depending on group affiliation. In this way we 
see how extra-state groups arise and begin to play an important role in constructing 
international relations. A very good example of this is terrorist groups with a religious 
motivation, like Al-Queada. A member may partly identify with his nationality but will 
identify much more strongly with his religion and the norms of the group. Take some 
thousands of members and this group has the potential to affect world events, like Al-
Queada has.  
The Life Cycle of Hegemony 
 
 
The life cycle of hegemony is an important issue when talking about malcontents. There 
is no set timetable to the rise and fall of hegemonic power. The modern world has, 
perhaps, sped up the process somewhat. The rise and fall of major powers used to take 
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millennia83. Now the life of a hegemon can take only a few decades as evidenced by the 
decline of the United States in the 21st century. Hegemons do possess a discernable life 
cycle; they rise because of a major war, experience a stable period of expansion and 
plenty and then begin a decline, which can vary in the speed it occurs. For such powers 
economics is closely tied into the other elements of hegemonic order84. Hegemonic states 
rise because of historical events (like major war) and the ability to maximize their 
economic base. The ability to capitalize on these is what makes hegemons hegemonic85.   
 Some contend that hegemony is a revolving cycle, one hegemonic state rises, 
peaks, declines and leads into the next hegemonic state86.  In Paul Kennedy‘s theory the 
last two centuries are divided into four distinguishable time periods:  
1. 1845-1875:  Hegemonic with a world economy centered on Great Britain. The 
economic doctrines that were espoused were consistent with British supremacy, yet 
universal in form. Britain not only held the balance of power in Europe but also ruled the 
sea. This dominance translated into the British having the ability to enforce obedience for 
the rules of the market in peripheral states. 
2. 1875-1945: This time period saw the above reversed with other countries challenging 
British supremacy. The balance of power held previously was de-stabilized. Instead of 
British free trade the specter of protectionism began to attain dominance in trade policies 
of Europe and elsewhere. The world economy began to fragment into economic blocs.     
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3. 1945-1965: The United States founds a hegemonic order similar to Britain‘s in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. Institutions and doctrines are kept, yet adjusted to fit 
a more complex world order.   
4. 1965 – present:  Here the American hegemonic order begins to break down as the 
smaller states are able to assert themselves following the recovery from the devastation of 
the Second World War. Economic troubles such as the oil crisis and the US going off the 
gold standard all take their toll on American hegemony. Essentially this is the start of a 
decline similar to Britain‘s in 1875.  
Historically hegemonies have been founded by states that have undergone 
powerful social and economic revolutions87. These states have ironed out the internal and 
domestic issues that would have otherwise prevented them from expanding out beyond 
their borders. Both Great Britain and the United States experienced this, as well as more 
ancient hegemonic powers such as Athens and Rome. These states were (and are) 
powerful because they were able to produce an internal equilibrium. Once this revolution 
is complete the opportunity is available for the state to unleash its energies to expand 
beyond the national borders. This can happen in several different ways. The objective of 
the state is the very thing that will produce change. These objectives can, according to 
Gilpin, be classified thusly: 
 
-The conquest of territory: The traditional method of acquiring wealth and ensuring 
security is the acquisition of new territory.  
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-Increase influence over the behavior of other states: The use of threats, alliances and 
spheres of influence, among other methods, can increase influence exercised. 
-Control of or exercise influence over the world economy:  The creation of an 
international market economy in the 17th century has given states a new outlet to seek to 
exercise control over, of course focusing on the economic realm88. 
 
As the newly powerful state expands it will, more than likely, come into conflict with 
other powers or into conflict with the reigning hegemon, if one exists. Seeking to achieve 
objectives based on interests and the identity developed from them, the newly powerful 
state will have to weigh the consequences of implementing these objectives. The 
assumption is that if a state finds that the gains will outweigh the potential costs then it 
may seek to throw the order into a state of disequilibrium89. The new power may have 
significant advantages over the old. The underlying causes of the Peloponnesian war, for 
example, included the open, democratic government of Athens, the powerful Athenian 
Navy and ideas that came along with such institutions. These prompted Sparta to take 
action thus causing a war that changed the face of Greece.  
 Gilpin calls this hegemonic war90. Such a war is between the old order and 
emerging one. The conflict will widen and last long enough to encompass most other 
states within the order. Such wars serve as major turning points in history; old powers are 
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beaten down while new powers emerge. On occasion there is no one power that emerges 
able to bring stability to the world stage. This is seen in the aftermath of the First World 
War, where no one European power had enough strength, in either economic or military 
terms, to resume their previous position in world affairs. The power that did have the 
ability to become a leader in world affairs, the United States, retreated back to isolation91. 
The end of the Roman Empire serves as such an example as well. The barbarians attacked 
and destroyed the Roman order yet were unable to capitalize on it; no one barbarian had 
enough power to re-establish the empire Rome had vacated. However in more modern 
times hegemonic war has produced victors quite capable of taking advantage of the new 
world created by the total war.  
 Once a new power has established itself as hegemon it must choose how to enact 
its new international order. Hegemons, as we have established, find their power through 
the consent of the subordinates. Empire is established through more coercive means, the 
use of physical force plays a greater role. Empires represent the most extreme form of 
hierarchical order92. In this order weaker units are not full sovereign and control is 
ultimately based on coercive domination93.  Rule by force is distinct from rule by 
consent94. Empires are not hegemons, as hegemons rule through consent and a 
universally conceived order.  The new hegemony must be universally conceived so that 
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other states within the order find it compatible with their own interests and identities. 
With its power established after war, the new hegemon begins to unleash an expansive 
effort that impacts both subordinates and peripheral states with patterns of economic and 
social institutions, culture and technology95.  
 As the hegemon spreads out the patterns of institutions, culture and technology 
begin to perpetrate a civil society at a global level. Indeed, culture has been identified as 
an important aspect of American hegemony96. Rome and Great Britain also counted the 
spread of their culture as an aspect of the power of their hegemonies. A look at 
governmental systems of any number of democracies quickly demonstrates the staying 
power of British culture within disparate societies. Reading the history of Europe into 
medieval times also shows the in road Roman culture made, even on the very societies 
that conquered the Western Empire.  Another, more important function is the regulation 
of inter-state conflict97. Empirical analysis of this point has demonstrated that indeed 
hegemonic governance exerts an influence over the outbreak of major war98. The 
economic and military might of a hegemon is, as Spiezio puts it, inversely related to the 
phenomenon of systematic instability.  
 Here we come to a problem of order. Building a hegemon is one thing, but 
building and maintaining an order is a different proposition. Order is a major issue within 
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international relations and especially for hegemons. Ultimately, order is established and 
maintained by the preponderance of power and prestige of the leading state99. We have 
established power within the context of hegemony, but prestige is concept that, while 
closely related, is distinct and different. 100. Prestige is closely linked with power but is 
built on a more hierarchical structure. We can identify prestige as ―Probability that a 
certain command with a certain specific content will be obeyed by a certain group of 
persons‖101. A hierarchy of prestige relies, as Gilpin tells us, on primarily economic and 
military power. They key point with prestige is that if your strength is recognized then 
you can achieve your aims without having to use it. For a state to acquire prestige it must 
be able to provide some sort of public good that invites other states to follow. Security, 
economic benefits, cultural identification and the political integration of elites will all 
contribute to the prestige of the hegemon. The ideological appeal and prestige of the 
hegemon are relevant to its ability to form a stable order102. 
 Once the hegemon is in power and apparently stable what exactly is it doing? 
Institutions and rules are first created that express the interests and identity of the 
hegemon and encourage subordinate groups to follow suite. The creation of institutions 
like the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
both represent organizations that benefit a hegemon while still appealing to subordinate 
powers in the order. International institutions are but one faucet of an expansive effort 
that takes the hegemonic interests of economics, social institutions, political models, 
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culture and technology, as noted above, and enables their adaptation by peripheral states 
and groups103. International organizations are an important tool in expanding the 
hegemonic order and reproducing the norms of the hegemon. The most important 
functions of international organizations include ideologically legitimating the norms of 
the hegemonic order, absorbing counter-hegemonic ideas and co-opting elites within the 
peripheral states to further hegemonic ideals104.  
 The absorption of counter-hegemony is an important task of hegemonic order. 
Counter-hegemony is exactly what it sounds like; a challenge to the order established and 
maintained by the hegemon. Most counter-hegemony during the birth and stable life of 
the hegemon tend to fail. After all, why upset a stable system?  This is the very picture of 
counter-hegemony105. True hegemons will incorporate some aspects of the aspirations, 
interests and ideologies of subordinate groups. Counter-hegemonies will identify aspects 
already in existence, renovate them, make them critical and apply them to their own 
interests and identity106.  On the scale of the international counter-hegemony will be a 
primary force behind the disequilibrium of the order. They would have weighed the gains 
versus the cost and decided that the profit was worth the expense. However, institutions 
like international organizations exist partly to mute such calls against the order.  
 Institutions are only part of the bargain, however. If subordinates within the order 
do not feel as if they are able to share the fortune of the stable world order the idea of 
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power through consent is lost. Thus the idea of collective goods becomes a relevant idea. 
A collective good in this context is ―one which all enjoy in common in the sense that 
each individual‘s consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other 
individual‘s consumption of that good107. Hegemons provide a number of collective 
goods through their prestige and power within their order. Security, economic benefits, 
cultural exchanges, technological innovations and many other benefits often are made 
available to subordinates within the order. The dissemination of collective goods from 
hegemonic rule provides a serious indictment for followers to follow.  
 The provision of security and economic benefits are collective goods as hegemons 
will provide these to ensure that the order is maintained. However, can we consider 
culture a collective good? Security brings peace and economics will bring prosperity to 
the order, but what does culture bring? First culture brings a measure of the hegemon to 
the civil society of the subordinate states, mixing into and sometimes eclipsing the 
domestic culture. The spread of British culture around the globe is perhaps a far more 
lasting attribute of hegemony that the economic and military benefits Britain invested in. 
The spread of liberal trading regimes, the parliamentary system of government and any 
number of cultural quirks the world over is proof that hegemonic culture does indeed 
penetrate into the civil society of subordinate nations. Ferguson makes the argument that 
the liberal trading regime of the British was indeed a major benefit of their hegemonic 
status108. Much of the world was provided (or forced) into accepting the British liberal 
trade regime and the arguments is the states with alternate systems, notably the Soviet 
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Union and China, have paid the price for such mistakes and are only now correcting it. 
Infusing the order with the culture of the hegemonic state is a collective good. Culture 
has the advantage of making the civil society of both the order and the individual states 
more able to identify positively with the hegemon. This in turn gives the hegemon greater 
compliance in certain areas, especially for a hegemon that rules through consensual and 
reciprocal relationships.  
 Culture is merely one of the thrusts that the hegemonic order has into the societies 
and governments of subordinate states. Elites within subordinate states are co-opted into 
the hegemonic order. This can occur several different ways; money is perhaps the most 
common in the form of aid to the state, direct payments to the elites (like gifts of cars, 
planes, etc.) and benefits within the order itself. Also elites can be co-opted into 
international institutions that are supported by the hegemon. Some elites may have a goal 
of working within to change the order. However these goals are quickly sidelined as the 
structure is designed against the idea of passive revolution many of these idealists 
entertain109. The experience of many Latin American countries under the order of the 
United States tends to validate this argument. The elites were co-opted through support of 
US government agencies and military assistance.  The same elites often bring in 
institutions to the country to solidify a shaky military/political/economic/cultural 
situation. These same institutions are inexorably linked to the hegemonic order and will 
bring the power of the order with them.    
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 Institutions provide a link between the state and civil society, and in this case 
between the hegemon and the order that it creates110.  Through the creation of links 
between the state and civil society the hegemon is striving to become what Gramsci 
termed an historic bloc, that is a force composed of material forces, institutions and 
ideologies that build and ensure the link between the hegemon and the order. The 
hegemon ensures that the range of power that is available preserves the order; economic, 
political, military and cultural methods all enforce compliance and participation111.  
  Hegemons will decline. Gilpin‘s theories on power transition provide a good 
starting point to discuss the decline and fall of hegemonic order. Eventually the hegemon 
will find the continued cost of expansion too great; indeed the continued cost of simply 
maintaining what it already has may be too much. The collective goods it provides may 
be less attractive than the ability to simply keep a stable system. The ability to quash 
counter-hegemony will also be muted as fewer followers find reasons to toe the 
hegemonic party line. The interests of the hegemon mutate from expansion, growth and 
power to retrenchment and keeping what it has. The decline and fall of the Roman 
Empire provides a stark reminder of the reality of international politics. The Roman 
world, so imbued with Roman values, culture and economics began to disintegrate as the 
resources to maintain the Empire evaporated along with, most importantly, the will to 
defend it112. The collective goods that the Empire provided, chief among them security, 
                                                 
110 Gill, Stephen and David Law, ―Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital‖ in International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp. 475-499. p. 476 
111 Ikenberry, p. 28 
112 Gibbon, Edward, Decline and Fall of The Roman Empire, Volume IV, Methuenand Company, London, 
1901. 
 55 
were pulled from the farthest provinces, like Britain, to defend the core of the Empire. 
Internal and external forces combined to put undue pressure on the faltering defenses of 
the Empire. Gibbon notes that three things spelled the death of Rome: the inability to 
defend itself, the inevitable effects of immoderate greatness that had plagued the Empire 
and the rise of Christianity, which served to sap the military spirit that had so defended 
the Empire in the past.  
 Rome did not fall in a day. The causes of the end of Roman order were spread out 
for hundreds of years. Not so in more modern times. However the symptoms are much 
the same. The increased costs of keeping the Empire in equilibrium, not to mention 
expansion, became too much for Rome113. This is a generalized symptom of hegemonic 
order in general, the rising costs to simply keep what is here now overpowers the 
declining fortunes of the order. The steady but yet inevitable shifts in the distribution of 
power will give rise to challenger states and malcontents. Challenger states will actively 
oppose the hegemon for more power, they will in this respect give rise to counter-
hegemony. These challenger states will up the ante, so to speak, and eventually such a 
challenge will result in hegemonic war114.    
 As other countries challenge the supremacy of the hegemon the balance of power 
that the hegemonic power holds both within and without the order will be upset. The 
hegemon will find itself increasingly unable to enforce compliance and participation. If 
free trade was a trademark of the hegemon then protectionism will begin to creep in as 
other states begin to fortify their trading regimes. A world economy that once existed will 
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begin to fragment into economic blocs. This is the situation Britain faced on the eve of 
the First World War115. The decline would continue past the First World War, into the 
Second and finally end after the Suez crisis in 1959. The First World War was the trigger 
that brought the final downfall of British hegemony116. The war had bled the British dry 
and the nation was unable to maintain the order that the 19th century had seen prosper. As 
Britain declined there really was no other hegemon able or willing to take her place. The 
hegemonic war that was the First World War (and the Second) had seen a victory for 
Britain and her allies but that victory had left them weak.  
 It is precisely at this juncture that the question of hegemonic stability arises. 
Hegemonic stability theory was first advocated by Kindleberger and essentially states 
that a hegemon must exist for a stable international economy to do so117. His argument is 
based on the Great Depression in the years following the First World War. As the 
international monetary system began to experience a bout of instability the usual method, 
which was for Great Britain to stabilize it, would not work, as Britain was far too weak to 
undertake such a feat. The depression was so wide and so deep, argues Kindleberger, that 
Britain was simply unable to bear the burden like she had in the past. Instead the buck 
was supposed to pass to the United States, still fresh from the First World War and 
apparently ready to assume leadership. Instead the isolationist sentiment prevalent in the 
country at the time squashed any such move. The system was left in the lurch and the 
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depression that followed was a direct result of the inability of the British and the 
unwillingness of the Americans.  
 Of course this depiction has always been rendered as too simplistic. As one author 
puts it, the presence of a single, strongly dominant actor in international politics lead to 
collectively desirable outcomes for all states in the current international system118. Some 
have challenged Kindleberger‘s ideas, including the thought that collective action is 
impossible without a dominant actor and that a declining hegemon will see a decline in 
cooperation; a claim that is refuted by some119. Snidal tests just how far hegemonic 
stability theory can possible go120. Here Kindleberger‘s theory is described as far more 
varied and dependent on the type of power hegemony uses, i.e. coercion or consent. 
Snidal talks about the public goods benefit of stability theory. The British provided 
stability as a public good, maintaining the international economy for free trade to benefit 
Britain121. As a result the rest of the world benefited too from this attitude. Snidal makes 
the point that America is currently playing the game differently in that instead of a public 
good there seems to be an attitude of control and a ―private club‖ atmosphere122.  Snidal 
brings the assumption that the goods provided by the hegemon are public under question. 
The interests of the hegemon will dictate the amount of international cooperation, a 
correlation between interest in such and the capability for maintaining such123.  
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 Keohane argued actively against Kindleberger‘s theory; he maintains that neither 
hegemon nor hegemonic order is needed at all. In a world where the hegemon is in 
decline the possibility for international cooperation and the maintenance of international 
regimes of trade is not impossible124. Indeed these regimes may just be able to flourish 
with appropriate cooperation on an international level. International intuitions and 
regimes help independent states in a hegemon-less world identify common interests and 
goals. A shared, common identity is a first step in maintaining a common interest. 
However, Keohane emphasized the need to start with Realism, which explains that each 
state is motivated through its economic and military power rather than ideals or ethics, as 
Realism provides us with a barrier against wishful thinking and pipe dreams in world 
politics125.  
 We can see here how some subordinate states can envision a world free of what 
they could deem as hegemonic interference. The hegemon may provide a measure of 
stability but world politics will go on without it in some way or another. There will 
always be a great power or powers, either in the making or in decline126. There will 
always be a malcontent to chafe against the great power. The stage at which the 
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Hegemonic Use of Force 
 
 
The use of force is a hallmark of the state127. Force is also, for a hegemonic power in the 
modern world, a last resort. Power comes through consent and if civil society does not 
support an act by the state than the state is in danger of losing that sanction.  The non-
military dimensions of power, which are the economic, political and cultural, are often far 
more effective in holding the hegemonic order together. The prestige of the hegemon is 
an important factor in the enforcement of compliance. A stable order is based on the 
prestige that the hegemon has built128. As this prestige declines because of economic 
troubles, political in fighting and numerous other reasons the ability of the hegemon to 
maintain compliance is put into decline. A thread that runs through Kennedy is one of 
internal decay rather than external problems being the cause of decline129. As the means 
of enforcement decline the element of power that remains strong is that of physical force. 
Even as the hegemon becomes thinly stretched in its obligations the military will often 
remain the one element of power that retains its capability to enforce the order. 
 Force dominates other means of power if there are no constraints on the choice of 
one‘s instruments130. Military power is an impoerant component of hegemonic power131. 
The large economic base and resource pool that a hegemon possesses allows it to build a 
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military that is state of the art. It is tempting to use force to enforce compliance within the 
order. However force is far more costly and more uncertain than other means. The use of 
force is not the most efficient method of achieving goals rooted in economics, ecological 
welfare, and human rights, among many others132. Major war has been deemed obsolete 
by some scholars, and for good reason133. Peace is seen as a far more preferable 
alternative than war and since the Second World War, the use of war as policy in world 
politics has become riskier134. The advent of nuclear weapons and the high costs of 
conflict in a modern age have helped to discourage conflict. We will, in all likelihood, 
never see another Second World War. The constraints on the use of force also can come 
from within the hegemonic order itself. With the threat of major war no longer hanging 
over the heads of the world, at least for the moment, the reasons to use force must be 
valid in the eyes of the order.  
 When does hegemony resort to force? In order to use force a hegemon must have 
issues that can be resolved by force. Gaining of territory, expanding trade, coercing an 
opponent, preventing secession, proving superiority, settling old scores, resolving 
disagreements and many others all fit into this category135. These situations are, for the 
most part, resolvable by means other than force, either by politics, economics or cultural 
solutions. The use of force signifies that the other means to resolution have failed. Why 
have these failed? The hegemonic order may not simply have the reach to impose its will 
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on the problem. Also, the hegemon may be in the throes of decline. As decline occurs the 
things that made a hegemonic presence so attractive, things like trade and political 
assistance are not so valuable anymore. In fact such things may indeed be part of the 
problem. At this point the hegemon has a choice; failure to resolve the problem to 
satisfaction or escalation. A failure to resolve the situation is a negative to the order and 
will hasten the decline of the hegemonic state. If the hegemon cannot at least make a 
compromise under peaceful conditions than the loss of face can be damaging to the 
ability of the hegemon to maintain its order effectively.  
 Escalation is the other option, and this is the use of force comes into play. The 
military of the hegemon is going to possess the elements that make it prestigious, 
technology, manpower, superior training and tactics and, of course, superior logistics. 
Appearing almost overwhelming to the opposition, the use or threat of force by a 
hegemon will stand a far better chance of solving the problem then the non-force methods 
described above. The modern United States and many of its allies employ what has been 
termed the ―Revolution in Military Affairs‖ or RMA136. The RMA in today‘s world 
describes the importance of changes in military organization, strategy and technology. 
The revolution and advancements in information and military technology that began in 
the late 1980s has taken a dramatic hold upon the use of force137. Computers, stealth 
technology, satellite information systems, and night vision are all part of the on going 
ability of the US to bring force down upon a problem effectively.  
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 Even with the revolutionary aspect of the application of force, are the costs going 
to be significantly lowered? The British involvement in Africa in the later 19th century, as 
outlined in several books about the Anglo-Zulu War, is an example of technology as 
applied by a hegemonic power. The British forces involved in the Anglo-Zulu conflict 
were superior in both firepower and technology. The Martini-Henry rifle was described 
as being ―never a better weapon for close-quarters fighting‖ with its 22 inch bayonet and 
two foot length was the pinnacle of single-shot battle weapons, was standard issue to the 
British Army at this time138. The logistics train was troublesome but the Army in South 
Africa in 1879 rarely lacked for much. The Army had artillery, mounted infantry and 
rocket batteries readily at hand. The first major battle, however, at Isandlhwana, was an 
unprecedented disaster for the British. What was supposed to be an easy war against an 
African kingdom quickly turned into a debacle of the highest order. The war was carried 
on, mostly as revenge for Isandlhwana. On a tactical scale the Army held its own and 
once the shock of defeat wore off the war was as good as won. The Zulus held no modern 
weapons, the only firearms being of 18th century vintage, no artillery, and little beside 
superb training and determination to defend their homeland. The British had started the 
war to acquire territory for Natal colony not to mention ridding themselves of a powerful 
neighbor that might cause trouble later on. What they got was costs that far exceeded the 
gain. The Army suffered the loss of a complete battalion (1st/24th, later known as the 
South Wales Borders) as well as the expense of shipping extensive reinforcements to 
impose a final defeat on the Zulus. As well, with the demise of the Zulu Kingdom the 
                                                 
138 Snook, Mike, Like Wolves in the Fold: The Defence of Rorke’s Drift, Greenhill Books, London, 2006. p. 
65 
 63 
British were left with an unorganized collection of small tribal units that revolted and 
warred with each other into the 20th century.  
 For all the advantages the British possessed the Zulu war was far more trouble 
than it was ultimately worth. The technological advantages provided by the ―civilized‖ 
British Army helped to breed a culture of superiority that resulted in the death of over 
1500 troops, both regular and colonial. Was the war a victory? Yes, it gained the 
objectives that the British had set out to acquire. Was the use of force successful? No, the 
costs of the war far exceeded the gain. The stability of the region was negatively affected 
by the absence of the Zulu King and the expenditure to win the conflict had been 
immense, over 5 million pounds in 1879 (nearly 415 million pounds in 2005 terms)139.  
There was little international outcry at that time for a war waged against native 
populations. The media at the time helpfully spread enough falsehoods to encourage 
consent to such a conflict. The Zulu wars were, and remain, a romantic excursion of 
victory and defeat by the British Soldier dressed in his red uniform valiantly patrolling 
the edges of Empire.  
 The British repeated this same performance at different locations with the same 
results in the 19th century. Invade a territory, experience defeat, re-group and re-enforce 
and then proceed to secure victory. The use of force would entail a high cost but the 
British possessed the resources to overcome any setbacks they would encounter. This is 
the essence of a hegemon. The use of force may prove inefficient but the superior 
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resources available ensure that a determined conflict will be ultimately won. There are 
exceptions to this, and these occur not because of superior resources but to the public 
consent needed for support. The Boer war is an example of public outcry against British 
action, both internal and external. Like Afghanistan and the Zulu Wars, the Boer war was 
the result of British economic and strategic considerations140. The tactics employed by 
the British included a scorched earth policy and concentration camps to house the Boer 
population141. These were unpopular at home and abroad; media exposure certainly 
helped to turn the tide of public opinion. The Boer war was costly in material and men 
but, like Afghanistan in 1881 and the Zulus in 1879, it was a victory. Of course, in order 
to rule the British had to rebuild what they had destroyed. This is perhaps the ultimate 
irony of the British Empire and hegemony. In order to enforce their rule they used 
physical force. But in order to build consent and hegemony they needed to re-build what 
they had destroyed, thus doubling the costs.  
 The use of force is a double-edged sword for a hegemonic power. As evidenced 
by the British, physical force was a sure way to achieving compliance to the ways of the 
hegemon. But that compliance comes at a cost that may be disproportionate to the gains 
made. The British used force primarily against powers that were equivalent to the North 
South relationship enjoyed by the United States over Latin America before the Second 
World War. The native regimes and non-European powers were susceptible to British 
force; they had little recourse. But against other powers in Europe, Britain was not able to 
use force with such abandon. The naval build up by German in the years prior to the First 
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World War was a good indicator that the ambition exercised in Africa and Asia would 
not translate well to Europe142. Force was, as Keohane and Nye suggest, a minor aspect 
of policy. It was the race to use the resources of hegemony to demonstrate the ability to 
use force, much like a peacock showing its feathers that was far more important than 
force itself. It was thought that by building a bigger navy, and more battleships, potential 
contenders could be deterred from attacking. 
 
The Decline of Hegemony 
 
 
An increased use of force is an element that often identifies a declining hegemon. Amid 
the loss of political and economic power a hegemon will find itself searching for a 
preferred grand strategy143. Grand strategy incorporates several components: the use of 
military as well as fiscal and political power, balancing both the ends and means in peace 
and wartime and long term planning144. The environment in which a hegemon finds itself 
will often dictate that strategy and the domestic forces behind it will be decided by what 
Lobell calls the commercial orientation of its contenders. By this it is meant that if a 
contender is liberal, than the strategy of the declining hegemon will follow suit, the same 
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idea goes for an imperial contender145.  Lobell argues that declining hegemons follow an 
identifiable pattern of what puzzles they must solve: 
 
-Which states to punish? 
-Where to cooperate? 
-How to allocate national resources between productive capacity and military security?146 
 
The goal through the answers to these questions is to balance commitments without 
compromising economic staying power. Every hegemon will produce different answers 
to these questions. We cannot find a set cycle of a hegemonic cycle. Instead we see the 
pattern of questions that Lobell identifies as deciding a declining hegemon‘s grand 
strategy.  
 A declining hegemon is faced with an ever increasing cost/benefit problem. 
Returns on the economy dwindle while the needs for consumption increase147. The 
consent that once provided the hegemon with the power it needed to run the order has 
been reduced in light of unpopular actions. Instability within the order is increasing. The 
hegemon has to try harder to produce the same results and eventually will be entirely 
unsuccessful at it. It is precisely at this point that the order will begin to fall apart, gently 
at first with some subordinate states not following the hegemonic lead. It will be more 
and more common to avoid compliance within the order. States and groups that have felt 
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the hegemonic order begin to realize that they can perhaps break out from the order and 
pursue their own national goals. Thus begins the period where the malcontents of 





The life cycle of a hegemon is, like Gilpin noted, a fairly set process. However every 
hegemon will manage itself differently according to the environment it finds itself in, as 
well as based on the identity it manufactures for itself in this environment. Each hegemon 
will respond differently when maintaining the order it has created. The management of 
hegemonic decline is important when dealing with malcontents. In the modern era after 
the Second World War force has lapsed into a minor role. The use of force is often the 
last resort of a hegemon that has exhausted its economic and political options for 
enforcing compliance.  The use of force within the hegemonic life cycle is dependant on 
the very environment which the hegemon finds itself in. That environment may be self-
created, as the hegemon pictures itself as embarking on a great crusade when in reality it 













The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America presented a plan for 
the United States in the wake of 9/11. The idea of deterrence, which had directed 
American policy for so long, was replaced by a strategy of preemption. Written in light of 
the perception of the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the 2002 National 
Security Strategy was designed to show that the United States would strike before the 
enemy could, all the while building democracy along with a coalition of willing states. In 
short, the US was reaffirming its status as a hegemonic power while simultaneously 
adjusting itself to what was domestically considered a new world situation. The new 
strategy was highlighted by the 2003 Iraq war and the subsequent occupation and 
―nation-building‖ that has engendered so much debate and controversy.  
 The United States had drawn the proverbial ―line in the sand.‖ President George 
Bush told other nations in late September 2001 ―either you are with the US or you are 
with the terrorists,‖ thus demonstrating a ―black and white world‖ mentality. The sane, 
safe order that had seemingly existed throughout the post-Soviet era had come to an end. 
The hegemonic order that was centered on the United States had begun to change. Instead 
of multilateral action, like that characterized by the First Gulf War, the Americans had 
made it clear that they would strike first and, if absolutely necessary, strike alone The 
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ability of hegemonic America to act preemptively and decisively is not in question; the 
United States possesses the most powerful military in the modern world and the resources 
to ensure that wherever this force is deployed and whatever it is to do it stands a better 
than average chance of success in most conventional conflict.   
 As I have noted in previous chapters hegemony is based on consent, not coercion. 
The most powerful tool in the American arsenal is arguably not the military but the 
ability to form a coalition of democracies to tackle issues at the international level. The 
preemptive strike doctrine (known as the Bush Doctrine in some circles) introduced after 
2002 swept the need for a coalition away as a primary concern. The war against terrorism 
and the ―axis of evil‖ had replaced the cold war. And while the world was not so black 
and white anymore, American policy strived to present it in such a light. 
 The new strategy of preemption developed by the Bush Administration helped to 
crystallize the way opposition developed to American policy decisions. There are three 
categories of malcontents that began to develop in the time prior to the 2003 Iraq war; all 
were dissatisfied with the approach the United States took to fighting the war on terror 
and all three malcontent types expressed this in different ways. These are called 
malcontents of hegemony. Unlike a counter-hegemony, where there is direct competition 
with the reigning hegemon, malcontents are dissatisfied with the current hegemonic order 
and find that the ideals of the hegemon run counter to the national (or state) goals that the 
malcontented states and non-state groups wishes to pursue       
This chapter deals with the theory of hegemonic malcontents. Specifically, it 
examines why they exist and how they respond to the hegemonic international order. The 
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Bush Administration‘s reaction to the 2001 attacks and the Iraq invasion helped to 
polarize reaction within the American hegemonic order. With a strategy of preemption 
firmly in place it was perhaps inevitable that world powers took different approaches to 
the way America was dealing with the threats it believed were facing it. Here I hope to 
establish a theory that explains not just the reaction to the American strategy but also the 
reactions of smaller powers to hegemons throughout history. What follows is a discussion 
on how states become hegemonic malcontents, a subject that has little prior evaluation in 
the literature on hegemony. Hegemonies are an important feature of the international 
stage. Malcontents play an essential role in the way a hegemon rules, especially as the 
hegemony declines and falls. Here I illustrate the characteristics that contribute to the rise 
of a malcontent. Next I describe the three types of malcontents--benign, passive 
aggressive, and revolutionary. Finally, I explain how the rise of malcontents will signal 
the end of hegemony  
 
From Deterrence to Preemption 
 
In response to 9/11, the United States attacked the only physical target associated with 
Al-Qeada--Afghanistan. According to the Bush Administration, Afghanistan was but the 
first in a series of targets that housed or aided terrorists.148  Allies within the US 
hegemonic sphere roundly supported the attack on Afghanistan. The regime in 
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Afghanistan was a routine violator of human rights as well as an active supporter of 
terrorist activity. The invasion and subsequent takeover of Afghanistan was easy for US 
allies to support.  
 The next target was Iraq. Saddam Hussein had been a thorn in the side of 
American foreign policy makers since the First Gulf War. President Bush in the 2002 
State of the Union address identified Iraq as part of the ―axis of evil.‖ Suddenly Hussein‘s 
regime became the next objective in the American strategy of preemption149. The consent 
that had characterized the Afghanistan conflict unraveled as Bush made it clear that Iraq 
would not only be the next goal but would also be eligible for the use of force if the 
situation was irresolvable diplomatically. The Bush Administration launched an effort to 
manufacture consent both domestically and internationally. At first the international 
effort at developing consent focused on the United Nations. Bush noted that Iraq 
routinely violated human rights accords and thwarted UN weapons inspections. The 
―coalition of the willing‖ was built using these arguments. Allies that the US had 
traditionally counted on, such as Great Britain and Australia, involved themselves in this 
coalition as did some Eastern European countries such as Poland. However, even as US 
determination to use force against Iraq picked up support, many states, including many 
European allies of the US, began to speak loudly and openly against the coercion option. 
The slow switch from a multilateral coalition--a traditional US bastion of its hegemonic 
order--to a bilateral coalition played a major role in the international opposition to the 
war as well as reactions from various states.   
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 France and Germany offered opposition to the Iraq policies of the Bush 
Administration both within and outside the UN. Not only did both states put forward 
fiery anti-war rhetoric, they also successfully pressured Greece (acting European Union 
President) into withdrawing invitations to prospective EU members who had sided with 
the US to a summit on Iraq.150 This rhetoric, however, caused a backlash in the US 
domestically, as members of Congress presented bills to restrict importations of French 
and German foodstuffs (particularly wine), and members renamed ―french fries‖ 
―freedom fries.‖. Eventually, France and Germany were joined by Russia in exercising 
willingness to impede the coalition through whatever diplomatic means available151.  
 Other states including Turkey and Saudi Arabia did not actively oppose the war to 
the same extent, but adopted policies that forbade or restricted U.S. military use of 
territory and over flight privileges. In the case of Turkey this was especially 
problematic152. The denial of Turkish support of any kind, including flyover and basing 
rights for the imminent invasion of Iraq was another blow against American strategy in 
Iraq.    
Outside the American sphere of influence, other countries also actively opposed 
the U.S. Iran, for example, opposed any sort of US attack seeing it, quite rightly, as a 
possible next target in the preemption strategy. Iran had been at odds with the US since 
the revolution in 1981, and Bush‘s inclusion of Iran in the ―axis of evil‖ further 
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exacerbated tensions. In the midst of U.S. threats, the reformist policies of Mohammad 
Khatami were replaced by the conservative Ahmadinejad regime.  
I include the 2003 Iraq conflict to paint a picture of what the U.S. was going to 
face as it embarked upon a strategy that departed from the consensus-based policies of 
the Cold War. Rather than deterrence, which encouraged consent from states and groups 
with America‘s hegemonic sphere, a policy of preemption against the perceived threat of 
terrorist attack helped to polarize the states within the order. While many states did join 
the ―coalition of the willing,‖ some did not and others took active steps to oppose it.  
The opposition that arose against U.S. action came from malcontents. 
Malcontents of hegemony do not seek counter-hegemony. Rather, they seek to work 
within the current order and pursue goals that differ from the ones set forth by the 
hegemon. The malcontents against the U.S. can be divided into three categories: benign, 
passive aggressive, and revolutionary. In this case, benign malcontents are states 
including France and Germany. While the opposition of states is quite heated, it 
manifests within acceptable institutions and within the rules of diplomacy, broadly 
speaking. In general, benign malcontents act against the hegemon but within the order 
created by the hegemon. Passive aggressive malcontents such as Pakistan do not offer 
open opposition within the order but are obedient because of the fear of a greater use of 
the carrot, or the stick, by the hegemonic power. Finally, revolutionary malcontents such 
as Iran oppose the hegemon on a number of levels, not all of them within the boundaries 
of the order. These malcontents are the greatest danger because they are willing to use 
violence and other means outside the established order to attain their national goals.  
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I believe that these three types of malcontents have existed within all previous 
hegemonic orders. Moreover, this typology can greatly improve our understanding of 
international politics. I will explore this further in the sections that follow. First, I will 
describe how a country becomes a malcontent. Next I will describe the different 
malcontents in far greater detail, providing examples along the way. Finally, I will 
examine the impact of malcontents on the hegemonic order. The importance of a 
malcontent cannot be understated in the context of hegemonic order. Left to its own 
devices a malcontent will not bring down a hegemonic power. However, as more and 
more malcontents cease to follow the leader the hegemon will soon loose the attribute 
that makes a hegemon: consent to rule  
 
What is a Malcontent? 
 
Attaining hegemony occurs when the interests of the dominant power--the hegemon-- 
transcend the limits of the purely economic class and these interests become the interests 
of lesser powers that follow the hegemon, either willingly or unwillingly153. There is an 
extensive body of literature on hegemony and hegemonic order. There is a far more 
limited body of work on other nations within the order--the followers and the 
malcontents. We can examine hegemony extensively, but such study will tell us little 
about the smaller powers within the international order. An examination of the First Gulf 
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War by Cooper puts forth the idea that followers make hegemony work154.  The thesis 
here is that the First Gulf War was, from a renewalist perspective, a boon to American 
hegemony. In the heyday of talk about a ―new world order‖ in the wake of the demise of 
the Soviet Union optimists in the US Government believed that the unity shown by the 
coalition, and the leadership by the US, was the start of a new era of American power. 
Cooper examines the First Gulf War from a follower‘s point of view. As I have discussed 
previously, consent is a far better tool to motivate than coercion. As the actions leading 
up to the ground war occurred, the US found itself having a difficult time persuading 
many states that the big idea was also the right idea155.  
 
Why is the concept important? 
 
The identification and explanation of hegemonic malcontents is a task that contributes to 
the field of International Relations and the practice of policy and history. A pragmatic 
view of hegemony dictates that there will always be threats to the order. Classifying these 
threats will, hopefully, help to dictate the use of the finite resources of the hegemonic 
state. States such as Germany may be malcontented, but the threat level is far lower that a 
malcontent such as Iran. We are able to identify followers of hegemony and challengers 
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to hegemony. The malcontents represent a middle ground, not necessarily followers and 
certainly not challengers.  
 My classification is a tool that will help to identify the strengths and weaknesses 
of hegemony, as well as the impact that the malcontents will have on those strengths and 
weaknesses. Theoretically I hope that this typology will enable a dialogue focused on the 
specific reasons states and non-state groups within the order choose to pursue goals at 
conflict with the hegemonic state. Practically this typology could be a tool to identify 
gaps in the hegemonic order and places where the hegemonic state could best utilize its 
power. Whatever the usage, I hope for this work to provide a basis for further research in 
the social sciences.   
 
Hegemony and the First Gulf War 
 
The coalition in the First Gulf War is widely viewed as an example of followership under 
a hegemonic lead156. Cooper and his colleagues argue that hegemony is only as good as 
the leadership it provides. Without followers, there is no hegemony. By examining the 
followers rather than the hegemonic power, the idea of successful leadership has been 
redefined. To be an effective hegemonic leader a nation must have followers accept a 
broad vision of collective goals articulated by a leader in whom both legitimacy and trust 
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are placed157. The George H.W. Bush Administration shifted from a diplomatic solution 
to a military solution too fast and with far too few reasons for some of the followers to 
spill their blood on a military operation. Simply put, the US was in a good situation, 
because despite issues with moving to a military solution too quickly, the costs for 
defection from the coalition would be even higher. By defecting from the coalition and 
the stated goals of the US, a country took the risk of looking weak in face of Iraqi 
aggression as well as losing aid and support from Washington. In simple terms of game 
theory, the cost to defect overshadowed the misgivings about participation in the war. 
While many followers accordingly sent military aid, much of this aid was relatively 
minimal. 
We cannot expect hegemons who possess a preponderance of power in economic, 
military, and political spheres to also possess the ability to lead. The United States during 
the First Gulf War provided leadership to a disparate coalition that counted its primary 
goal as defeating Iraqi aggression. What the First Gulf War demonstrated is that 
followership is just as important as leadership. The power and influence a hegemon 
possesses is dependant on the policies of other states within the system158. The hard 
balancing of the Cold War, that is, the formation of alliances to increase military 
capabilities, has given way to what is called soft balancing—the use of diplomacy, 
economic statecraft, international institutions, and international law to balance against 
                                                 
157 Cooper, et.al, p. 408 
158 Jesse, Neal and Kristen Williams, ―The Leader can‘t Lead when the Followers Don‘t Follow: The 
Limitations of Hegemony‖ Paper presented at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the International Studies 
Association, February 28th-March 3rd, Chicago., Ill.  
 78 
threats159. In this light, the Second Gulf War can be seen as soft balancing against the 
actions of the US160. Nonetheless, the lack of followership and balancing attempts are 
testing the limitation of hegemony in the years after 9/11. 
A malcontent is not a follower. A follower is one that is led effectively because it 
accepts what the leader seeks. During the post-9/11 attack on Afghanistan followers were 
indeed led by a hegemon whose goals they supported. The subsequent attack on Iraq in 
2003 was not in the best interests of the group who willingly followed the American lead 
into middle Asia. While the US had few problems with a preemptive attack on Iraq, many 
of the coalition of the willing had interests that stretched into the Middle East and Iraq 
itself. An approach that concentrated on soft balancing techniques and UN inspired 
inspections was far more likely to encourage a positive response from the coalition. Such 
attempts at soft balancing had been used for most of the 1990s to, in the eyes of the Bush 
Administration, little effect. The US stressed that immediate action was necessary against 
Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction and that a continuation of the soft balancing 
would fail to possibly disastrous results. These US policy decision saw followers not only 
ceasing to follow but some began to transform into malcontents—countries that were 
dissatisfied with American actions and policies. These malcontents have the potential to 
affect the entire international system. The actions taken by many of these malcontents 
reflected the trend toward soft balancing of the post-cold war era. Many small European 
states took up the U.S. cause, riding a bandwagon as an attempt to balance against the 
Western European states who dominate the European Union.  
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Choose You Poison: Options for the Malcontent 
 
Malcontents have several specific paths of action they can take against the hegemon. 
Challenging hegemonic power by convincing others within the system that such power 
will cause more harm than good is one option161. Blackmail through what is called 
―undesirable consequences‖ can work for both ally and adversary162. This sort of action 
includes such threats as the continued spreading of nuclear weapons. Outright refusing or 
ignoring of the hegemon‘s demands is another strategy, as the hegemon cannot force 
every state to do its bidding.163. The more states that refuse, the easier it becomes for 
other states in the order to follow suit. Other methods of dealing with hegemonic power, 
like institutional membership and neutrality, also exist as options for dissatisfied states164.  
Simply choosing not to follow the lead of a hegemon is a rather easy way to opt 
out of the order. States such as those located in Western Europe will use paths of action 
such as these to avoid the policy the hegemon has chosen. Other malcontents were never 
followers of the hegemon in the first place. These malcontents may pursue strategies that 
are more reactionary in nature in an effort to be ―left alone.‖ Drawing from revolutionary 
theory we see reactionary malcontents angered over a perceived meddling by the 
hegemon in their internal and regional affairs. Many revolutionary states are externalizing 
internal conflict through attacks on what they perceive as detrimental to the revolution 
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like, for example, Iran after the overthrow of the Shah in 1979165. Revolutions become 
successful only when the administrative and coercive capacities of the states have been 
weakened by a combination of external and internal challenges166. Consequently, some 
malcontents are more reactionary when a perceived weakness appears in hegemonic 
power within the region.  
Somewhere between ceasing to follow a hegemon and reacting more strongly is 
an approach that allows the subordinate state to stay under the hegemonic order yet 
exercise its own power when it feels that the hegemon is overstepping its bounds. The 
case of Brazil during the Second World War is an example of this behavior. Brazil was 
the only Latin American state to contribute to the Allied war effort. It cooperated fully 
with the U.S. in assisting in the defense of the Northeastern South American coastline167. 
Yet even given this activity Brazil did not support the U.S. in its call for all South 
American countries to halt relations with the Axis powers. In addition to Brazil, two more 
South American states, Chile and Argentina, did not do this (though Chile eventually 
relented and ceased all contact with the Axis powers).  Further, the U.S. tried to convince 
all Latin America countries not to recognize the post-coup Argentinean government in 
1943, and again Brazil did not go along. Eventually the entire effort fell apart168. In large 
part, Brazil stayed a loyal subordinate state to U.S. hegemony in the region. But the 
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actions it took in relation to Argentina demonstrate that its leaders were willing to check 
US power in the region through diplomatic means. 
In the end, a malcontent is a state that has the desire to exercise national policy 
that allows for freedom of action without interference from external powers. The very 
nature of hegemony requires a carrot and stick approach to the maintenance of the order. 
It must not be forgotten that while the order is designed so everybody can benefit, the 
ultimate beneficiary is the hegemonic state. A strong hegemon will be able effectively to 
use a combination of consent and coercion to drag subordinate powers along. As decline 
sets in subordinate states will be able to disagree with the actions of the hegemon more 
freely. States that are subject to hegemonic influence will sense they have the ability to 
break out from under the thumb of the hegemonic state. They are all malcontents, but the 
ways in which they respond are different.  
 
The Limitations of Hegemony 
 
The desire of the malcontent to exercise purely national goals within the hegemonic order 
tests the limits of hegemony. A hegemon will have an identity that will influence what 
interests it has, and these interests are imposed upon the order as a whole. The British 
promotion of free trade in the 19th century was based on the identity of Britain as 
industrial powerhouse and colonial Empire. Free trade was an essential element of British 
success; the order benefited both Britain and the rest of the world, at least according to 
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the British worldview. Britain‘s hegemony was concerned with the maintenance of 
empire on one hand and the free and open trade of British goods on the other. Inevitably 
hegemonic interests will collide with the goals and interests of the subordinate states. The 
Venezuelan incident of 1902 in which the country defaulted on loans from Germany and 
Britain is an example of this collision. Britain and Germany sent naval forces to force 
payment, while Theodore Roosevelt began to exercise the Monroe Doctrine against 
European intervention169. Neither Germany nor Britain had the clout to force the issue; 
instead the U.S. played the role of arbitrator between the two sides. Britain recognized 
who exactly was the dominant power in the region, while Roosevelt refrained from a 
show of force170. Britain was already in decline as a hegemonic power. The inability to 
enforce the order in the Americas demonstrates the limitations of hegemony. 
In 1902 the U.S. was a power on the ascendance, while Britain was in a slow but 
steady decline. The U.S. was establishing an identity as an imperial power in its own 
right. Traditionally the Americas were seen as the backyard of the US, an area that was to 
be free of European influence. In 1902 the expulsion of the Spanish from Cuba left the 
U.S. as the sole imperial power in the region, a status that Roosevelt was eager to 
preserve and nurture.  
Hegemons are rarely able to make informed decisions about the limitations of 
their power. Instead they often find out while attempting to enforce the order. Jesse and 
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Williams171 theorize that states are affected by domestic factors, such as regime type, 
political parties; elite desire to remain in power, public opinion, and the influence of 
interest groups, when challenging the hegemonic power172. Therefore, instead of a 
response to hegemony, a malcontent will be exercising goals that relate to domestic 
factors. This can make it difficult for hegemons to know when to stop. In the case of 
Venezuela and the U.S. in 1902, the British realized exactly where they needed to stop 
without the U.S. taking overt steps to assert its power in the region through a show of 
force.  
Because hegemons rely on a mix of consent and coercion there must be a point at 
which the use of force comes into play. If a hegemon is unable to obtain what it wants 
though political or economic means, it may ask: Should force be employed? The use of 
force is a stopping point that the hegemon must thoroughly examine. A number of 
factors, including the possible gains from a use of force, the reaction from the external 
international order and the internal domestic community, the cost to the rest of the 
hegemon‘s projects, and the danger of upsetting the stability of order, all may be taken 
into account. However, as noted above, the hegemon rarely has the luxury of foresight. 
Often what appears to be a quick enforcement of the order can become a bog in which the 
power of the hegemonic state is threatened. The Boer War for Great Britain helped to 
bookend the 19th century as well as the decline of British hegemony. The Vietnam War in 
the 1960s and 1970s served as a quagmire that haunted US domestic and foreign politics 
for the next 35 years. War is where hegemons are both born and die. A prolonged war 
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resulting from a simple use of force is perhaps the greatest risk that a hegemon takes 
when it embarks on the use of force. Even a victory may leave the hegemonic state so 
drained as to hasten its decline.  
Walt notes that many post-9/11 U.S. policies graphically demonstrate the 
limitations of hegemony. First, massive spending shows that U.S. foreign policy is not 
cost-free173. The freedom of action and the lack of sacrifices gave the U.S. a fairly free 
hand in acting out foreign policy immediately after the end of the Cold War. The low 
casualty to success ratio of the First Gulf War combined with the low number of soldiers 
killed in Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo gave the US a sense of hubris174. 
The attacks on New York graphically portrayed the price for the global engagement of 
American forces. The economic growth, successful humanitarian and military 
intervention, and status as the sole superpower meant little in the long run; al-Qaeda had 
proven that American soil was indeed vulnerable. Walt‘s first lesson is that America can 
no longer assume that it can wield global influence at little or no cost to itself175. He also 
notes that we must discard the notion popular in the U.S. that America represents a 
―shining city on the hill‖ that other societies admire. Indeed, the September 11th attacks 
showed that much of the world views the U.S. with ambivalence. International support 
for the U.S. was widespread in the wake of the attacks, but not unanimous. As the 
invasion of Iraq demonstrates, there is a limit on the amount of sympathy for the 
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American cause176. The second lesson is that America must be prepared to listen to its 
allies and pay close attention to who really is the enemy. Not every state is willing to 
follow the ―shining city on the hill.‖ Finally, Walt argues that the United States cannot 
―go it alone‖177. The amount of international support needed in the aftermath of 
September 11th was enormous, including access to foreign territory, use of foreign 
airspace: enduring and extensive support of other countries (especially to attack far flung 
terrorist networks) is needed178. The hegemon alone cannot succeed. Instead, the entire 
order needs to be co-opted into the effort. The danger is that the effort will drag on for 
too long, thus jeopardizing international support. As the seventh year from the attacks on 
New York is entered this lesson is playing out dramatically over the Iraqi conflict and the 
prolonged fighting in Afghanistan.    
As a hegemon reaches the limits of its power, the malcontent subordinate states 
begin to arise. Either the hegemon (the US) is unable to make followers of the 
subordinate states, as in the case of France and Germany, or the national goals of the 
subordinates‘ conflict directly with those of the hegemon (e.g., in a current case, Iran and 
its bid to build a nuclear reactor). A malcontent will seek to test the limitations of the 
hegemon. In many cases this will fail as the malcontent underestimates the hegemon 
and/or overestimates its own power. In some cases the order will be enforced and 
hegemony maintained. If the malcontent succeeds in its exercise the hegemon will be 
forced to respond in order to maintain its power. If power is not restored than the 
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weakness of the hegemonic state has been demonstrated and the inevitable decline has set 
in.  
   
Three Types of Malcontent 
 
The three following types of malcontent, benign, revolutionary, and passive-aggressive, 
have been noted previously but in this section they will be discussed about in far greater 
detail. Categorizing the malcontent will help to demonstrate the crossroads that mark the 
limitation of the hegemonic order. Malcontents will arise at all the stages of the life cycle 
of hegemony. Only when the hegemon is weak will the malcontent succeed in the goal 
they have embarked on. These goals differ drastically, from merely opting out of a policy 
they consider ruinous to foreign policy endeavors to ambitions of regional power and the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons. Each type of malcontent will have an established 
framework for which to evaluate it. Some of this framework will be similar from type to 
type. Other points of the framework will differ to highlight the differing paths each type 
will follow. For each model of malcontent I have outlined several points to help frame the 
malcontent‘s methods and reasons for going against the order. Each framework is 
followed by a relevant example of malcontent to illustrate in reality how the theory 
works.  
The state has always been a primary focus within international relations theory. 
While the state is the primary focus of the three types of malcontents the non-state 
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groups, like terrorist organizations and nationalist movements, are just as important. 
Nationalism is the conviction that the national and political unit should be congruent179. 
Terrorist organizations aim to spread murder, assassination, sabotage and subversion, the 
destruction of public records, the spreading of rumor, the closing of churches and other 
actions which contribute to a common end; the propagation of fear180. Groups that can be 
defined by the above represent malcontents that can fit into the typology below. Terrorist 
organizations like al-Qeada are not malcontents; instead they seek to overthrow the 
hegemon completely. We can look to groups dedicated to terrorism such as the Black 
Hand, which played a part in the start of the First World War with the assassination to 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand for an example of a non-state malcontent, albeit one pre-
disposed to methods of violence to achieve its aim of throwing off Austrian rule. The 
wave of nationalism during the Yugoslav civil war is another example of malcontents 
trying to rid themselves of outside hegemonic influence, in this case the Serbs against 
America and Europe. After 9/11 there was a fresh recognition of non-state groups and the 
potential they have to throw off the rule of the hegemon. While such problems had 
existed since the start of the previous century the attack on the American mainland 
highlighted the existence of such threats to the hegemonic order. Even if a terrorist 
organization or national group seeks only to rid itself of hegemonic influence the 
methods they utilize will place them uncomfortable next to organizations like al-Qaeda. 
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Such placement will negatively affect the outcome of any organization or group, no 
matter the goal.   
There are three types of malcontents: benign, revolutionary, and passive-
aggressive. Each is unique in the way they approach the objective of pursuing purely 
national goals free of hegemonic interference. The benign uses the soft-balancing tactics 
of diplomacy, economic means, and institutional paths (like the United Nations). The 
revolutionary will employ means that verge on violence and hostile negotiations. The 
passive-aggressive will appear to accept the hegemon but will also undertake its own 
agenda when it feels it can get away with it. The next section deals with the three types of 
malcontents, each laid out around a framework to better understand their motives and 
means to act away from the hegemon.   
 
Ceasing to Follow: The Benign Malcontent 
 
Benign malcontents employ methods against the hegemon that generally rely on soft 
balancing techniques including diplomacy and action through international institutions. 
Most often cast in the role of follower the benign type supports the hegemon, as the order 
is beneficial to the politics, economics and security of the nation or state. During the peak 
of hegemony the subordinate states follow because they have an investment in the order 
they are part of. Do not take this to mean that this type will blindly follow the hegemon 
on expeditions that are potentially ruinous. This is precisely the point where the benign 
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malcontent is born. There comes an intersection where the demands of working with the 
hegemon will conflict with the self-interest of the individual state. As the hegemon 
embarks on endeavors that promise little and entail high risk, the benign malcontent will 
begin their attempts at restraining the hegemonic state‘s actions. They do not want to 
destroy the order but seek to bring the order back the equilibrium that benefits all, not just 
one.  
Benign malcontents cease to follow the hegemon but not the order it exists in. The 
hegemonic order provides benefit and the benign states see the hegemon as threatening 
the stability of the order and their own national goals. These malcontents are bound to the 
hegemon in such a way that soft balancing will be seen as the only option. The war of 
words and diplomatic maneuvers can and will become heated, but there is little or no risk 
of actual military power or even the tactics of hard balancing. The benign malcontent is a 
self-interested state; its identity is closely tied to the order in which it participates, even if 
that order is going in a direction that the malcontent disagrees with.  
In order to analyze the benign malcontent we must first establish a framework. 
This framework must take into account the means by which benign malcontents work 
against the wishes of the hegemonic state while still maintaining the order itself. Benign 
malcontents are often hegemonic followers who have chosen to not follow the leader in 
an effort to not only preserve the order in which they exist but also to exercise a purely 
national goal they may have.   
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1. Soft balancing as a means to restrain the hegemon 
 Benign malcontents do not seek to utilize hard balancing methods against the 
hegemonic state. Through diplomacy, no matter the tone, and the use of international 
institutions the benign malcontent will try to restore the balance of the hegemonic order. 
The benign malcontent sees the hegemonic order going in a direction that will hurt their 
national goals.  The exchange is decidedly asymmetrical in that the benign malcontent, 
while regionally powerful, is often not able to muster enough strength to convince the 
hegemon to heel to the order wide vision. 
 
2. A decline of state resources relative to the state’s expenses and commitments. 
 As the resources of the hegemon decline the benign malcontent will begin to pick 
up a greater part of the expense and commitment. As the closest type of malcontent to the 
hegemonic state the benign malcontent will have not only bear a greater part of the 
burden but also a larger stake in the well being of the order. Along with such obligations 
comes a greater sense of entitlement, not necessarily a sharing of power but a greater 
piece of the hegemonic pie. This includes a certain freedom of action that may not be in 
the best interests of the hegemonic state.  
 
3. Hegemonic alienation that sees the closest of allies begin to drift apart in the goals 
they seek for their participation in the order.  
The vision that the hegemon has for the order and the vision that the benign 
malcontent has may be two very different things. A change in strategic goals, economic 
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problems and recognition of new political realities may see a divide between the 
hegemon and its most powerful allies within the order. The benign malcontent is not able 
to increase their influence over the hegemon and consequently is unable to affect its 
behavior. The prestige that the hegemon enjoyed is waning, but the prestige for the 
benign malcontent is also not increasing, keeping the relationship asymmetrical. The 
system as it stands, however, is stable. Thus the benign malcontent seeks to keep it stable, 
even if this means going against the hegemon itself.  
 
4. Alienation will not go so far as to see a break between malcontent and hegemon 
 This point is important for the benign malcontent. While they may feel alienated 
and disgruntled the benign malcontent will not seek to totally break from the order they 
are a part of. The benign malcontent has too much invested and derives positive benefit 
from their participation. Being involved in a network of trade agreements, defensive 
alliances, and other beneficial arrangements, the benign malcontent wants to ensure that 
the order survives. Consequently they seek to balance out the actions they perceive as 
harmful.  
 
5. Elites within the order share experiences 
The political elites still share the similar vision that convinced them to buy into 
the hegemony in the first place. Whether this vision is of democracy, capitalism or free 
trade matters not, the fact is that they are still invested in the order. The idea of culture as 
a collective good plays an important aspect in this regards. The culture of the hegemon 
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imparts a bit of civil society into the order. Culture is an element that makes states 
identify positively with the hegemon. Benign malcontents are more deeply ensconced 
with this culture, in some cases they share multiple aspects of it, thus making it more 
difficult to fully break with the hegemonic order. Political elites not only buy into the 
culture but also are co-opted by institutions, money and a shared vision. Even in benign 
malcontents the vision is similar but the paths to attain it are radically different.  
 
The states of Western Europe, post Second World War, provide an example of the benign 
malcontent and how they oppose the hegemon. Not all comparable states are in 
agreement with the benign malcontent. In Western Europe‘s case many new prospective 
entrants since 2000 into the European Union were Eastern European states who fully 
supported what the US was doing in regards to actions like the Iraq war of 2003. This had 
the potential to create problems in the region. The institutions that the benign malcontents 
and the followers of the order built have created a link that is incredibly difficult to break.   
 Will a benign malcontent seek to overthrow the hegemonic state and assume the 
lead? Perhaps, but the most important question is if their power potential match the goals 
they have set for themselves181. Neither France nor Germany possesses the ability to 
achieve such a thing, even if they had any sort of goal to ascend to such a role. 
Hypothetically the European Union could become a hegemonic power. The United States 
would have to admit that its power had declined to such a point that a symmetrical power 
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relationship with its European partners would be the only way to maintain the order. Such 
questions on the nature of the future are reserved for chapter four.  
 
The Cold War in Europe: How Europe Became Malcontented 
 
The United States never really wanted to become the dominant force in Europe in 
the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The Atlantic Charter represents what 
the Roosevelt administration was aiming for after the war, namely self-determination, 
economic multilateralism, and collective security in the face of a possibility of a return to 
isolationism182. However by 1947 it was obvious that Great Britain was no longer the 
Empire it had been in previous decades. Two world wars had drained Britain of first the 
ability and finally the will to enforce the hegemonic order it had once possessed. Instead 
of a partnership of Anglo-Americans stretching across the Atlantic, as Churchill had 
hoped for, the stark reality was one of America reaching out to a war-torn and bankrupt 
Europe. With Britain withdrawing from her commitments in the Eastern Mediterranean 
there was little doubt that if the Soviet Union was to be kept in check the US would have 
to step in and take over where Britain had left off183.  
By 1946 there were rumblings among many foreign policy specialists about the 
inevitable division in Europe between the Soviets and the West, led by the United States. 
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There was still hope that the situation could be resolved, but the Soviets would have to be 
convinced that indeed, two systems could co-exist peacefully in Europe184.  The 
Americans had tried to hold off forming a sphere of influence and tried to get the USSR 
to do the same. This failed, and the involvement that the US had begun in the 
Mediterranean began to solidify into something else, something far grander than any 
isolationist could have predicted before the war. Two major American initiatives began to 
take shape in 1947: the Truman doctrine and the Marshall plan. Both were at the forefront 
of American involvement in Europe.  
The Truman doctrine took a cue from Churchill; essentially that the world was 
divided into black and white, democracy versus totalitarianism185. The United States did 
not want to risk open war with the Soviets. Instead the Americans bet that the Soviets 
would not go to war again and embarked on what can best be described as the very 
essence of a hegemon; the economic revitalization of Western Europe through the 
Marshall Plan186. The US could not hope to maintain any sort of balance of power 
scenario with the Soviets on its own. The de-mobilization of US forces following the 
Second World War Europe as well as extensive commitments around the world helped to 
limit the strength of the US in Europe. Rebuilding Western Europe was seen as an 
important strategy in keeping the Soviets at bay. Europe was a primary focus of this and 
consequently seen as the best use of limited resources. American planners saw economic 
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means as not only a quick method, but also the most effective method of strengthening 
Europe187.  
There would be no American Empire in Europe. Instead the emphasis was placed 
on the creation of an independent center of power on the continent capable of maintaining 
equilibrium without American intervention188. However, the presence of the Americans 
was very much welcomed by their hosts, they had been essentially invited into Europe 
and the Near East and most states were quite happy they were there. Secretary of State 
George Marshall called this American attitude ―enlightened self-interest‖189. In some 
ways the creation of a hegemonic order in Europe came from the bottom; people who 
welcomed the support of the United States. The seeds for European integration were also 
being sown with France and Germany as the center for a United Europe that could stand 
equal with America against the Soviet threat. However such intentions would remain just 
that for sometime, as such visions were overwhelmed by policy influenced by reality.  
The year 1949 saw America deepen its involvement in Europe. The Berlin airlift 
prompted a renewed commitment to American participation in European security. The 
birth of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, stems directly from the crisis that 
perpetrated the Berlin airlift and the need for not only an effective deterrence against the 
Soviet threat but also interests against renewed German aggression and American 
guarantees to France that military assistance would be forthcoming190. The choice to 
resurrect Germany was a controversial one. There was little desire to see Germany 
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dominate any sort of unified Europe, but the idea to balance Germany with Great Britain 
died as the extent of British weaknesses at home and abroad began to play out191. The 
special relationship between Britain and the United States combined with British 
reluctance to take part in European affairs helped to separate them from the rest of 
Europe early on.  
The early history of American involvement in Europe helps to paint a picture as to 
the extent of cooperation between the Atlantic. While America at first eschewed any sort 
of ―sphere of interest‖ this changed as the extent of Soviet policy became clear. The 
important part of this is the invitation that Western Europe extended to the United States 
to participate in the security of the continent192. The US wanted to build Europe so as to 
provide equilibrium in the balance of power. Europe wanted increased American military 
participation in addition to extensive economic aid. The use of material incentives 
combined with the projection of norms that emphasized economic multilateralism 
through both external inducement and internal reconstruction helped to entrench the US 
in the affairs of Europe in the immediate postwar years193.  
Western Europe‘s weakness at the end of the Second World War helped to ease 
the adaptation of the norms that flowed in along with the money of the Marshall Plan. 
The right and left wing parties within Britain, France and Italy were weakened by the 
economic recovery that took place. Instead strong centrist coalitions helped to make for 
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what Ikenberry calls the normative consensus about the terms of the postwar order194. 
Much of the power that the US wielded in post-war Europe was based on this social 
distribution of norms. The aftermath of the Second World War saw America articulate a 
set of norms and political conditions that were closely tied to the economic rebuilding 
and coalition formation within Western Europe195.  
The ―enlightened self interest‖ that the United States displayed in Western Europe 
came about because of the Soviet threat. Without the need to balance against the Soviet 
Union the United States would have, most likely, taken a far less important role in 
European politics after the war. With strong isolationist elements in Congress as well as 
Truman‘s desire to stay out of Europe initially, without the Soviets the postwar 
reconstruction may have gone very differently, perhaps the same way the Wilsonian 
project after the First World War failed with the defeat of the League of Nations in the 
US Senate. This leads to the era after the Cold War, when the need to balance in Europe 
disappeared along with the Soviet threat in the early 1990s. The order that the US had 
established and nurtured was missing the Soviet threat, the same threat that had helped, in 
part, to drive the US participation in European politics.  
The Soviet Union and the cold war were the glue that bonded the allies on both 
sides of the Atlantic together196. Three unifying elements held the US and Europe 
together, (1) the Soviet threat, (2) the American stake in the European economy, and (3) 
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the generation of political elites that had developed the habit of working together in a 
common endeavor197. These elements were experiencing a change in the aftermath of the 
Cold War and this would change the way that the US and Europe behaved towards each 
other. In the absence of a common enemy many scholars began to talk about a divorce of 
sorts between Continental Europe and the United States198. Some talked further about a 
return to a multipolar environment where the individual European states would play the 
old style game of geopolitics199. The idea of a united Europe seemed like a possibility 
that could very well come to fruition in the aftermath of the cold war200. However the 
inability of the Europeans to define security and defense hurt the attempts to solve the 
Yugoslavian crisis in 1991-92 and led to a greater sense that Europe was not ready to 
look after its own problems. There was still a gulf between national interests and 
collective interests and this lead to an open role that the United States could still fill, even 
in a reduced capacity, as it seemed in the 1990s. The Europeans were still followers to a 
lead taken by the hegemonic US; defense spending from the latter equaled twice the total 
of the European allies combined in 1992201. By 2000 the differences in defense spending 
had scarcely improved with Europe supplying only one-third of NATO‘s equipment and 
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only one-sixth of its military research and development202. Even with increased European 
unity the Americans would play an important role in security and defense for many years 
simply because of the material it was able to bring to any coalition arrangement.  
As viewed at the turn of the millennium the relationship that stretched across the 
Atlantic was still trying to define itself against the post-Cold War world. Several 
difficulties were set to cause problems in US-European relations, among them an 
increasing occupation with domestic issues, economic friction, cultural differences in 
US/European thinking (among them capitalism versus social welfare), confusion in the 
creation and execution of foreign policy because of systematic differences, and the 
danger of US unilateralism that sought to introduce policy with extraterritorial effects that 
paid less attention to concerns among allied nations203. These problems could be worked 
through though in most respects. It is not to say that Europe would automatically follow 
America‘s lead but as long as the model of leadership and followership were kept the 
possibility of continued cooperation was certain204.  The prestige that the United States 
had once enjoyed in Western Europe was wearing off and to keep the allies on board 
required a good bit more work than during the Cold War.  
Then September 11th, 2001 dawned and while the United States cleaned up the 
disaster domestically it began to assemble a coalition that would hunt down the 
perpetrators of the attacks and any states that would harbor them. The honeymoon period 
of coalition warfare began to wear off as the United States began to repeat the Truman 
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Doctrine in defining the world in black and white, the terrorists (and those who harbor 
them) versus the free peoples of the world.  Under the Bush Administration the United 
States would push the idea of unilateral action even further than the Clinton Presidency 
had pushed the concept with Kosovo, Somalia and other interventions.  While the 
honeymoon period in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks saw 
unprecedented cooperation between Europe and the US the calls for a coalition to enforce 
the preemption strategy began an alienation of Europe from America.  
Some have argued that the United States does not need Europe at all in the 
waging of a war against terrorists and associated states205. The differences between the 
two cultures have opened up into a wider gulf then ever before. The United States had 
turned to states branded as ―evil‖ as replacements for hard to catch terrorists206. This 
assertion may be controversial but proves a point: that there is a fundamental disconnect 
between the hegemonic US and the allies in Europe who were once regarded as 
indispensable. Europe will not realize itself as counter-hegemony against America207. 
Instead the nation-states of Europe have remained allies of the US while attempting to 
balance policies and strategies they see as dangerous to the international order that they 
have a stake in.  
As benign malcontents the states of Western Europe, most notably France and 
Germany, conducted soft balancing against the US invasion of Iraq. France, under 
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Jacques Chirac, embarked on a campaign against the US effort to assemble an anti-Iraq 
coalition while Germany, who held the United Nations Security council rotating chair, 
engaged in an effort to block the Anglo-Spanish-US resolution against Iraq208. The 
warfare between Germany and the US were merely rhetoric, including Donald Rumsfelds 
comparison of Germany to Cuba and Libya209. Several European states, including the 
―NATO eight‖ (Britain, Italy, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, and Spain) and later a group of ten aspiring NATO members all located in 
Eastern Europe supported the resolution and the US effort. France and Germany would 
not use violence or threats of violence. Indeed, they possessed a stake in the international 
order, an order they were trying to balance out. Economically and politically both states 
possessed a measure of power that could realistically provide a balance to the preemptive 
aspirations of the United States in regards to Iraq.   
While France and Germany may not be able to openly challenge the United 
State‘s hegemonic status they can certainly provide a balance that may encourage the US 
to soften its approach to the war on terror. The radical switch in the United State‘s 
strategy from deterrence to preemption has caused a crisis of direction for many long-
term allies of the US. Under the Bush Presidency the US is quite prepared to use its 
overwhelming strategic superiority in an attempt to impose its preferred vision of the 
world210. The vision that both the US and Europe share of getting rid of militarist 
terrorists still exists. The Europeans and the US must realize that to maintain the desired 
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outcome it is necessary to keep a compatible international system where these goals can 
be pursued211. Both sides need to understand the realities of the situation; the 
international community needs American support so as to not be rendered impotent and 
American needs to realize that going it alone will open up US property and citizens as 
primary targets of terrorists212.  Here the framework on benign malcontents to applied to 
the European benign example: 
 
1. Soft balancing as a means to restrain the hegemon 
For Europe this has become a primary means by which to restrict the United States. The 
use of diplomacy, economic sanctions, and institutional methods (like NATO and the 
UN) are all examples of how Europe tries to restrict the actions of the hegemon.  There is 
little other choice, Western Europe and American are still closely tied together and 
pursuing balancing through means other than force is the norm.     
 
2. A decline of state resources relative to the state’s expenses and commitments. 
The decline of American hegemony has seen the states of Western Europe pick up more 
responsibility. The strong European commitment to Afghanistan is perhaps one of the 
best examples of European penetration in areas that would not have seen such 
involvement two decades ago. As other commitments and expenses take their toll on 
American hegemony, notably Iraq, Europe will have to step in to fill the gap.  
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3. Hegemonic alienation that sees the closest of allies start to drift apart in the goals 
they seek for their participation in the order.  
With the Soviet threat to Europe gone the unitary vision that the US and Europe 
possessed has changed. Europe seeks to work with much of the third world and while the 
commitment to the war on terror is no less vocal than the United States the means to 
accomplish it has caused a rift. This rift is indicative of many aspects of Europe-
American policy disagreements. No longer is Western Europe dependant on the US for 
military and economic support. The equal status that the partners now have has led to 
diverging approaches to the structure of the international order.   
 
4. Alienation will not go so far as to see a break between malcontent and hegemon 
While America and Western Europe may experience alienation from each other over a 
multitude of issues the fact remains that economically and politically the ties remain very 
close.  
 
5. Elites within the order share experiences 
Differences such as the socialist leanings of many Western European Governments and 
the United States have done little to alienate the elites.  For all the apparent differences in 
government, at heart both Europe and the US are capitalist democracies with common 
elements in culture that allow elites within the system to engage in a dialogue that will 
make any break far harder to engineer.  
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Fighting Against Oppression:  The Revolutionary Malcontent 
 
The term ―sham independence‖ originates from Kwame Nkrumah‘s work 
Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare and describes what he believes:  
 
A state can said to be a neo-colonialist or client state if it is independent de jure and 
dependant de facto. It is a state where political power lies in the conservative forces of the former 
colony and where economic power remains under control of international financial capital
213
.   
 
Nkrumah espouses the same ideas revolutionaries across time have, that of exploitation 
of smaller groups by their larger neighbors. Lenin‘s concept of Imperialism represents the 
early application of such revolutionary belief. Lenin wrote of capitalists reaching beyond 
their own borders to exploit the workers and peasants in less developed states214. For the 
average revolutionary, however, the enemy is the political elite and the foreigners who 
are seen as exploitive and gluttonous in the face of poverty and oppression. Nkrumah‘s 
particular brand of revolution was directed at Africa and the neo-colonialism that he saw 
taking place in the 1960s. On the face of it Africa was independent but, as put by 
Nkrumah, was tied to a ―sham-independence‖ that was just another method of control by 
European Colonial powers.  
 Even though hegemony is based on consent, such a concept is rarely accepted 
universally on the international stage. There will always be states, or non-state groups, 
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who do not wish to offer their consent to the order but inevitably must bow to it. They do 
not have the strength to break out from beyond the reach of the hegemon to exercise their 
own national goals. The hegemonic state perhaps considers these malcontents important 
to the order in some way, as a holder of an important resource or a strategic position that 
must be maintained and defended. A revolutionary malcontent wants to break out from 
under the thumb of the hegemon and is willing to utilize whatever means necessary to do 
it, including violence.  
 Taking a cue from revolutionary theory we can outline a general theory of how 
these malcontents seek to pursue their goals against the hegemonic order. Revolutionary 
malcontents exist throughout the time of a hegemon but will begin to see the fruit of their 
labor pay off best as the hegemon enters into a decline. Goldstone has established an 
analytical framework for revolutions that will help to establish the same for revolutionary 
malcontents215. I have used Goldstone to construct a framework for the revolutionary 
malcontent type. The following numbered paragraphs are adapted from Goldstone‘s 
analytical framework. 
 
1. A decline of state resources relative to the state’s expenses and commitments. 
During the peak of hegemony it is easier to enforce the order. Through political 
and economic pressure the hegemon can impose the order it has created. Sanctions on the 
malcontent‘s exports, restrictions on needed imports and monetary aid can be used as 
both carrot and stick to entice the malcontent to the party line. As the fortunes of the 
                                                 
215 Jack Goldstone, ―An Analytical Framework‖ in Revolution: International Dimensions, Mark N. Katz, 
editor, CQ Press, New York, 2001, pp. 9-30.  
 106 
hegemonic state decline it may find itself unable influence malcontented states with 
promises of economic sanctions and military aid.  
 
2. Hegemonic Alienation: Alienation from the hegemonic state creates resistance to 
the need for new state revenues and institutional reforms, thus blocking recovery of 
the order.  
The goals of the hegemon and malcontent differ precisely because the hegemon is 
concerned about not only the good of the order but also the success of the hegemonic 
state. The hegemon is alienated from the needs and problems of the revolutionary 
malcontent, thus creating an atmosphere where any varied means of resistance will be 
used to exercise the national regional goals of the malcontented state. 
 
3. Popular mass mobilization potential: States and non-state groups with grievances 
stemming from economic and political issues will mobilize into a bloc against the 
hegemonic state and possibly the entire order. 
If one malcontent exists, the possibility of another coming to light is high. These 
malcontents will be able to perhaps form a friendship based on their mutual dislike of the 
hegemonic order. Cuba, for example, sent support in the form of men, aid and material 
(supplied by the Soviets) to revolutionary Africa in the 1970s, helping to propagate a 
communist revolution. During the early 21st century several states, among them 
Venezuela, Cuba and Iran, formed friendships based on their malcontent status, 
mobilizing into a loose coalition that the United States was forced to contend with.  
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4. States undergoing internal revolution will often externalize it
216
. 
Throughout history states undergoing internal revolutions will externalize against 
threats or perceived threats. The Iranian hostage crisis was a strike against the United 
States after the 1979 overthrow of the Shah, for example. The Chinese entry into the 
Korean conflict in 1951 was prompted by a perceived threat to their border from forces of 
the United Nations and South Korea. Revolutionary malcontents are most dangerous 
when they undergo internal revolution. As the bonds of the former government are 
thrown off the possibility is there that the newly revolutionary state will seek to exercise 
foreign policy free of the supposed oppressive international regime as well.  
 
5. Revolutionary malcontents are often the most politically marginalized and 
excluded groups or states within the order. 
The states that can be defined as malcontents, like Iran after 1979, Cuba after 
1959, the Boer republics in the later 19th century and North Korea after 1945 all had been 
marginalized by the order they existed under. Marginalization leads to actions like 
internal revolution and exercise of options best in the national interest versus hegemonic 
interest that prompted a response by the hegemon to restore the order to the malcontent. 
In some cases force was used (Boer war, the Korean conflict) in other cases economic 
and political strength was used to attempt to resolve the situation (Iran and Cuba). None 
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of the examples used ended in a clean win for the order and indeed three of the four still 
represent current issues for the United States.  
 
6. The pursuit of goals thought essential to the national self-interest are denied by 
the hegemonic order.  
 As a self-interested state with few ties to the hegemonic order, the revolutionary 
malcontent will seek to pursue goals that satisfy that interest. These goals do not sync 
with the good of the order, like the acquisition of nuclear weapons, for example, by a 
state such as Iran. If the state fits within the above framework then it is willing to test the 
hegemon over the issue. The hegemon‘s response is essential in the determination of the 
future of the order.  
 
 Revolutionary malcontents can exist even at the height of a hegemon‘s strength. 
Cuba, for example, succeeded in its internal revolution and began to externalize against 
the US as objections were raised concerning the nationalizing of American owned assets. 
The Bay of Pigs invasion marked a failure of the hegemon to restore the order and 
consequently the US had to contend with a malcontent that not only would not heel to the 
demands of the hegemonic state but was also aided by a counter-hegemonic force, in 
Cuba‘s case the Soviet Union who saw Cuba as a forward base of operations. This frame 
of mind led directly to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1963. As Cuba demonstrates there is 
no set method of dealing with revolutionary malcontents. If the carrot and stick method 
fails the next logical step will be to utilize physical force. 
 109 
 The revolutionary malcontent rejects the civil society of the hegemon, the same 
civil society that ties the benign malcontent so tightly to the hegemonic state. Today we 
see a distinct entity in the democratic west. While cultural differences do manifest 
themselves Western Europe, the United States, and Canada all share a similar civil 
society. This civil society has been adapted in bits and pieces, and some whole parts, by 
other regions of the world as well, like Eastern Europe. However revolutionary 
malcontents like Iran actively seek to distance themselves from what they regard as a 
suffocating environment. Internal revolutions bring a nationalist ideal and when internal 
revolutions externalize this nationalism will revolt against the civil society of the 
hegemonic order.  
 Many states that will fit the revolutionary malcontent classification were 
established by Western powers and saw their culture and civil society highly penetrated 
by them as well217. Robert Snyder makes a hypothesis that perhaps helps us to understand 
the revolutionary malcontent a little better. He theorizes that revolutionary states take 
defensive steps after a hegemon (in this particular case, the US) initiates an action that is 
perceived as potentially threatening or in anticipation of aggression in the near future218. 
The foreign policy of the revolutionary malcontent is concerned with purging the 
influence of the hegemonic power as well as engaging in state building by externalizing 
the internal conflict. The hegemon is seen as a looming threat and anything the 
malcontent can do to shore up against this threat will be undertaken.  
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 Since the Second World War the US has seemingly resisted responding 
immediately to the hostility shown by revolutionary states, like Cuba and Iran. Instead it 
was only a move that directly affect US interests, like the taking of the US embassy in 
Iran or the Cuban missile crisis that prompted an American reaction219. Great Britain 
acted much the same in the months previous to the Second Boer War, preferring private 
intrigue to official sanction. The Boer republics did everything in their power to sidestep 
the British presence in South Africa; this ultimately led to open war, a war that 
highlighted the beginning of the end for the British Empire.  
 
The Second Boer War 
 
The Boers had originally come to South Africa from The Netherlands and as descendants 
of the original Dutch they maintained an enthusiastic independence that Britain, who had 
taken over governance of South Africa in 1806, found hard to reconcile. Attempts by the 
British to impose their rule on the Boers (especially the emancipation of slaves) led to 
what the Boers called ―The Great Trek‖ which took them North and saw the 
establishment of two Republics, The Transvaal and The Orange Free State. Despite a 
nominal independence granted by the British the two Boer states would be subjected to 
ever greater scrutiny by the British Colonial Government, cumulating in the attempt to 
annex the Transvaal in 1880. The First Boer War was a failure for the British and the two 
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Boer Republics regained their nominal independence. The discovery of gold and 
diamonds led to a wave of British colonization north of the two Boer states; the Boers 
also benefited from the discovery of gold. The Boers began to receive more and more 
attention, first from British colonists who were swept northward in the gold rush but also 
British officials who began to covet the rich lands occupied by the Boers. Men like Cecil 
Rhodes and his contemporaries saw the Boer republics as barriers to furthering their own 
wealth and power. The non-Boers in the Republics were deprived of rights, yet subject to 
taxes and conscription. The British government saw the same republics as a thorn in the 
side of the colony in South Africa, a thorn that grew larger each day as the wealthy 
republics flaunted their independence more and more. As well the British wanted to 
secure just and fair treatment for the British gold hunters. Clearly the situation would not 
stand for long and hence the underpinnings of the Second Boer War were laid.  
 The Second Boer War is a case of a hegemon asserting its control over a territory 
that has been deemed desirable but controlled by a small state. The small state in this case 
was surrounded by British territory and enjoyed the support of European countries that 
would like to see Britain‘s power checked, in the case of the Boers, Germany was a 
primary benefactor. The Boers called the British and other nationalities that attempted to 
make their fortune Uitlanders and it was the friction stemming from the gold-seeking 
Uitlanders and the independent Boers that brought the British government in. The 
Transvaal Republic was militarily the most powerful state in South Africa and the most 
troublesome for Cecil Rhodes and other British capitalists trying to cash in on the gold 
rush. It was with Rhodes that the Second Boer War would ultimately start. Though other 
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factors would come into play, most historians regard the Jameson Raid as the catalyst for 
the war, leading to the Transvaal‘s preemptive attack220.  
The Jameson Raid was supposed to coincide with an uprising in the Transvaal by 
the Uitlanders and the two armed parties would bring to a boil the tensions in the Boer 
Republic, freeing the Uitlanders to exploit the gold and diamonds without the 
interference of the Boers. The plan was for Jameson and his men to meet the Uitlanders 
on the road to Johannesburg and together they would overthrow the Kruger regime and 
install a government that would grant more rights to the outside interests in the small 
country.  Rhodes and other prominent British businessmen in the Transvaal felt that this 
way was the only way to be left to make money in peace. The Colonial Secretary, Joseph 
Chamberlain, was supposedly in the know as well, providing a wink and a nod to the 
scheme221. The Jameson Raid was built around the majority of Rhodesian Mounted 
Police and was reasonably well armed with cannon, Maxim machine guns and other 
armament. What it lacked, however, was knowledge of what was happening in the capital 
of the Transvaal, Johannesburg. The president of the Transvaal, Paul Kruger, had made 
peace with the Uitlanders, a peace that restored stability to the Republic and his regime. 
Jameson would be riding into oblivion; there would be no uprising to greet him and no 
message to turn back. In his secrecy he had cut the telegraph wires, nobody, not even the 
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one man Jameson answered to, Rhodes, would be able to rein him in. Five days later 
Jameson was in the gaol in Johannesburg and his dreams of success, or at least a heroic 
last stand, had been shattered by politics and the Boer commandoes.  
Kruger was in a position to once more stand up to the British. He wanted full 
independence for his people and his Republic. Even the Orange Free State, the 
neighboring Boers, who had been friendly with the British, were put off by the raid and 
allied themselves closer with the Transvaal and Kruger. Paul Kruger was an old man but 
an old man that made it his life to maintain the independence of his people, first in 1881 
when the British invaded and now in the face of a failed military raid and the subsequent 
pressure by the British to give rights to the Uitlanders. Britain was not exactly unanimous 
in support of the Uitlanders. Many regarded the whole deal as smacking of Imperialism 
and the gold-powered likes of Rhodes and his associates had helped to hang a brace of 
money-bags on the whole spectacle222. The problems all fell into place though when Paul 
Kruger took the first step by issuing an ultimatum that demanded of Britain that it: 
1. Agree to arbitration on ―all points of mutual difference‖ 
2. The British troops on the borders of the Republic shall be instantly withdrawn  
3. That all British reinforcements sent after 1 June 1898 be withdrawn 
4. That Her Majesty‘s Troops on the high seas not be landed at any South African       
Port.  
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The ultimatum would expire in 48 hours and if no compliance were to be had the 
Transvaal would regard such as a declaration of war and would take appropriate action223. 
In many ways David had just rather foolishly flung the first stone at Goliath.  
 The Boer Republics represent a revolutionary malcontent that took a preemptive 
step against the hegemon; probably not the best of ideas but something that was felt 
necessary. Having not suffered a defeat since 1848 the Boer Commandos, which were all 
male Boers of fighting age, went to war confident they could repeat the victory of 1881 
where the Transvaal had originally secured its independence after a British invasion. The 
Boers had lost one man compared to the British losses of 92 at the final battle of the 1881 
war. The ultimate British victory in 1902 came at a heavy cost amid both domestic and 
international outrage at the tactics employed, including the use of concentration camps to 
separate the commandoes from their base of support. By the end of the war the British 
had invested considerable resources to win the war including three thousand miles of 
blockhouses to protect lines of communications, heavy garrisons throughout South 
Africa, and nearly 250,000 troops224. Losses amongst both parties had been high, the 
British had suffered somewhere in realm of one hundred thousand casualties of which 
twenty-two thousand had died, while the Boer Commandoes had taken around 7,000 
deaths225. These military figures do not take into account the thousands of Boer civilians 
who had died in British concentration camps, somewhere between 18,000 and 28,000.  
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The war was a series of political mistakes on both sides. Rhodes and his fellow 
Uitlanders wanted freedom within the Transvaal to accumulate their profit. The British 
tried to drum up support through dubious claims of wrongs on the Uitlanders by the 
Boers. Jameson proved to be the ultimate mistake by the British as it hardened the resolve 
of Paul Kruger and kept him in power at a time when his political hand may have been 
overplayed. The British turned down chances to negotiate even when Kruger relented and 
offered a Reform Bill that would have averted the war226. Kruger, for his part, solved all 
the political problems the British may have had in going to war with his 48 hour 
ultimatum. Boer confidence and British obstinance ultimately brought the war on.   
  
1. A decline of state resources relative to the state’s expenses and commitments. 
 In the years prior to the Second Boer War little was spent on running the British 
Empire from an administrative standpoint. Indeed, Chamberlain‘s Colonial Office had 
around ₤600,000 to budget on the entire Empire227. The British had a history of sending 
too little to deal with a problem, suffering defeat then sending in the necessary resources 
to win. While the Empire as a whole was not on the decline not much attention was paid 
to it before the war. The Boers saw this and reasoned, reinforced by their previous 
successes, that they could win a true independence from British influence. Locally there 
was little in the way of state resources and the ability to present an effective ―carrot and 
stick‖ approach was limited. The Boers had an advantage and they knew it.  
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2. Hegemonic Alienation: Alienation from the hegemonic state creates resistance to 
the need for new state revenues and institutional reforms, thus blocking recovery of 
the order.  
 The Boers had tried to extract themselves from the reach of British influence 
since the first great trek in the 1840s. The establishment of the Transvaal and Orange 
Free State as Boer Republics created a line, a line that the British disliked intensely.  
Uitlanders such as Cecil Rhodes wanted to exploit the wealth in the area free of outside 
influence. Boer treatment of the Uitlanders within their republics helped to strengthen the 
British case. The Jameson Raid was a direct result of the Boer retarding of British profits 
from the gold mine228. The Boers were well alienated from the British mainstream, men 
like Paul Kruger preferred to keep it like that and he had the support necessary within the 
Republic to uphold it. Policies like the dynamite monopoly gave revenue to French and 
German businesses and in turn provided the Transvaal with a willing source of support 
when war appeared to be on the horizon. The Boer Republics alienated themselves from 
the British and the British did likewise to the Boers.  
 
3. Popular mass mobilization potential: States and non-state groups with grievances 
stemming from economic and political issues will mobilize into a bloc against the 
hegemonic state and possibly the entire order. 
 The Boers were not alone in their grievances against Britain. The support that 
Kruger received from Germany and France played a major part in allowing the Boers to 
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strengthen themselves for war229. While not a bloc of resistance against the British the 
international support the Boers received was instrumental in giving them the resources to 
fight. 
 
4. States undergoing internal revolution will often externalize it
230
. 
 While the Boer Republics were not going through what many would call a 
revolution, Kruger was trying to keep a conservative grip on his state by denying the 
British any influence whatsoever in the running of the Transvaal. This nearly cost him the 
presidency until the Jameson Raid provided Kruger a new lease on life. The Second Boer 
War was not so much a case of externalizing of internal revolution but the externalizing 
of a conservative desire to remain independent. 
 
   5. Revolutionary malcontents are often the most politically marginalized and 
excluded groups or states within the order. 
 The Boers were politically marginalized, they had undertaken their Great Trek to 
rid themselves of British control and they had defended their independence in 1881 
successfully.  The Boers had little recourse, one of Kruger‘s points in his Ultimatum 
demanded arbitration by a third party. The British excluded the Boers from the order but 
the Boers also voluntarily excluded themselves by dealing with Germany and France as 
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outside investors. This appealed to the Boer love of independence as well as 
strengthening the position of the Transvaal through European support.      
 
 6. The pursuit of goals thought essential to the national self-interest are denied by 
the hegemonic order. 
 
The goal of the Boer Republics was independence, pure and simple. That they existed at 
all is a testament to this ideal. Independence was a national goal that was not permissible 
in the British quest to control the Cape of South Africa. The Boers were rich in gold and 
this paid off in increased power for the fledgling Republics. While being described as 
unorganized the Republics would not fit that description forever. The last thing the 
British needed on the Cape was a powerful, independent nation of capable and potentially 
hostile Europeans. British diplomacy reflected this policy in the finals months before the 
war.  
 
In sum, the Boer war reflects the framing theory that describes a revolutionary 
malcontent. While not revolutionary in the contemporary sense the Boers sought to do 
what revolutionary malcontented states do; break away from the hegemonic influence in 
the area. The Kruger regime upheld the conservative ideals that had led to the Great Trek 
in the first place, until British interference this was to be replaced with a strong reform 
faction in the Transvaal Government. The overconfidence the Boers held plus the 
perceived weakness of the British on the Cape strengthened the belief that they could 
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start and successfully win a war to solidify their independence. The Transvaal exhibits 
characteristics that define revolutionary malcontents. This led to a war that destroyed any 
dreams of independence.        
 
      
    Toeing the Line: The Passive-Aggressive Malcontent 
 
The benign malcontent seeks to balance the hegemonic state and remain close to the 
order. The revolutionary malcontent seeks to break away from the order to pursue its own 
self-interested goals. The passive-aggressive malcontent is a bridge between these two 
types. Being caught in the middle has never been an attractive proposition to anybody, 
especially for a small state on the international stage. Passive-aggressive malcontents 
must seek a balance between the forces of the hegemon and other forces pushing for 
different goals. Most often these come in the form of foreign/domestic pressure points. 
Domestically there exists pressure to go against the precepts of the hegemonic state; 
religious demands, national groups, and elements within both state and civil society can 
all contribute. The domestic demands collide with international goals such as a war 
against the same groups that exist within the state and goals that conflict directly with 
both civil and state society.   
 The leaders of the passive-aggressive malcontent are in a hard place. In order to 
reap the benefits and stay within the good graces of the hegemon they must accede to its 
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demands. But if the same leaders do so with too much totality the forces within their state 
will overthrow them, or at the very least make life more difficult. In essence the passive-
aggressive malcontent is force to toe the hegemonic line and seek to assuage both sides 
that results in neither being totally satisfied with the effort put forth.  
 Passive-aggressive malcontents are states that have a population divided along 
religious or national lines. In states with a strong Muslim population, like Saudi Arabia or 
Turkey, the divide is amongst the secular and the religious and one usually dominates the 
other in government yet not so much as to give complete freedom of action. The secular 
world that was largely founded in many Islamic countries is at odds with a growing 
dissatisfaction among the poor and disenfranchised. The civil society that many passive-
aggressive malcontents inherited from the Western Democracies has never been fully 
developed. Instead of a civil society that translates to a state, people find association 
along ethnic and religious lines. This translates into opposition as the religious and 
national organizations see the hegemonic order as trying to supersede what they have 
formed.  
 The elites within passive-aggressive malcontents are positioned between two 
worlds, neither of which fully accepts them. On one hand to stay in power they must 
pander to a population that is not fully in step with the demands placed on the elites by 
their presence on the international stage. On the opposite side is the hegemonic order 
itself and the desire of the hegemon to see that its interests are covered. The elites 
themselves are self-interested and will try to pander to both sides to keep power. 
Maneuvering in tight political quarters is a tricky business and some of these elites will 
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lose their position (and quite possibly their head). What was a passive-aggressive 
malcontent will be at risk to become a full-blown revolutionary malcontent that is not 
willing to compromise with the hegemon.  
 Passive-aggressive malcontents are subjected to numerous inducements by the 
hegemon. These inducements are a mix of threats and promises that tend to alter the 
preferences of leaders in secondary states231. The leadership/elite of the malcontent 
knows that if they do not consent to the hegemon the stick will be used on his state and 
this leads to the loss of power, a situation that is best avoided. Hegemonic pressure adds 
to the fine line that the leaders of these malcontents must tread. As with the two previous 
types of malcontents a framework will be useful in identifying and examining the 
passive-aggressive category.  
 
1. Passive-Aggressive Malcontents have cleavage in their society: 
 Most often this cleavage is between secular society and religion. Other times the 
cleavage is between ethnic or national groups. Most important, this cleavage is nearly a 
balance; neither side can overtake the other to gain power in the government. Both sides 
will exert influence on both domestic and foreign policy. Political identity plays a role in 
how this cleavage manifests itself in how the government operates. Deep differences 
separate identity in social life from political life. These differences allow a government to 
function insofar as all the pressures are applied equally.   
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2.   Hegemonic Alienation is not as pronounced as in revolutionary malcontents: 
 While revolutionary malcontents are often alienated from the hegemonic order 
because of any number of reasons (see Iran and Cuba), passive-aggressive malcontents 
are not as alienated. Some passive-aggressive states, such as Turkey and Pakistan, 
maintain a secular government and have made efforts at keeping Islamists, which is the 
political ideology of Islam, out of the government. This gives the passive-aggressive 
malcontent a stake within the order and for a hegemon bent on imposing its will on the 
international system there will be an interest in keeping the secular government afloat and 
within the order.  
The nature of hegemonic alienation will depend on the value of the passive-
aggressive malcontent‘s position within the order. Ireland, previous to the Second World 
War, struggled to become an independent state, free of British influence232. With the 
coming of war Ireland increased in importance to Britain and the Allies because of its 
strategic position and the continued desire to pursue an independent foreign policy. For 
Ireland, this was ensconced in a policy of neutrality. Irish independence remained 
benevolent towards Britain but continued to pursue policies that reminded the Allies that 
Ireland was a free state; such policy included continued relations with Germany233. 
Britain could not simply alienate Ireland; the island‘s position was crucial for the war 
effort and such alienation could produce a German advantage when such things could be 
ill afforded. Ireland maintained a line between neutrality and cooperation with Britain.  
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3. Passive-Aggressive Malcontents have a Civil Society: 
 The interplay of civil and political society helps to construct the state. One cannot 
overshadow the other; they must remain in balance to have a healthy state. Passive-
aggressive malcontents have a civil society that is weak, sometimes inherited from a 
colonial past, other times it just has never had the chance to mature. Benign malcontents 
have a fully developed civil society while revolutionary malcontents have a very weak or 
non-existent civil society. Passive-aggressive malcontents do not have a fully realized 
civil society but what they do have is enough to give a boost to both political society and 
the state.  
 
4. Passive-Aggressive Malcontents have regional interests that are different from the 
hegemon: 
 Regionally the passive-aggressive malcontent will have goals that differ from the 
hegemon. Brazil during the Second World War recognized the importance of US aid but 
worked to keep pressure off Argentina and Chile, rejecting American attempts to unite 
Latin America as well as breaking relations with South American states who maintained 
relations with the Axis powers234. US efforts to exclude Argentine were blocked several 
times by Brazil. Brazil was a friendly nation, even sending troops to the European theater 
and fully cooperated with the US during the war. But in matters of regional importance 
Brazil tried to minimize US participation.  
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Pakistan and the War on Terror 
 
After the attacks of September 11th Pakistan assumed an importance to the American 
hegemonic order. Previously Pakistan had had been on rather poor terms with the United 
States because of disagreements with India, refusal to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 
and continued support of the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan235. Much of bad blood 
stemmed from Pervez Musharraf‘s military takeover of the Government in 1999. Though 
Musharraf did not institute martial law and struggled to keep business as usual in both the 
foreign and domestic realms his takeover did little to calm fears within India and the 
United States236.   
 Pakistan had for years supported the Taliban through the Directorate for Inter-
Services Intelligence, or ISI. The ISI had penetrated deep into Afghanistan through 
support of the militant Islamists, who were later to become the Taliban in the mid-
1990s237. Pakistan, through the ISI, provided the support that swept the Taliban into 
power and kept them there, despite widespread Afghani disapproval238. For Pakistan, a 
Taliban controlled Afghanistan provided another anchor for the continued strategy to 
wrest control of the province of Kashmir from India. Afghanistan would also be friendly 
to the Pakistani government, thereby safeguarding an important border area and allowing 
all that more pressure to be placed on India. In effect the Taliban was a proxy in the 
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tensions with India239. US concerns about Osama bin Laden and continued pressure to 
capture him in the late 1990s was of secondary concern to Musharraf once he took power. 
The support for the Islamists in Afghanistan and within Pakistan itself was widespread in 
both the population at large, especially among the poor and dispossessed, and the army, 
which included some officers at the highest levels of command240.  
 September 11th and the attacks on the United States changed the importance of 
Pakistan in the American hegemonic order. Suddenly a troublesome, backwater, Islamic 
state became the frontline on a war to not only get revenge but to extinguish the terrorists 
once and for all. The demands placed on Musharraf from the Americans came swiftly and 
were spelled out in very clear terms: cooperate with us and benefit or face the 
consequences. In the face of the black and white world the Bush administration created 
there was no shades of grey; Musharraf made the only choice he could, stand with the 
Americans and destroy the nation he and his military had helped create241. The stark truth 
was that any hedging with the American demands would also give India an edge on the 
numerous disputes between the two countries, something that could ill-afford to 
happen242. Musharraf tried to cling to a belief that the Islamists that he had supported for 
so long and the terrorists were not one in the same. By acting as a bridge he thought he 
might be able to preserve the legitimacy of the Taliban while appeasing the US. However 
the declaration by the head of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, that bin Laden was a guest of 
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Afghanistan and that he would be sheltered there wiped away any notion of preserving 
the status quo243. Association with anybody associated with terrorism suddenly became a 
bad idea and to preserve himself and his regime Musharraf moved ever closer to the 
American led coalition.  
 As Musharraf made his bed with the Americans elements within both the military 
and society at large began to side more closely with the Islamists. Militant Islam was on 
the rise and placed the blame for their situation on American oppression. An indication of 
this was in July of 2003 when General Aziz Khan publicly stated that the number one 
enemy of the Muslim world was the US due to its identification of Islam as a threat244. 
Khan echoed what many Pakistanis were already feeling and what a large number of 
them had already acted on by joining organizations and schools that bred a type of 
militant Islam bent on the destruction of the West. Trying to reign in the explosion of 
militant Islam, Musharraf began to tightly regulate the existing mudrassahs while not 
allowing new ones, he also limited foreigners coming into Pakistan as well as expelling 
foreigners who were seen as joining the militant Islamists245. 
 Musharraf found himself between two rocks, the Americans and the vocal 
Islamists in his own country. To appease the Americans Musharraf had not only cut all 
ties with the Taliban (and al-Qaeda, by default), he also struggled to distance himself 
from anything that could be considered ―terrorist‖. Musharraf has not gone all out against 
the religious extremists though. The ISI, with extensive contacts in the tribes in 
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Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan have provided discreet support for pro-
Taliban elements in the area246. An example of this support from the ISI is seen when two 
former Taliban Deputy Ministers where allowed to attend a tribal social function and 
subsequently disappeared into the mountains247. Further, US forces were restricted in 
striking terrorist camps on the Pakistani side of the frontier248.  
 Pakistan is seen as a linchpin in the war on terror, at least insofar as it is 
conducted in Afghanistan. Even with a diversion of attention on that part of the 
Americans to Iraq, Pakistan is still important and Musharraf could not abandon his 
commitments without a backlash. The diversion of attention to Iraq could play a crucial 
part in years to come, especially with the continuing rise in militant Islam and the 
Pakistani Governments seeming inability to eliminate it. The deep links forged between 
elements of the Pakistani military and the Taliban are still there despite the official 
termination of support after 9/11. Musharraf must walk a delicate balance; he already has 
had at least three assassination attempts by militants who decry his cooperation with the 
US. On the other side is the lawyer‘s strike in March of 2007, which occurred after 
Musharraf‘s suspension of the Pakistani Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  The 
declaration of martial law in late 2007 is a result of Musharraf‘s tenuous hold on power in 
the face of the upcoming elections (which he won when they were held in February of 
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2008249).  Stuck between the rule of law on one side and militant Islamists on the other 
Musharraf is reaping the results of Pakistan‘s position with both the American war on 
terror and the internal discord in his country. 
 Why is Pakistan a passive-aggressive malcontent and not a revolutionary 
malcontent? First, and most importantly, is Pakistan‘s civil society. Inherited from the 
British and nurtured by the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali-Jinnah. Jinnah was 
invested in the rule of law in a secular state250. It was understood that independence was 
the ultimate goal, but to make that work Jinnah believed that much was to be learned 
from the British colonial rule. This put him at odds with Gandhi and was an important 
element in the formation of Pakistan as a separate state251.  Jinnah encountered the same 
problems that Musharraf has; Muslim clerics, in the form of an organization called The 
Congress uloma, who wanted Pakistan to take a more Islamic flavor. To his credit Jinnah 
kept his vision of a secular state intact and, despite military coups, corrupt bureaucrats 
and politicians, and the continuing strain of a strong Islamic community, Pakistan has 
managed to keep a semblance of secular rule.  
 The issues Musharraf has been experiencing with the growing Islamic militant 
factions and civil society itself is an indication of the disconnection between civil society, 
political society and the state. The state has accumulated too much power at the expense 
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of the civil and political societies252. This imbalance has taken away the development of 
civil society thus leading to the explosion of institutions that support and breed Islamic 
militancy. Actions such as the lawyer‘s strike in early 2007 confirm that civil society is 
still in existence in Pakistan and willing to take action against unjust grabs of power.  
 The clash between the civil society and the religious militants is part and parcel of 
the State‘s position. The interplay between civil society and religion is an integral part of 
the balancing act that Musharraf must maintain. Without this balance Pakistan would 
perhaps go the way of Iran, with Islamic revolution and the subsequent classification as a 
revolutionary malcontent, yet another state that actively opposes the ruling hegemon. 
However with this balance Pakistan, and Musharraf, must somehow appease the people 
while toeing the line with American demands and requests. It remains to be seen as of 
this writing if favor will tip in favor of the religious extremists, Musharraf‘s government, 
or the nascent civil society.  
 Pakistan is considered passive-aggressive precisely because it has not entirely 
bent its policy to match what the United States demands of it. Before 9/11 Pakistan was 
actively supporting (and played a hand in building) the Taliban. This was considered an 
important foreign policy in the continuing disputes with India. Musharraf was trapped, if 
he did not agree to American demands sanctions would be forthcoming, as well as 
inclusion on the list of countries that harbor terrorists253. This would not only result in 
Pakistan becoming an outcast but also benefit India in future relations; a situation that 
was unacceptable for Musharraf and Pakistan as a whole. Musharraf needs to be part of 
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the American hegemonic order, or at least on good terms with it. He cannot, however, 
ignore the Islamists both in and out of his government. To overtly support Islamic 
militants would not only be invitation to trouble with America but also undermine 
Musharraf‘s regime.  Instead Musharraf needs to provide what American wants while 
carefully choosing situations that will not put the balance of power into the hands of the 
Islamic militants. Closing off certain areas of the frontier to American activity, keeping 
the ISI in Afghanistan among the tribes, and doing business with North Korea and Iran 
with nuclear technology are actions that go against American policy254.  
 With its position as a not-entirely reliable ally of America, despite official 
statements to the contrary, Pakistan has little room to change policy. Even with American 
attention diverted to Iraq any failure on the part Musharraf and his government to at least 
pay lip service to anti-terrorist policy will result in sanctions that can be ill afforded. In 
Pakistan‘s case the hegemon is the reason it has undertaken policies that match the rest of 
the order. Without the Americans offering the carrot and stick Pakistan would not have 
acted against the Taliban. Relations before 9/11 demonstrates that Pakistan‘s importance 
was limited and therefore could pursue a pro-Islamist policy without any ill effects from 
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1. Passive-Aggressive Malcontents have cleavage in their society: 
Pakistan was created as a Muslim state. The cleavage within Pakistan is between the 
Islamists, who want a state based on the precepts of that religion, and the secular society 
within Pakistan. Not all Muslims in Pakistan support the Islamists, and many participate 
in the civil society that, though weak, is still active.  
  
2.   Hegemonic Alienation is not as pronounced as in revolutionary malcontents: 
Pakistan was considered a strategic though not an important area to the United States in 
the days before 9/11. Relations were bad; Musharraf‘s military coup, inability to squelch 
bin Laden and bad relations with India all contributed to this. After 9/11 Pakistan 
assumed a new, and overwhelming, importance to the strategic vision of the US. 
Musharraf quickly was given a stark choice; join the effort willingly and consequently 
reap the benefits or Pakistan would be ostracized as a terrorist supporting state. In this 
case the alienation was dependant on Pakistan‘s position within the hegemonic order.  
 
3. Passive-Aggressive Malcontents have a civil society: 
The presence of civil society gives society an outlet that is not nationalistic or religious in 
nature. In Pakistan the civil society was inherited from the British and is unbalanced 
because of the power given to the state. But, actions such as the lawyers strike in March 
2007 and the March 2008 election of a new Prime Minister show that civil society is still 
in effect in Pakistan and plays a role in keeping the Islamists at bay. It is in part the 
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presence of civil society that keeps Pakistan a secular state, no matter how tenuous that 
seems at times.   
 
4. Passive-Aggressive Malcontents have regional interests that are different from the 
hegemon: 
Pakistan has different interests than the US in Central Asia. Before 9/11 Pakistan had 
helped to bring the Taliban into being and to the governance of Afghanistan. This was 
part of a plan to use Afghanistan as a proxy in the dispute with India, primarily over the 
province of Kashmir. After 9/11 Pakistan disavowed the Taliban and any support for 
Islamists in Afghanistan, even giving use of territory to the US for the purpose of hunting 
down terrorists. Without hegemonic interest, Pakistan would not have totally abandoned 
its efforts in Afghanistan.   
   
Conclusion 
 
Hegemony is a fickle concept. Hegemonic states strive to build an order based on 
consent, which is the only way to ensure success in the long-term. As hegemons mature 
and begin to enter decline the malcontents start to go against the order. In The Old 
Regime and Revolution, de Tocqueville said ―Evils which are patiently endured when 
they seem inevitable become intolerable once the idea of escape has been suggested‖. 
While the hegemon may not have perpetrated any evils there will always be states that 
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feel like they are being held down. As other states within the order accumulate economic 
and military power they will want more equal treatment and a bigger say within the order. 
Other states will see an opportunity to exercise their own goals both within and without 
their state and region. Make no mistake though; it takes a long slow decline or a major 
war to make the hegemon a doddering old man within international relations. This means 
that the malcontents must exercise caution in how they deal with the hegemon.   
 As a famous professional athlete once said, ―To be the man, you gotta beat the 
man‖
255. Nowhere is this more true then within the hegemonic order. Malcontents are 
important phenomena, as they are not directly challenging the hegemonic state for 
leadership. Instead they want to be able function as independent states, with minimal 
outside influence. The reasons for this are many but all lead to the same end; freedom 
from hegemonic interference. In Western Europe‘s case this stems from a realization that 
in many ways Europe is quickly becoming the equal of the United States in the economic 
and political realm. For the Boers it was a conservative desire to keep things at the status 
quo and to exploit their wealth in peace. For Pakistan it was the desire of Pervez 
Musharraf to remain in power and work toward his own goals for his state. Whatever the 
reason the more power the malcontents assume, the weaker the hegemon will become. 
The ability to offer the carrot and threaten the stick will diminish and along with it the 
capacity of the hegemon to accomplish its own goals and maintain the order. The 
hegemon may very be ―the man‖ but its power will be compromised as the malcontents 
usurp more and more. 
                                                 
255 Flair, Ric, To Be the Man,  Pocket Books, New York, 2004 
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 In lieu of major war, the decline of a hegemon is rarely quick and rarely clean. 
Malcontents are a sign of decline; more malcontents equal a weaker hegemon. As more 
malcontents rise the ability to hegemon to bring them back into the order diminishes. The 
order begins to weaken and, eventually, the hegemon will lose its power, leaving a world 
that is more anarchical and multi-polar. In the aftermath of the First World War, no clear 
winner emerged and the Allies quickly broke up, the US withdrawing to the Americas, 
Britain too weak to exert its former hegemonic strength and the rest of the Allies unable 
to emerge from a war-torn Europe to form a new order. Even if a post-hegemonic world 
does not resemble a post World War One scenario there can be little doubt that no clear 
power will emerge. Establishment of a theory of malcontents will help to identify future 
areas of conflict, be it based on economic or military strength. No one malcontent will 

























This section will lay out step by step how to study the future through the application of 
the Tonn methodology to futures analysis. This is a tool that incorporates the scanning of 
leads and translates these leads into numbers that are organized into results that point to a 
particular result or set of results. Developed originally by the private sector, 
environmental scanning encompasses the review of a disparate number of sources, which 
include but not limited too science and technology journals and databases, gray literature 
reports, industry publications, technology developers, and major government agencies256. 
Tonn‘s methodology takes the idea of environmental scanning and incorporates it into a 
larger scheme that develops a systems model to organize the scanning while quantifying 
the impacts that particular leads will have on the various components of the systems 
model. Different leads will have different impacts and some systems model components 
will be impacted with multiple and possibly conflicted leads257. Here the methodology 
will be outlined, step-by-step, in what I hope is an easy to follow manner.  
 
 
                                                 
256 Tonn, Bruce E., ―A methodology for organizing and quantifying the results of environmental scanning 
exercises‖ in Technological Forecasting and Social Change: An International Journal, 75 (2008)  pp. 595-
609.    
257 Tonn, p. 596 
 136 
Step One: Development of the Systems Model 
 
A systems model is used to organize our study of the future. The model is built from 
components, each of which represents a piece of the overall environment. Components 
are influenced by other components. For example in my model, hegemonic economic, 
military and cultural power all directly influences the hegemonic political power 
component, which in turn influences the international hegemonic order. Sometimes 
components will exist, yet do not directly influence anything else, and yet are important 
parts of the model. My model does not have any of these ―free floaters‖. The illustration 
below (Figure 1) is the systems model developed for this futures exercise. The model is 
designed to represent the current international hegemonic order centered on the United 
States. After the illustration I go into detail about each of the components and the 
reasoning behind them.  
The primary component, that is the component that is impacted by everything, is 
E1: International Hegemonic Order. The order is built around the United States and is 
affected by two US based components, D1: Hegemonic Political Power and C2: 
Hegemonic Military Power. Political power is an amalgamation of economic and cultural 
strength, in other words the ability to get things done without the use of hard power. 
Military power is exactly that and its function is to influence the hegemonic order 
through the use of the stick. On the opposite side of the systems model F1 through F3 
represent states under or affiliated with the hegemonic order. F1: Hegemonic Followers 
generally support the hegemonic order and, most likely, the hegemon. F2: Hegemonic  
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Figure 1: Systems Model 
C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: This is the power of the hegemon‘s economy, in this case, America. 
Any leads that may affect the economic power of the US would have an impact here; the sliding US dollar 
and advent of a possible bullet train in California are both examples of leads that would affect the US 
economy. 
 
C2: Hegemonic Military Power: Military power is often a primary source of power for the hegemon and 
this component catalogs all the leads that have potential to impact it.  
 
C3: Hegemonic Cultural Power: This component is reflective of the particular set of institutions that 
America spreads throughout the world, namely free markets, democracy and American exceptionalism.  
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Figure 1, cont. 
 
D1: Hegemonic Political Power: The above three components form to impact the political power of the 
hegemon. Political power represents the ability to use the carrot and stick of raw economic and military 
power to accomplish goals without actually using said power.  
 
E1: International Hegemonic Order: The International Hegemonic Order represents the sphere of 
influence that surrounds the United States. This systems component is the end point for all other 
components; in other words the other components will all impact this one 
 
F1: Hegemonic Followers: Hegemonic Followers are states that are willing to follow the United State‘s 
lead on various issues. States such as Britain, Poland and Romania are representative of this category.  
  
F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: Malcontents are states that are too small to actively oppose the hegemon yet 
seek to do whatever in their power to escape from the influence of the hegemon. States such as Venezuela 
and Iran fall into this category. 
 
F3: Hegemonic Challengers: Challengers are states that are on the cusp of being able to rival the United 
States in the exercise of regional or world power and are willing to do so.  States such as Russia and China 
are states that fall into this position.   
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 Malcontents seek to break out from under the order to pursue their own goals thus 
weakening the order by not being in it. F3: Hegemonic Challengers are states that seek to 
upstage the hegemon and, perhaps, the order to carve out their own order. 
  
Step Two: The Acquisition of Leads 
 
Once the systems model has been designed the next step is the scanning exercise. 
Scanning is undertaken to acquire leads; that is relevant and timely sources that influence 
each of the components. Leads are a factor or factors that could change any component 
within the systems framework258 Leads are culled from a wide variety of sources which 
include and are certainly not limited too: journals, mainstream media, internet blogs, 
trade journals, think tank reports, and any other source that provides relatively reliable 
information that matches the above criteria. For this work the leads were drawn from a 
wide variety of sources that included journals like Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Far 
Eastern Economic Review, Comparative Strategy, Aviation Week. Other sources included 
publications such as The Economist, The Christian Science Monitor, Financial Times, 
Kiplinger’s, and The New Yorker. Websites of organizations like The Brookings Institute, 
Jane‘s Information Group, World Security Network, The Center for International and 
Strategic Studies, The Belfer Center for International Affairs at Harvard, and Global 
Security.  
                                                 
258 Tonn, p. 597 
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 The selection process was based on the subjectivity of the researcher. For this 
exercise the acquisition of leads was a three-fold process. First was the identification of a 
lead that looked to be relevant to the topic of malcontents and hegemonic decline and 
came from a reliable source. Reliable sources, like the ones noted above, were again up to 
the subjectivity of the researcher but based on the knowledge and experience of the same. 
Second the lead was matched with an appropriate component, for example, lead number 
18, The US Military Index for March/April 2008, would be matched with the C2: 
Hegemonic Military Power. Lead number 33, Only in America: Will America‘s 
Particularities Survive George Bush?, were matched with C3: Hegemonic Cultural Power 
because of the articles topic about American exceptionalism and its impact on world 
affairs. After this has been done the lead is then put into abstract form and then scored for 
its potential impact, as detailed in the next step.   
The leads themselves are contained in Appendix 1: Sources and Data for the 
Futures Analysis of the American Hegemonic Order. The following leads are 
representative of the Appendix and will give the reader an example of the format. 
 
 2: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: Sliding US dollar rates hit JSF program 
 
The sliding dollar has caused the Joint Strike Fighter program to skyrocket in cost because of 
overseas contracts. The JSF was conceived as an international cooperative program and much of 
the success hinges on the US-UK partnership in the deal. Future cost increases are expected as the 
USD continues to fall. This lead demonstrates the impact of the troubled US dollar on other 





5: E1: International Hegemonic Order: British Face Rising Cost of Living, Credit Crunch 
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British citizens have faced a rise in the cost of living that sees cheap credit disappearing and 
bankruptcy on the rise.  Here the troubles of the hegemon affecting the economic health of many 




6: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents:  Pakistani PM vows to fight terror 
Yusuf Raza Gillani, the Pakistani Prime Minister, claims the first priority for his country is to find 
peace and fight militants. Among other actions the ban on student and trade unions has been lifted 
and steps toward integrating the lawless tribal areas into the rest of the country, along with full 
rights for the inhabitants, have been discusses and enacted. Pakistan has now elected a 
government that feels that is does not have to maintain the same levels of cooperation with the US 
as the Musharaff administration did. While not overt, this decrease in cooperation will no doubt 





Each of these leads came from three different sources, the BBC, Jane‘s Information 
Group and National Public Radio. The number of the lead is first and the component 
next. Each of the above examples is attached to a different component; this is a subjective 
decision by the research as well. Each lead is attached to the component that best fits it. 
For example lead 6, F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: Pakistani PM vows to fight terror is 
associated with the F2: Hegemonic Malcontents component because it deals with a 
passive aggressive malcontent and the way they plan to pursue a policy issue. Other 
components will be judge in a similar manner.  
 The total number of leads in this analysis is totaled at 60. This number was, like 
other aspects of this study, chosen subjectively by the author. To achieve 60 up to 200 
sources were scanned. Some sources, like a more in-depth study of academic journals and 
technology sources were not scanned as closely as sources that concentrated on world 
affairs and thus represent a source that could be used in a repeat of this study in the 
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future. The chosen leads were deemed relevant to the components within the systems 
model. The methodology can be used with as many or as few leads (within reason) as the 
researcher deems necessary. However too few leads will give a poor picture of the future 
and while the more leads may certainly equal better too many may make the study 
ponderous. The leads for this particular analysis were chosen from contemporary sources, 
none older than a month or two from March/April of 2008. The concept was to provide a 
picture of the future based on current information from the sources named above.  
 
Step Three: The Coding of Leads 
 
Once the leads have been gathered and put into their respective components they then 
must be coded for their potential impact on the systems component. This impact is 
influenced by uncertainty. The uncertainty is represented by the upper and lower numbers 
in each box. Why uncertainty? We could code leads all day, happily assigning numbers at 
will. However in a study such as this the future is never known for certain. Further with 
the strong subjective streak of the exercise the uncertainty is present to remind us that 
nothing is guaranteed to come to pass. The upper and lower scores represent this 
uncertainty using the knowledge and intuition of the researcher. Coding is done for a set 
period of years, in this case 5, 10, and 20 years into the future. This coding is the linchpin 
in what makes this exercise an effective tool.  
 Assigning impact score is done on a scale of –10 to +10, where –10 represents a 
complete reduction or negative change in the model component (e.g., in the emission of a 
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pollutant) and +10 represents an extremely massive increase or positive change in the 
component259. Table 1 is the Chart for Assigning Impact scores and shows that as the 
impact score increases, the change in the component increases quickly at first and then 
levels off asymptotically to either –1.0 or 1.0.  
Imprecise probabilities, also known as upper and lower probabilities represent the 
areas of uncertainty that are encountered in the study of the future. Here is a brief 
introduction to imprecise probabilities. Let P (A) be the lower probability of an event A 
occurring and let P¯ be the upper probability. Then, 0 ≤ P (A) ≤ P¯ (A) ≤ 1.0. If one is certain 
that event A will occur, then P (A) = P¯ (A) = 1.0. If one is certain that event A will not 
occur, then P (A) = P¯ (A) = 0.0. If one has no knowledge about the occurrence of event A, 
then this is expressed as P (A) = 0.0 and P¯ (A) = 1.0. With precise probabilities, this 
situation is expressed as P(A) = 0.5. Let‘s say that some knowledge is gained about A (for 
example, let‘s assume that A is the percent of red balls in a clear glass urn filled with a total 
of one hundred red and blue balls and a cloth covering the urn has been removed so that one 
can now count the balls visible from the outside), then the lower and upper probabilities can 
be adjusted, say to P (A) =0.4 and P¯ (A) = 0.6. In the precise probability case, the addition 
of new knowledge leaves the P (A) unchanged at 0.5. The ability to represent a wide range of 
knowledge and changes in knowledge make imprecise probabilities very attractive for the 
methodology260. 
                                                 
259 Tonn, p. 598 
260 Tonn, p. 600 
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Table 1 
Chart for Assigning Impact Scores 
 
Qualitative Change in Component Change in component score (y-axis) Impact score (x-axis)  
Extremely massive increase .99999 10 
Extreme increase .986 5 
 .90 3 
Substantial increase .46 1 
 .38 .8 
 .29 .6 
~ 20% increase .2 .4 
~ 10% increase .1 .2 
 .05 .1 
 .005 .01 
~ 1 in a million increase .0005 .001 
 .00005 .0001 
~ 1 in one hundred million increase .000005 .00001 
 .0000005 .000001 
No Change 0 0 
 -.0000005 -.000001 
~ 1 in one hundred million decrease -.000005 -.00001 
 -.00005 -.0001 
~ 1 in a million decrease -.0005 -.001 
 -.005 -.01 
 -.05 -.1 
~10% decrease -.1 -.2 
~20% decrease -.2 -.4 
 -.29 -.6 
 -.38 -.8 
Substantial decrease -.46 -1 
 -.90 -3 
Extreme reduction -.986 -5 
Reduction to very close to zero -.99999 10 
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 Let Pi,t(Lj) represent the lower probability that the lead j will have the 
estimated impact on component i in year t and let P¯ i,t (Lj) represent the upper 
probability. The lower expected impact of lead j on component i in time period t 
is then Ei,t(Li) = Ii,t (Lj)* Pi,t(Lj) and the upper expected impact is Ē  i,t(Li) = Ii,t 
(Lj)* P¯i,t(Lj). As suggested, lower and upper expected values are calculated in 
approximately the same fashion as normal expected values. To put these 
formulas in context an example of three leads are il lustrated below and assigned 
impact scores as well as upper and lower probabilities.  
 
2: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: Sliding US dollar rates hit JSF program 
The sliding dollar has caused the Joint Strike Fighter program to skyrocket in cost because of overseas 
contracts. The JSF was conceived as an international cooperative program and much of the success hinges 
on the US-UK partnership in the deal. Future cost increases are expected as the USD continues to fall. This 
lead demonstrates the impact of the troubled US dollar on other aspects of American hegemonic power   
 
 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
-.0006 -.005 -.0045 
Upper 0.75 0.85 0.8 
Lower 0.65 0.75 0.75 
 
Using Figure 1: Chart for Assigning Impact Scores, we can examine this lead within the 
context of systems component C1: Hegemonic Economic Power. The sliding US dollar is 
beginning to affect defense projects, so the impact will be rather large and it will be 
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negative because such with both the loss of economic strength and the potential impact 
on military strength this lead will have a 1 in one hundred thousand decrease; not 
substantial but not terribly small either. The upper and lower improbabilities for this lead 
are not particularly large because the military budget will be the last to be touched and 
other ways to make up the shortfall will most likely be found.   
 Another example of lead coding is number 5, E1: International Hegemonic Order. 
 
5: E1: International Hegemonic Order: British Face Rising Cost of Living, Credit Crunch 
 
British citizens have faced a rise in the cost of living that sees cheap credit disappearing and bankruptcy on 
the rise.  
 
 
 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
-.00003 -.000035 -.000037 
Upper 0.8 0.7 0.85 
Lower 0.75 0.65 0.8 
 
 
Again, using Figure 1: Chart for Assigning Impact Scores, we can see how this lead may 
potentially impact the component of E1: International Hegemonic Order. The credit 
crunch has become a global phenomenon in this lead and the impact within five years is a 
one in ten million decrease in the order as a whole. Britain is only one part of a larger 
order and while the crunch is certainly hurting the average Briton, the impact will not be 
great individually. However, if multiple states within the order are feeling this, the impact 
will increase; this is covered in step four. The impact and the improbabilities are smaller 
still as with ten and twenty years the economy of the states within the order begins to 
stabilize as the economic cycle continues.  
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 A final example of the coding of leads is number 15, F2: Hegemonic Malcontents. 
15: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: A Balancing Act in Pakistan 
 
Pakistan‘s new government has made it clear that the cooperation enjoyed with Musharraf is going to end. 
The new PM and government will begin to undertake strategies that limit US freedom for military 
operations, negotiations with militants as a counter strategy and serious concerns about civilian deaths in 
the war against extremists.  
Basically the US will have to balance diplomacy and negotiation with a government that is not so eager to 
lay down to the US effort against Islamic militants.  
 
Type:  Passive-Aggressive 
 
 
 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
-.009 -.0002 -.0003 
Upper .45 .25 .35 
Lower .35 .2 .29 
 
The impact here in five years starts at a one in one hundred thousand decrease. 
This number reflects the fact that Pakistan is not actively resisting the US in the 
region, but is stating that the agreement that was previously enjoyed will not be 
necessarily repeated. At the ten and twenty year mark the impact  is lessened as 
US involvement in the region may very well wind down as well as possible 
governmental changes in Pakistan itself.   
Step Four: Aggregating the Leads 
Once the individual leads have been coded and assigned to a systems component they 
must be combined. Having multiple and often conflicting leads means that an effective 
means of aggregating them must be found. The following equations can be interpreted as 
calculating the expected changes in the systems model components estimated from the 
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impacts of the leads on the components. Tonn uses the following formulas to model the 
impact of all the leads attached to a component on the component itself.  
Let E(Δ(Ci,t)) and Ē(Δ(Ci)) define the lower and upper expected values, respectively, 
of the change in component Ci in time period t. Let I(Ci,t) and Ī(Ci,t) define the lower and 
upper expected values of the aggregated impacts of leads (Li‘s) on component Ci in t 
years. Then, the lower expected value of aggregated impacts of leads (Li‘s) on 
component Ci in t years is calculated by equation (1) and the upper expected value are 
calculated by equation (2): 
 
(1) E(Δ(Ci,t)) = (1-e-I(Ci,t))/(1+e-I(Ci,t)) where  
 
I(Ci,t) =  Pi,t(L1) *Ii,t(L1) + Pi,t(L2)*Ii,t(L2) + …… Pi,t(LN)*Ii,t(LN) 
 
(2) Ē(Δ(Ci)) = (1-e- Ī(Ci,t))/(1+e- Ī(Ci,t)) where  
 
Ī(Ci,t) =  P¯i,t(L1)*Ii,t(L1) + P¯i,t(L2)*Ii,t(L2) + …… P¯i,t(LN)*Ii,t(LN)   
 
These equations can also be interpreted as calculating the expected changes in 
the model components estimated from the impacts of the leads on the 
components261.  The total impact of all the leads within a systems component is 
then calculated and the total number can be tracked through the systems model 
itself, leading thusly to step five. An example of this can be seen by component 
by F2: Hegemonic Malcontents (Table 2). 
                                                 
261 Tonn, p. 601 
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Table 2 
F2: Hegemonic Malcontents 
Lead #  5 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
6 0.0001 0.3 0.35 0.00003 0.000035 
11 0.00008 0.6 0.65 0.000048 0.000052 
12 0.00001 0.002 0.004 2E-08 4E-08 
15 -0.009 0.35 0.45 -0.00315 -0.00405 
16 -0.00005 0.5 0.75 -2.5E-05 -3.8E-05 
23 -0.0009 0.8 0.9 -0.00072 -0.00081 
39 -0.00004 0.3 0.5 -1.2E-05 -0.00002 
45 -0.06 0.4 0.9 -0.024 -0.054 
53 0.005 0.2 0.4 0.001 0.002 
 
Lead #  10 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
6 0.0005 0.35 0.39 0.000175 0.000195 
11 0.00015 0.65 0.7 9.75E-05 0.000105 
12 0.00009 0.02 0.12 1.8E-06 1.08E-05 
15 -0.0002 0.2 0.25 -0.00004 -0.00005 
16 -0.00002 0.8 0.85 -1.6E-05 -1.7E-05 
23 -0.0012 0.85 0.9 -0.00102 -0.00108 
39 -0.0003 0.2 0.4 -0.00006 -0.00012 
45 -0.0005 0.3 0.6 -0.00015 -0.0003 
53 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.49 0.63 
 
Lead #  20 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
6 0.0008 0.39 0.4 0.000312 0.00032 
11 0.0003 0.5 0.6 0.00015 0.00018 
12 0.0003 0.8 0.9 0.00024 0.00027 
15 -0.0003 0.29 0.35 -8.7E-05 -0.00011 
16 -0.000009 0.7 0.75 -6.3E-06 -6.8E-06 
23 -0.0009 0.85 0.9 -0.00077 -0.00081 
39 -0.002 0.7 0.9 -0.0014 -0.0018 
45 -0.0003 0.2 0.4 -0.00006 -0.00012 
53 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.02 0.06 
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Once the impacts have been figured we can use equations (1) and (2) to calculate the 
leads into the expected changes in the model component into overall lower and upper 
expected changes, based on table 1:  
Lower Expected Change -0.0116 0.2695812 0.569638 
Upper Expected Change -0.02635 0.337071 0.607052 
 5 yrs  10 yrs 20 yrs 
 
 
Here the lower and upper expected change for the hegemonic malcontents component are 
illustrated in five, ten, and twenty year increments. The changes start out small, only 
about a one in one-hundred increase within five years. However, as we hit ten and twenty 
years the numbers from the leads indicate a far greater increase in the component score, 
in the case of the twenty year upper probability, an extreme increase in power. These 
upper and lower changes are derived from the leads within the F2 component. These 
numbers come from the following leads: 
 
Step Five: Tracking Component Changes through the Systems Model 
 
Systems model components will have impacts on each other. In this model‘s case these 
impact are numerous as seen in the above chart. Hegemonic economic, military, and 
cultural power will directly affect hegemonic political power that in turn affects the 
hegemonic order and so on. Estimating the impact of components on one another is done 
exactly like the assignment of impact scores to leads. First the leads must be aggregated 
within the component, and then the over all score is taken into account. The impact score 
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assigned to component impacts are separate from the aggregated leads impact score. The 
model will assume that the systems components impact each other in a sequential 
manner.  
 In this systems model components such as C1, C2, and C3 have been modeled to 
have an impact on D1, for example. In this methodology, it is proposed that the impact of 
one component upon another be treated mathematically as another lead. Let 
Pi,t(Cj)*Ii,t(Cj) and P¯i,t(Cj)*Ii,t(Cj) define the lower and upper expected impacts of 
Component Cj on Component Ci. Then, to incorporate the impacts of components upon 
each other, equations (1) and (2) are modified into equations (3) and (4), respectively:  
(3) E(Δ(Ci,t))= (1-e-I(Ci,t))/(1+e-I(Ci,t)) where  
 
I(Ci,t) =  Pi,t(L1)*Ii,t(L1) + Pi,t(L2)*Ii,t(L2) + …… Pi,t(LN)*Ii,t(LN) + 
Pi,t(C1)*Ii,t(C1) + Pi,t(C2)*Ii,t(C2) + …… Pi,t(CM)*Ii,t(CM) 
 
(4) Ē(Δ(Ci,t)) = (1-e- Ī(Ci,t))/(1+e- Ī(Ci,t)) where  
 
Ī(Ci,t) =  P¯i,t(L1)*Ii,t(L1) + P¯i,t(L2)*Ii,t(L2) + …… P¯i,t(LN)*Ii,t(LN)  + 
P¯i,t(C1)*Ii,t(C1) + P¯i,t(C2)*Ii,t(C2) + …… P¯i,t(CN)*Ii,t(CN)   
 
The impact of one component upon another should be estimated exactly like the 
impact of a lead upon a component, although these scores should, on average, be much 
higher than scores for single leads. Instead of taking a lead and interpreting its impact 
score, one would review the estimated change in a component, as calculated by equations 
(3) and (4), and then estimate the impact score of that component on the next component. 
Please note that that the estimated change in the first component is NOT the same as its 
impact score upon another component. Thus, one cannot simply push component change 
scores through the model (e.g., by using spreadsheet formulas). Analysts will have to 
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review component changes and estimate component impacts upon other components at 
every stage of the model. To make this process easier, the model assumes that 
components impact each other in a sequential manner, much like the structure of a neural 
network. Impact recursion is not built into this methodology. This assumption seems 
reasonable since this is supposed to be an easily applied environmental scanning and 
screening tool, not a complicated simulation model262.  
This methodology allows a great deal of flexibility in regards to how the analysis 
is constructed. The method can be used with all leads impacting all components that are 
relevant. As an alternate all the calculations can be done with as little as one lead that 
impacts multiple components (Tonn suggests a lead that emphasizes climate change as 
such a lead would have rather far ranging impacts on many components. Also this 
methodology can assess the impact of leads from across the model on one particular 
component, like, for example, all leads dealing with oil impacting C2: Hegemonic 
Military Power.  
An example of this is the impact of F2: Hegemonic Malcontents on the end 
component of E1: International Hegemonic Order. The following is the impact and 
probabilities of the above: 
 
Impact of  F2: Hegemonic Malcontents -0.09 -0.09 -0.1 
Lower 
Probability   0.7 0.8 0.85 
Upper 
Probability   0.85 0.9 0.95 
 
                                                 
262 Tonn, p. 601 
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The impact of F2: Hegemonic Malcontents on E1: International Hegemonic Order is 
coded exactly like the leads. While the impact of F2 is a subjective number as estimated 
by the researcher, the upper and lower probabilities from the aggregated leads within the 
F2 component play a part in this subjective number. The upper and lower probabilities 
are then aggregated into the other impact numbers within the E1 component.  
 
Step Six: Adding it all Up 
 
When completed the overall component changes should tell a story about the future in a 
scientific and methodical way. The numbers that the methodology produces can be used 
in a variety of ways. In this work the numbers will be interpreted in Chapter 5. 
Environmental scanning is just one tool that futurists can use to study potential futures. 
Another method is the narrative scenario, which is employed along with the results of the 




A Futures Analysis of the American Hegemonic 
Order and the role of the Malcontent 
 
 
The world that the US dominated during the Cold War is history. Black and white politics 
between ―good‖ and ―bad‖ are no longer as clear-cut as they may have been in the past. A 
simple case of with us or against us will not work in the complicated world born by the 21st 
century.  The lack of a Communist Soviet Union or a Fascist Germany ensures that the 
opportunity to divide the world into ―cowboys‖ and ―Indians‖ has past. Instead we have 
entered a period the enemy is defined by the highly subjective word terrorist and appears to 
be homeless. The ―war on terror‖ that demands so much attention has proven a central 
element in questions that have risen concerning the dominance of the United States. Samuel 
Huntington calls the international arena a uni-multipolar, a situation that sees a dominant US 
surrounded by other major powers. This situation sees the hegemony that the US enjoyed is 
fading slowly as a result of the rise of other international powers, such as China and India, as 
well as economic and political pressures that no longer favor the US. This has had a negative 
impact on the domestic finances and politics of the hegemonic US.  
 The malcontent‘s role in the decline of the US hegemonic order is centered on the fact 
they are beginning to realize that they may have a chance to achieve their national goals in the 
face of a disapproving US. Many malcontented powers receive some sort of assistance and 
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recognition from hegemonic challengers, as a malcontent will help in a balance of power 
situation against the hegemon. Each of the types of malcontent, benign, revolutionary, and 
passive-aggressive, plays a role in the world arena. Some overtly subvert the hegemon‘s rule 
while others want to quietly cast off the troublesome tenants of hegemonic policy.   
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the results of the futures analysis exercise. First 
this chapter will explain how the futures analysis methodology examines sources to present a 
picture of the future. Second I will present an analysis that puts the leads, numbers and figures 
into a narrative that explains what the status of US hegemony is. More importantly I will 
concentrate on the hegemonic malcontents that are part and parcel of the international arena. By 
presenting this I hope to demonstrate the validity of the futures analysis methodology in the 
field of international relations. Further, this methodology will allow me to put a practical face 
on the theory I have advanced in previous chapters.  
  
The Results of the Acquisition of Leads 
 
The leads by themselves tell a story, they help to set in motion the future as we will, 
perhaps, see it. In this section I will talk about the leads and what direction they take both 
the individual components and the entire model. The leads are contained in appendix 1 
and are divided by systems component, then number.  In this model sixty leads were 
identified and subsequently associated with a systems component. Here I will discuss the 
results of the scanning exercise and what kind of picture the leads paint for each systems 
component. Table 3 below is for the total, overall component changes: 
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Table 3: Component changes 
Component Five Years Ten Years Twenty Years 
C1: Hegemonic Economic Power    
Lower Expected Change -0.03248 -0.06427 -0.14882 
Upper Expected Change -0.03909 -0.07248 -0.17397 
C2: Hegemonic Military Power    
Lower Expected Change -0.0042085 -0.003123 -0.00132 
Upper Expected Change -0.0044567 -0.003305 -0.0014 
C3: Hegemonic Cultural Power    
Lower Expected Change 9.34E-05 0.00019 0.000356 
Upper Expected Change 0.000101 0.000207 0.000379 
D1: Hegemonic Political Power    
Lower Expected Change 0.232715 -0.0100764 -0.0232 
Upper Expected Change 0.247012 -0.0105063 -0.02468 
E1: International Hegemonic Order    
Lower Expected Change -0.01058 -0.31473 -0.56713 
Upper Expected Change -0.02368 -0.33794 -0.61927 
F1: Hegemonic Followers    
Lower Expected Change -0.03093 0.004389 0.225356 
Upper Expected Change -0.0376 0.005477 0.253865 
F2: Hegemonic Malcontents    
Lower Expected Change -0.0116 0.2695812 0.569638 
Upper Expected Change -0.02635 0.337071 0.607052 
F3: Hegemonic Challengers    
Lower Expected Change 0.2400955 0.525074 0.826016 




C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: The leads in component C1 paint a picture of a 
hegemon in economic distress. The US dollar is rapidly sliding in comparison to other 
currencies, to the point that it may replace by the euro when trading for certain 
commodities. The economic calamities of the US may not be a temporary problem either, 
they may, in fact, be the leading edge of something worse. As economic power declines 
the ability of the US to use it to affect political outcomes will decline as well. The US is 
staying the same in a world that is rapidly changing.  
Here the leads give an overall component change that ranges from a negative 
three percent decrease in hegemonic economic power in five years to a 14 to 17 percent 
decrease at twenty years. With so many changes occurring so rapidly in the last year the 
leads have given insight into a longer term change, namely that of the US losing much of 
its economic clout within world markets. Lead no. 52 discusses what will happen after 
the dollar and is representative of many that believe that the dollar is no longer the 
hegemonic force it once was. The rise of euro has given many an alternative, an 
alternative they will no doubt exercise. Further lead no. 31 is indicative of the reliance on 
oil that US economy has and that such a continued need will necessarily be negative as 
oil become more expensive and less prolific.   
 
C2: Hegemonic Military Power: While the economy of the US has affected the military 
power slightly, in reality the US has maintained its strength and shows great promise for 
the future. Currently the US is stretched out over two conflicts and this has hurt the 
power of the hegemon. However the number of advanced projects in the works will help 
 158 
to make the US military, to excuse the phrase, leaner and meaner in the way it conducts 
operations. Many of the leads see automated tools such as robots and drones in 
development to become incorporated within the forces in the next five years or so. 
Essentially the leads demonstrate that the US is as powerful as it ever was militarily and 
will continue to be so for the foreseeable future.  
 For this component the leads give very small levels of negative impact scores, 
ranging in the 1 in one hundred million decrease. Even at twenty years the level of 
decrease is quite small. The US military will indeed be hit by the shrinking economy but 
with the level of research and design that the military has, as indicated by leads 22, 26, 
27, 28, and 35, the negative impacts by leads like 4, 18, 21, and 59 will be largely 
canceled out. The leads indicate a switch to a force that is slowly becoming more capable 
while shrinking because of force multipliers, like robots. The US has such a lead in 
military technology and logistical capability that even with a reduced budget it is possible 
to foresee only minor losses in force capability.  
 
C3: Hegemonic Cultural Power:  The values that help define American, democracy, 
free trade and civil liberties, among others, are still alive and strong and spreading. The 
values that American has long stood for still seem to be popular and while other aspects 
of American power may decline the culture it has propagated will continue. Culture is, 
unlike other aspects of hegemonic power, more nebulous and more difficult to judge. The 
leads have been selected on the basis of how they relate to the above attributes that seem 
uniquely ―American‖. 
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 The leads here see an increase that begins quite small (in the 1 in one hundred 
million range) and ends up being a bit more significant in twenty years time, around 1 in 
a million increase. The leads here indicate that democracy, which America has 
traditionally pushed hard, is still being adapted by many states around the world. This 
growth is tempered the fact that America is slowly losing the exceptionalism that has 
defined so much of the post-Cold War world view. America is in danger of becoming 
more and more isolationist in a world that has ceased to appreciate the American spirit 
and this will hurt the spread of those American values that are beneficial to the rest of the 
world.    
 
D1: Hegemonic Political Power: American‘s political power is still fairly consistent. 
Despite a poorer economic situation American is still seen as a primary aid provider, 
especially in these times of high food and energy prices. Further, military assistance is 
still readily given to allied states. Despite economic woes, America is still able to 
convince companies like Shell that assistance to Iran is not in their best interests. The 
leads suggest a relatively high amount of American political power.  
 The political power of the hegemon will experience a steep drop, beginning in the 
five year range as a 23-24 percent decrease and getting markedly smaller, but still 
negative, as we wind up in the twenty year period at a two percent decrease. The leads 
(no.7) indicate that despite a change in presidents, American will still stay on roughly the 
same foreign policy path and that Iraq will remain a troublesome burden on the exercise 
of political power. In the longer term such things will still present echoes in how 
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American deals and is dealt with. On the upside, America is still able to exercise some 
pull as leads 51 and 58 indicate. The fact is, and will most likely remain for some time, 
that American stands as an important giver of aid, readily supplying logistical support for 
international disasters.   
 
E1: International Hegemonic Order: The old saying of ―So goes GM, so goes the 
nation‖ is applicable here. The order is suffering from roughly the same maladies as the 
hegemon, namely the global credit crunch and other economic woes. A primary 
institution of the order, NATO, is in need of a restoration of credibility. Some states 
within the order, Argentina is pointed out, are suffering economic meltdowns which are 
blamed on the IMF and the primary backer of such, the US. Plagued by rising food and 
energy prices the international hegemonic order is suffering and many states are looking 
elsewhere for their support.  
 The decline of the order is steep and the decline is steady over the twenty year 
timeline. Starting at between a one and two percent increase at five years and ending up 
at between a negative 56 to 61 decrease at twenty years, this loss of power can be 
ascribed to a number of factors. Leads 1, 5, 41, and 44 all demonstrate how the 
economies of even stable members of the order, like Iceland, are being hit by the global 
economic problems. Other leads, like 40 and 41, are representative of issues that will help 
to sap the strength of the order. The rapidly rising price of food has begun to hit the 
hegemonic order; a sure sign of something serious. The ability to function off 
inexpensive food and energy is disappearing and this will hurt the order, especially in the 
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long term as economic troubles conspire to take away the ability to maintain the standard 
of living that the order has become accustom to.  
 
F1: Hegemonic Followers: The hegemonic followers are not as rigid as they once were. 
Some, like Canada, are beginning to strike out on their own to select regions, such as the 
Caribbean. Many NATO states are beginning to expand and lean away from the picture 
of the US as a senior partner. In many ways the US has nurtured this by bypassing NATO 
in the new strategy of preemption. The followership of the states behind the hegemon is 
weaker than it has been in many years, perhaps weakest since the founding of the order in 
the post-Second World War period.  
 The initial decrease in hegemonic followers (being small, one in a hundred 
thousand decrease) is a result of the backlash from the hegemonic economic crunch. The 
following two time periods, ten and twenty years, show increases which are dramatic, 
ending at a roughly 20 to 25 percent increase. Leads such as no. 8 and 19 demonstrate 
that followers like Canada are starting to break into new territories without the assistance 
of the hegemon. NATO, an important institution for followers of the order, is starting to 
take on a life of its own. Such success in Europe and engagement abroad make NATO a 
force to be reckoned with, even without the full support of the United States.  
 
F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: The malcontents are beginning to turn against the power 
of the hegemon. Pakistan, for example, has elected a new government, democratically, 
that is determined to do things without the overt interference of the US, like talking to the 
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Islamists within the state. Other malcontents, like Venezuela, are seeking to spread its oil 
capacity to areas that exist under nominally tight US control, such as the Caribbean. 
European malcontents, like Germany, are beginning to evolve their foreign policy to 
approach issues without the US in the picture. The weakness of the order and the 
hegemon has allowed the malcontents the ability to exercise their national goals, at least 
to a point.  
 The malcontents suffer a slight loss in the five year period, between a -.01 and a   
-.02 decrease. After that the malcontents begin a rapid rise in their impact scores, ending 
in the twenty year period between 57 and 61 percent. Why so much? First the small 
decrease is brought about by questions regarding gaps in Chavez‘s rule (lead 11) and 
problems regarding the infrastructure on Iran‘s oil fields (lead 53). However these will be 
balanced by leads such as 6, which is part of the Pakistani effort to fight terrorism their 
way, which includes lead 15, and the end of the full cooperation given by the government 
to the US effort. Leads indicate that Iran and Germany will continue their increase in 
power, with Germany dabbling with the idea of a more active foreign policy and Iran 
continuing to pursue its vested interest in Iraq‘s fate. Venezuela is working towards 
providing an alternative to US involvement in the Caribbean (lead 45). The thing that 
makes this lead important is Venezuela‘s oil and the means that Chavez uses to exploit 
that resource as a base to build a following in the American backyard.      
 
F3: Hegemonic Challengers: Challengers are beginning to rise and, based on the leads 
here, becoming stronger. China and India are beginning to make inroads with both Africa 
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and the EU in regards to trade agreements and aid. China has stumbled as of late 
economically, leading to questions that revolve around its ability to sustain the 
tremendous economic growth. Meanwhile the EU is beginning spread its wings in 
Europe, slowly building an independent economic and political life away from the US. 
Many states have begun to build around the US, changing how business is done on a day 
to day scale.   
 Hegemonic challengers, like the malcontents, have very large increases that start 
at the five year mark as between 24 and 43 percent and range to 82 and 85 percent at the 
twenty year mark. The large increase is due to leads such as 13, 32 and 34 which detail 
the rise of China as a power to contend with. Lead 13 is very interesting as it 
demonstrates that both India and China are beginning to make inroads in places they have 
never really been before and Africa is ripe for development by potentially major powers 
like India and China. These states will experience an economic slow down, as evidenced 
by leads 25 and 30 but I believe in the twenty year run this will do little to truly put a 
muzzle on the growth of the hegemonic challengers as major contenders for power on the 
international scene. Lead 49 is perhaps one of the more important leads. By having 
France come back in as a full member the two benign malcontents that were against the 
2003 Iraq conflict will be able to exercise influence on the most important defense 
alliance in the western world. This will have major implications for both the power of the 
US as well as the European Union. NATO may very well be on its way to becoming the 
defense pillar of the EU.  
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A Narrative Scenario of the Future 
 
The numbers for the futures methodology exercise are divided into five, ten, and twenty 
year forecasts. Consequently, I will divide my scenario section about them in a similar 
manner and discuss the state of the American hegemonic order at each stage. Scenario 
building is an important part of futures analysis. Scenarios are tools for taking a long 
view in a world of great uncertainty.263 The scenario that follows is merely one possible 
future. While based off the leads and the results of the exercise, the scenario is 
speculation based on the researcher‘s own knowledge. I have divided the narrative into 
five, ten, and twenty year increments to coincide with the rest of the methodology. This 
scenario is derived from the futures analysis exercise and is, of course, merely one 
possible future; one man‘s idea of a possibility based on subjectivity as well as the hard 
data found from the exercise.  
Five Years 
Within five years the component where everything meets, E1: International 
Hegemonic Order, continues a slow, yet steady decline. With a spread between -.008 and 
-.015 the initial loss is under 2 percent. Yet these two percentage points represent many 
things. First institutions within the order have lost credibility in the eyes of the world. 
NATO, WTO and other organizations that represent the order are not as powerful as they 
once were. NATO has lost some of the status that made it an integral part of the defense 
                                                 
263 Schwartz, Peter, The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World, Currency-
Doubleday, New York, 1991. 
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of Europe. The International Monetary Fund and its primary supporter, the United States, 
are seen by many South Americans as a primary cause for Argentina‘s meltdown.  On 
another front, the economic crisis centered on a global credit crunch has began to hit 
states not only such as Britain, but also smaller, more stable states such as Iceland who 
depend on foreign investment. Finally it seems as if a democratic recession has started, 
rolling back the wave of democracy that influenced many small states in the late 1990s 
and early ‗00s. While not really Islamic in nature, this democratic rollback will have 
serious repercussions for the stability of the order if it continues. These democratic 
rollbacks could stick because of the rising prices in food and energy and the inability of 
many to cope with the increased prices.  
 The center of the International Order, the United States, is an important cause of 
the slow decline. The economic power of the US is very much in doubt. The rapidly 
declining dollar, coupled with rising energy and food prices, hurt the economic health of 
the US, perhaps past the point of recovery. The initial number stands at between three 
and nine percent, both negative. This negative number is more damaging than it first 
appears as the US is the driving force behind many international institutions, as well as 
the basis for much trade in foreign markets because of the use of the dollar. Many are 
starting to ask themselves ―what next after the dollar?‖ and looking for other currency to 
use in markets. In this environment, NAFTA may assume an increased importance in the 
economy of the US. While the economy may be in the beginning stages of a bad flu, the 
military power of the US is still high, with almost negative miniscule changes, mostly 
brought upon by the war and pull out from Iraq. The military is still the strongest element 
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of American foreign policy, either as by threat or by use. The continuing research and 
design into tools such as robot soldiers, airborne drones and other advanced weapon 
systems and force multipliers help US military strength. The military will shrink 
numerically yet stay or increase in the ability to project force.  
 States that represent challengers and followers of the order are a mixed lot. 
Hegemonic followers of the order, which include states such as Canada and Australia, 
experience a small decline of between negative two and three percent. These states are 
going through the same shocks as the rest of the order but are also able to stabilize their 
currency better, resulting in rising local values against the US dollar. States such as 
Canada are slowly realizing their potential at the international level, and are seeking to 
expand their economic ventures into unexplored areas, such as the Caribbean. Hegemonic 
challengers, however, are predicted to realize big gains in the next five year growth 
between 8 and 30 percent. The large spread can be attributed the challenger states‘ (such 
as India, Russia, China and the European Union) rise in power and the decline of the US. 
While militarily no power can match the US, economically these challenger states 
represent a serious force in world markets. Even more important they are starting to 
discuss trade pacts with each other, such as the EU and China.  
 The first five years represents a period in which the US and the order surrounding 
it are suffering economic decline among a rapidly changing world. While many followers 
of the US adjust to these changes, the US does not. This will hurt it later on. Make no 
mistake; the military power of the US is second to none. While China and other states 
appear to be powerful they lack the ability to project force the way the US can. In five 
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years the United States will remain a superpower and the center of the hegemonic order. 
But the order will weaken with it, as the global financial crisis (centered on the credit 
crunch and rising food and energy prices) spreads.  
 
Ten Years 
Five to ten years out the International Hegemonic Order is still on its long, slow 
decline. Now the numbers stand at between a 1 and 2 percent decline within the 
hegemonic order. The economic meltdown has been stabilized to a point, but the wealth 
that once existed has never come back. The international institutions that helped make the 
order a reality are weaker. Moreover, hegemonic challengers are making it possible for 
smaller states to avoid having to conform to the draconian economic standards of the 
IMF. The credit crunch has eased, making it possible for the middle classes of Britain and 
the US (among many others) to stabilize the economy. The bubble that fed the extreme 
rise in energy and food prices has long since burst, making it possible for many small 
states to get back on their feet and solidifying many democracies that were in danger of 
collapsing. The order has, in large part, stabilized itself economically and many of the 
smaller states, such as those in Eastern Europe and former Commonwealth states, are 
playing an increased role in how the order is managed.  
 The reduced economic strength of the US makes the increased participation of 
other order member states important. For the ten year mark we see a further decrease in 
economic power in the range of between two to five percent. Again, this may seem small. 
But as the economic strength of the US declines other states will take up the slack and a 
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corresponding decrease in the successful use of political power will occur. By this point 
many international markets have gone off the dollar as the standard currency, many using 
the euro as a more stable alternative. The drop in energy and food prices has allowed the 
US to slow its decline to some extent and even experience resurgence in the domestic 
economy. Compared to challengers, however, this resurgence is too little too late. The 
economic power of the hegemon has slipped.  
 In contrast, the military power of hegemon has not slipped. While the decline still 
exists, it is small. The end of the Iraq war allowed the US military to reorganize and 
integrate new technology ago. Capable robots controlled by humans now perform many 
dangerous tasks. Drones have taken over many reconnaissance and ground attack duties, 
leaving high technology projects like the Joint Strike Fighter for air superiority. On the 
ground a highly integrated web of command and control equipment supports the 
individual soldier, enabling smaller units to perform bigger tasks more efficiently. 
Research and design has slowed because of the smaller economy, but many tools are still 
in development. What appears is a smaller, more capable force that effectively 
accomplishes many tasks remotely, with minimal loss of life. The ability to project force 
is undiminished; the nuclear carrier force has entirely replaced the remaining 
conventional CVs, for example. The modern American miracle of large scale logistical 
deployment and support are still in place, thanks to the smaller, more capable force make-
up. The military has become a tool that takes the place of political pressure. If a small, 
Middle Eastern state is giving American interests in the area trouble, a battle group of 
some sort is likely to be sent. Diplomatic pressure is forgone. Coalition forming is still 
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important, but the legacy of Iraq often shines through and more likely than not the US 
approaches a military situation alone, with minimal coalition support 
 The hegemonic followers are still behind the US, and they lend their support on 
occasion. But they have also begun to strike out on their own more. Canada is developing 
economic ties with South America and the Caribbean. Australia is in talks with several of 
its neighbors in the South Pacific. Great Britain has started investigating the use of the 
euro. Eastern Europe is forming increasingly stronger economic and cultural ties with the 
Western European states. The numbers for hegemonic followers show a slight increase 
and this is reflective of the success many of these states have had in improving their own 
situations without overt US activity. These states still support the US, but this support is 
increasingly more in spirit than in actual military support. In addition, the followers are 
more active in aiding the states of the third world, preferring to send money rather than 
military aid to young democratic states.  
 The hegemonic challengers to the US and the order are experiencing a renaissance 
with gains between 40 and 90 percent. China is continuing its trend as an economic 
powerhouse. Between servicing the debt of the US and new trade pacts with the EU, 
China booms. This boom period has also hit the military and the People‘ Liberation 
Army is continuing the move away from huge masses of troops to a more streamlined, 
technological force, something that the money flowing into the country is helping with. 
Prudent minds in Beijing have decided that the Taiwan problem is best serviced by 
economic means. Taiwan is seen increasingly as a partner in Chinese economic growth. 
China stumbles, but only slightly and the tiger that is China continues to grow. Russia has 
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profited from Putin‘s strategy of switching to economic means rather than military means 
of deterrence. The country is a powerhouse of natural energy and is ready and willing to 
cut off the taps to get its political way with Europe. The nuclear arsenal is still Putin‘s 
way of dealing with any potential state-based threats while the conventional Russian 
forces are benefiting from energy revenue. Russia is not above flexing its increased 
military muscle when needed, but it prefers to bargain with its energy reserves.   
Twenty Years 
By 2028 we will see significant changes in the way the US and the order that 
surrounds it must operate. While the order has resisted change, its power has dropped 
between 15 and 25 percent, which is a decrease produced by a changing world and an 
order that cannot seemingly adapt. NATO is still around and remains an important pillar 
of the European Union Defense community and is not necessarily controlled or 
dominated by the US. After the rebuilding of Afghanistan a major push by Great Britain 
and other member states sought to restore NATO‘s credibility as a military alliance. 
Because of its European make-up NATO was seen a natural transition to become the 
security arm of the EU. This decision saw the influence of the US reduced drastically, 
even though the force projection capability of the US was still an integral part of NATO 
operations. Other institutions, like the IMF, are also still around, though they lack the 
support they did twenty years ago. Many within the International Order felt that the IMF 
was a negative in relations with third world states.  Concerned EU members will have put 
alternatives to the draconian policies of the past in place. Elsewhere the order has 
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weakened considerably in its influence due to the growth of challenger states. South 
America, for example, has established more extensive ties with China, the EU and 
Russia. This has allowed South America to resist political pressure from the US because 
of the reduction in trade.  
 The US has, in the last twenty years, seen a precipitous drop in its economic 
strength. This is somewhere in the order of 46 and 69 percent, a massive drop in power. 
The globalization of the new millennium has continued, leaving the US behind in many 
ways. The dollar, once the benchmark for world markets, has been partially replaced by 
the euro. Each currency is used about equally on world markets, especially in energy 
trading. Russia, in particular, has used the euro exclusively for all of its energy 
transactions.  The domestic economy has stabilized and this has paid off well for the 
NAFTA agreements, which have morphed into a far closer economic arrangement then 
the original signers would have though possible. In many ways Mexico and Canada 
represent a significant part of the perceived economic strength of the US. Without these 
two states, the US would have an economic strength similar to that of Britain or 
Germany.    
Military strength is the most important component of US power left. With a 
leaner, meaner military than twenty years previously, the US is still the most powerful 
conventional force in the world. Robots and drones have given US forces the ability to 
strike anywhere with relative impunity, and with lower domestic political costs. Force 
projection is still the most powerful tool in the arsenal and the legendary logistical 
capability of the US military has lost little. The smaller force profiles have allowed for an 
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efficient reduction in numbers. In essence, when NATO needs a lift the US is still the one 
called. This superiority in military strength has also led to increased use when political or 
economic muscle will not work. Without the capacity to present an effective ―carrot‖ to 
potential troublemakers the US has resorted, in recent years, to deploying more and more 
military solutions that would normally have resulted in political and economic pressure 
ten years previous. The ability to deploy without coalition or alliance partners is the crest 
of sea change in American foreign policy that began ten years before. Rather than 
spending months trying to use soft power to resolve issues and then forming a bickering 
array of partners, the US now simply deploys a Carrier Battle Group and a Rapid 
Deployment Force to deal with an issue. Politically these have garnered the US negative 
reactions from around the world. Further, challengers such as China and Russia are 
increasingly concerned at such behavior. This has led them to investigate the best 
methods to match force capabilities with the US so as to counter any move against their 
interests. In essence a new Cold War has begun, though the participants don‘t quite 
realize it quite yet.  
     The hegemonic followers of the United States are now seeing increases that 
range between 8 and 20 percent. This means that the followers are more and more like 
equal partners in the running of the order. Canada has deep ties in the US thanks to 
NAFTA, and Australia now has a significant stake in the economy of the South Pacific as 
well as ties with India. Great Britain has largely integrated itself into the EU, even though 
the pound has still not been replaced by the euro. Eastern Europe still supports the US 
and the order but has forged ever stronger ties with Europe and NATO as a precaution 
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against Russia. While many followers still follow, they have also begun to make ties 
elsewhere. The foreign policy of the US also worries them, and the possibility of using 
their newfound political and economic power to force a change has been discussed.  
 Hegemonic challengers represent the greatest external threat to the current 
hegemonic order. With numbers that represent an increase on the order of between 86 
and 90 percent, the hegemonic challenger states, including India, China and Russia, will 
be serious competitors in the economic, political, and military arenas. Economically these 
states have most likely overtaken the US and the order. Russia is using its massive energy 
reserves as a source of cash and influence in Europe and around the world, possibly 
forming partnerships with South American states. Europe and Russia are only friends 
when it comes to dealing in the energy market; Russia has a product Europe needs and 
Europe has money that Russia wants. Putin‘s game of using his natural resources as a 
political tool is paying off handsomely. India has become a major player in Asia, and 
while tensions still exist with Pakistan these tensions are far higher with China and its 
growing military and economic reach. Both China and India have poured massive 
amounts of economic aid into Africa, and both have entered into trade agreements with 
African states. Because of this Africa is experiencing a renaissance. Essentially the 
hegemonic challengers are not so much directly challenging the US as they are creating a 
new, multi-polar world. The US centered hegemonic order is another player in a new 
international scene.  
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The Impact of Hegemonic Malcontents 
Within my futures analysis hegemonic malcontents represent a force that chips away at 
hegemonic power while perhaps courting the challengers and each other. Like the above 
analysis, the hegemon and the order are not really changing, while the world around it is 
changing, and changing dramatically at that. The hegemonic malcontents will experience 
an increase in their power as the order begins to weaken and the challengers become 
stronger. Many of the malcontents have resources, such as oil, that are essential to the 
growth of industry and, consequently, economic strength.. 
Five Years 
 The malcontents at five years, based on F2: Hegemonic Malcontents, experience a 
small decline of between one and two percent. Many of the malcontents that were 
included in the scanning, including Pakistan (as a benign malcontent), Iran (as a 
revolutionary malcontent) and Venezuela (also as a revolutionary malcontent), are 
unstable politically. This instability will hamper any growth that these states may see, 
even with a weakening hegemonic order. In five years time Iran will be experiencing a 
severe infrastructure problem that sees its aging drilling and refining plants begin to fail. 
The US has managed to prevent any major western firms from stepping in and rebuilding 
these facilities. The oil fields are still operating but a cascade of failures has reduced 
capacity, causing concern among many states that consume Iranian oil. Iran was able 
avoid any sort of armed conflict with the US after 2008, but tensions remain very high.  
Venezuela has seen its fortunes begin to decline as the management of the current regime 
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begins to fail, even while the demand for Venezuelan oil holds steady. Chavez is barely 
holding on to power, as the good things he has done have given way to lavish spending 
and a stagnant economy. Pakistan, meanwhile, has managed to stabilize its democratic 
government and has made a tenuous peace with the Islamic militants. While this has 
caused problems with the US and India it has gone a very long way in giving Pakistan a 
measure of political stability. Germany has continued its distancing from American 
foreign policy by throwing itself deeper into the planning of the EU. Germany‘s goal is to 
enable the EU to become a fully independent entity, which it already is for the most part. 
But these plans include increased military power as well.  
Ten Years 
 Ten years hence marks an exciting time for the hegemonic malcontents of the 
order. Their growth is very high, with changes between 26 and 33 percent. These extreme 
increases demonstrate that the power of the hegemonic order is declining in relation to 
the rest of the world and that the malcontents are capitalizing on their newfound freedom. 
Iran‘s oil infrastructure has been rebuilt, or is in the process of rebuilding, with assistance 
from Russia, China and the EU. Iran has ceased to throw around its brand of Islamic 
militantism because of increased profits flowing into the country. Make no mistake; the 
Islamic clerics still hold power. But they have toned down their message, as the US is no 
longer seen as the threat it was ten years ago.  
Venezuela has become more of a threat to US and Canadian interests in the 
Caribbean. By building an oil infrastructure ten years previously, Venezuela has captured 
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a surprisingly large share of the Caribbean market. And by the use of well written trade 
agreements, Venezuela has made quite a few friends. The US, however, sees this as a 
threat to the one area of the world that is US-dominated. Eventually Venezuela imposes a 
oil embargo on the US, thus driving energy prices beyond 2008 levels while overtly 
working to unite South America. The US decides that the best way to handle this threat is 
to send a military response and the resulting situation sees Venezuela bowing down to US 
demands to stop sanctions amid the destruction of several refinery complexes. Venezuela 
is devastated economically and the US is condemned around the world for such an 
outright act of war.  
 Pakistan and India have forged a more-or-less permanent truce and Afghanistan 
is being supported actively by both states. Of course tensions will always exist. But 
India‘s rise to power has convinced the democratic Pakistani Government to work with it. 
Islamic militants are in the Pakistani Parliament but have a small voice in the way things 
are run. The winding down of the war on terror has made Pakistan just another country to 
the US, a status that Pakistan likes. For the first time in many years central Asia is quiet 
and free of an American presence.  
Twenty Years 
 At twenty years North Korea has collapsed. The death of Kim Il-Jung spelled the 
end of a corrupt regime, and talks of union began with the South. Within six months an 
agreement had been reached, mostly for aid as the South was reluctant to jeopardize its 
own economy by incorporating the destitute North so quickly. States including China and 
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Russia took an interest in the North and begin to render aid as well. The massive military 
machine of the People‘s Republic causes concern as their intentions are unknown. The 
US sends a military presence as insurance; this is unwelcome by all parties. The 
rehabilitation of North Korea will be a massive undertaking and will help to unite Japan, 
China and South Korea, something few other things have done.  
 Iran has grown exponentially in the past ten years due to increased demand for oil 
from China and India. The attack on Venezuela by the US prompted Iran to take a hard-
line economically by setting sanctions against the US. A military task force sent to Iraq 
did little to quell Iranian outrage. An attack caused by a few drone guided missiles from a 
US carrier group caused an international outcry so loud that action was suspended and 
reparations were made. Relations stabilized, to a point, but the power of the US in the 
Persian Gulf region was reduced to the point of nullification.  
 Pakistan has made significant economic inroads, mostly from pacts with both 
India and China. Afghanistan is, for the first time, a viable trading partner with Pakistan. 
Venezuela has recovered from the US attack ten years ago and has calmed down in its 
anti-American actions and rhetoric. Besides having renewed economic ties with the US, 
Venezuela has also been one of the South American countries to enter an expanded 
NAFTA, a move spearheaded by Canada. The malcontents at the twenty year point are 
not so much malcontents anymore. The US does not have the economic power to force 
any sort of policy on them, while the malcontents have gained power, along the lines of 
69 to 92 percent. In other words the influence of the US on these states at the twenty year 
mark is minimal. 
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Conclusion 
Hegemonic malcontents are not a primary reason for the decline of American hegemony. 
Instead they represent a piece of a larger picture. First and foremost the numbers indicate 
that the world around the US and the order it has built is changing. Challengers are 
become stronger and followers are beginning to look elsewhere. The US is ―staying the 
course‖ and not really adapting to a rapidly changing world. The reliance on military 
power will become a larger part of American foreign policy as other fortunes, mainly 
economic and political, decline. The ability of the US to project military power will 
remain high. This ability, however, may very well be viewed as an acceptable substitute 
for soft power methods of enforcing policy. As challengers such as Russia and China 
become more powerful the world will become more multi-polar. The US and the order 
that it has built will be but one among equals.  
 This exercise concentrated on the international hegemonic order as a whole while 
the rest of this work focuses more on malcontents. The reasoning behind this is based on 
the fact that in order to demonstrate that malcontents will not be a major cause of 
hegemonic downfall but rather an element that will hasten a hegemon already in decline. 
As a source of challenges for the already stretched hegemon, malcontents will test the 
ability of the hegemonic state to enforce the order. This is the role they play; if the 
hegemon lets the malcontented state pursue policy then it is obvious that the hegemon is 
on the decline. If the hegemon enforces the order and the use of the carrot fails, the use of 






So where does all of this lead us? Hegemony is a universal concept, something that is 
able to transverse history with great ease. Malcontents within hegemony will always exist 
in one form or another. Knowing how hegemony functions will enable us to see how 
malcontents form and, subsequently, we can see how these malcontents contribute to the 
decline of a hegemonic state.  Power will lead nowhere if it is not used correctly. We 
have seen leaders who can wield power without consent, men like Idi Amin, late 
President of Uganda, and other dictators who are soon deposed the first time their power 
is seen as lacking. Hegemons are able to function because they possess a unique mix of 
power and consent. This enables them work even as their economic and military power 
declines. The consent of the hegemonic order serves as their basis of power; without it 
they would wither.  
The symptoms of hegemonic decline are all present in the United States at the 
start of the 21st century. The consent that was once so easy to generate is more difficult 
now in the face of unpopular foreign policy decisions. Economic power which the US 
once possessed in spades has began to dissipate around the world, making other powers, 
such as China, contenders on world markets. The European Union, once a collection of 
ragged, war torn states has slowly evolved into a force that rivals the US for economic 
influence. Much like Britain in the 20th century the US is experiencing a decline in 
influence, first economic, then political. With no real empire to partition off the US is 
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faced with a far starker reality; that of loss of influence in a world that once was willing 
to do what it wanted with minimal convincing. The heady days of post 9/11 are long gone 
as the war in Iraq seemingly drags on indefinitely and changes on the outside of the US 
affect the domestic situation with rising food and energy prices and a war against the 
dollar.  
Where does the malcontent stand in all this? Malcontents, no matter their type, act 
as an additional drain on the hegemon. They want to be left alone to pursue national 
goals. But these national goals can be quite varied in their ultimate aim. No matter if it is 
to build a nuclear power plant, expand oil refining capacity into the Caribbean or simply 
to be left alone to mine gold on the veld in peace the malcontent will help hasten the 
decline of the hegemonic state. The malcontent will believe that the greatest chance of 
success will occur when the hegemon demonstrates a weakness, a gap in its power. This 
is when it will begin to defy the hegemon and it is here that the hegemon must respond. If 
the response is through soft power the political strength of the hegemon must be up to the 
challenge. If the hegemon chooses force then the all important question arises; will the 
order approve?  
This is where the typology comes into play. Using force against a benign 
malcontent like Germany would be nearly unthinkable into today‘s world. We can take 
parable of Oliverotto de Fermo on page 26 as an example of how not to act in dealing 
with those who are ruled. The message here is that the odious, the violent and the 
repulsive do not stay in power for long. Use of force against a malcontent such as Iran, 
which would be classified as revolutionary, is something that, perhaps, the hegemonic 
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state could justify to the rest of the order. The typology can play an important part in the 
allocation of hegemonic resources and how best to deal with threats to the stability of the 
order. The lack of soft power in pursuit of a Germany or a France may also function as an 
indicator of loss of power in that particular region. The US has suffered a loss of clout in 
recent years with its European allies, a loss that is readily apparent when the actions of 
Germany and France are examined in 2003. Using the typology we can identify where 
this might happen next and, possibly, identify the states that will be a part of it.  
Hegemonic states and the order which they form are betting against history to see 
how long they can stay successful on the troublesome and unpredictable international 
stage. Some hegemons realize their time is waning as budgets and the will to rule shrink, 
as the British experienced in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Some 
hegemons are like a cosmic red dwarf, puffing out to their maximum size just before their 
total, inevitable collapse. Military power is the last resort of a declining hegemon and is 
often the only powerful tool left in its arsenal. But the overt use of force in today‘s world 
is a negative; something that will bring derision from challengers and followers alike.  
The malcontent is betting too, only against the reactions the hegemon will take. 
Odds are that the malcontent will decrease as the hegemon drags its actions out, either 
because they do not work or because they are not working strongly enough. Each type of 
malcontent will respond differently and each will prompt a differing reaction. The lengths 
that the hegemon is willing to go to bring the malcontent back into the order will state 
quite loud and quite clear where the hegemonic state is in regards to the use of force and 
the use of soft power.  
 182 
Hegemons are generally quite liberal in how they see themselves and their order. 
Dealing with malcontents creates a tension between that liberal creed and the practical 
reality of running affairs on the international stage. The dangers to security will vary 
immensely during the life cycle of a hegemon. Malcontented states are generally going to 
be placed lower than challenger states and other groups that directly threaten that 
security. Underestimating a malcontent is a dangerous move and one that will only serve 
to hasten the downfall of a hegemonic state. The use of force can be deemed a necessary 
tool against the outliers of the hegemonic order. But force is often a very poor tool for 
restoring the order. It is hard to generate consent from nations, states, and groups that 
have been squashed by military action. It is even harder to placate followers and 
supporters within the order after an overt use of force that many see as unnecessary. 
Hegemons must bear in mind that their rule is based on the consent of the order, without 




The identification of malcontents will point to gaps in the hegemonic order; the areas 
where the hegemon is most vulnerable. Pragmatically the ability to see how the 
malcontent typology affects the decline of a hegemon can provide a new dimension to 
policy formation and execution. While many states that are labeled as malcontent are 
constantly in the media, a means to categorize them and apply that to the level of threat 
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they present will help to allocate the scarcer resources in a time of decline. A systematic 
identification of malcontents would also assist policy makers in formulating timely and 
appropriate responses.  
 This work is a timid beginning to fill a gap in the literature. While much has been 
written on small states, hegemonic followers and hegemony itself I have found little that 
grouped everything together into a coherent work on malcontented states, nations and 
other assorted groups. In this age of terror, where homeless groups are just as dangerous 
as conventional armies, an opportunity for further research would exist using the 
malcontent typology as applied to non-state groups.  
 The futures analysis section of this work is the practical application of my theory 
presented previously. Futures study is a field that has seen a great growth in the last 30 
years and presents an organized, scientific means to examine possible scenarios for the 
future. This work has incorporated a methodology that was originally conceived to 
examine environmental issues. I believe it speaks volumes about the usefulness and 
versatility of this methodology that it is so easily adapted to the material this work 
explores. A positivist method of examining and analyzing the future can provide 
important insight for both policymakers and political scientists. In this work the future is 
bleak for the United States and the order that it has built. Essentially it is not the US 
declining so much as it is the rest of the world shifting away from the reality that the US 
has known since the Second World War. Malcontents play an important role in this as 
they find there is more and more freedom to operate. While this is but one possible future 
based on available data today it is nonetheless important. The results of this study are 
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subjective and based on the researcher‘s own knowledge and intuition. Not surprisingly 
the prospects for further research using the same methodology are nearly boundless. I 
believe strongly that this methodology is an effective tool for presenting possible 


















Appendix 1: Sources and Data for the Futures Analysis of the 
American Hegemonic Order 
 
C1: Hegemonic Economic Power 
 
2: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: Sliding US dollar rates hit JSF program 
Date: 3/20/08 
 
The sliding dollar has caused the Joint Strike Fighter program to skyrocket in cost 
because of overseas contracts. The JSF was conceived as an international cooperative 
program and much of the success hinges on the US-UK partnership in the deal. Future 
cost increases are expected as the USD continues to fall. The sliding dollar is now 




 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
-.0006 -.005 -.0045 
Upper 0.75 0.85 0.8 
Lower 0.65 0.75 0.75 
 
 
17: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: The Coming Financial Pandemic 
 
For months, economists have debated whether the United States is headed toward a 
recession. President George W. Bush can tout his $150 billion economic stimulus 
package, and the Federal Reserve can continue to cut short-term interest rates in an effort 
to goose consumer spending. But those moves are unlikely to stop the economy‘s slide. 
The severe liquidity and credit crunch from the sub prime mortgage bust is now 
spreading to broader credit markets, $100 barrels of oil are squeezing consumers, and 
unemployment continues to climb. And with the housing market melting down, empty 
pocketed Americans can no longer use their homes as ATMs to fund their shopping 
sprees. It‘s time to face the truth—the U.S. economy is no longer merely battling a touch 
of the flu; it‘s now in the early stages of a painful and persistent bout of pneumonia. 
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Predicting a long-term financial pandemic, this lead shows how long-term the economic 






 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
-.009 -.005 -.00009 
Upper .2 .3 .3 
Lower .15 .25 .25 
 
 
24: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: An End to Currency 
Manipulation 
 
As the value of the dollar drops, currency stability all over the world is affected. The 
main point here is that the dollar needs to be made stable again to counter the 
hyperflexibility of global markets. An unstable dollar affects the currencies tied to it, 
such as China and Vietnam, while other states have unpegged their currency from the 
dollar in light of the rapid drop. The author believes that a strong dollar, as the 
responsibility of the Federal Reserve, is needed in order to stabilize world markets. With 
the dollar loosing it‘s primacy the effect on hegemonic power if the dollar is replaced, 




 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
-.014 -.009 -.009 
Upper 0.6 0.65 0.75 




31: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power:  Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict 
 
The world has grown much more peaceful over the past 15 years -- except for oil-rich 
countries. Oil wealth often wreaks havoc on a country's economy and politics, helps fund 
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insurgents, and aggravates ethnic grievances. And with oil ever more in demand, the 
problems it spawns are likely to spread further. Oil is important to US economic power 
and its rise in price will continue to affect the economy. Further malcontents who possess 





 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
-.0012 -.0014 -.0016 
Upper 0.55 0.6 0.85 
Lower 0.5 0.55 0.8 
 
 
37: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: Toward an Economic 
Strategy against Iran 
 
In the evolving American debate over strategy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 
idea of economic warfare - the coordinated application of punitive 
trade/inflationary/socioeconomic pressures - has received comparatively little attention. 
This is somewhat surprising, given the intrinsic vulnerabilities, ranging from a heavy 
dependence on foreign refined petroleum to a centralized economic hierarchy, now 
visible within the Iranian economy. This article outlines these "points of entry," and 
details the economic approaches that U.S. policymakers can employ in order to convince 
the Iranian regime that the real costs of its nuclear program are likely to outweigh the 
potential benefits of atomic acquisition. Using economic power against Iran will be an 
important test of hegemonic economic power; the more is succeeds, the better for it.  
 
Source: Comparative Strategy, Volume 27, Issue 1 January 2008 , pages 20 - 26 
 
 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
.0005 .00009 .00007 
Upper 0.85 0.75 0.8 







43: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: Bullet train coming to 
California ballots 
 
California will put a 10 million bond to finance the 42 billion dollar bullet train proposal 
to link North and South. Such a proposal is important in that it would help to provide an 
alternate form of cheap, efficient and fast transportation in an era where the car is less 
and less feasible for long, daily commutes. Such a proposal is, hopefully, a sea change in 
how the American Economy is built. Projects like the bullet train are indicative of a 
switch in the US to alternative means of transport. If these initiatives are successful it will 
help in maintaining the economic power of the hegemon.    
 
Source: Christian Science Monitor: http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0409/p02s03-
usgn.html 
 
 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
.000002 .000005 .4 
Upper 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Lower 0.9 0.9 0.9 
 
 
52: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: After the dollar 
 
As the US dollar keeps sliding in value, the question of what will be the next reserve 
currency for the international economy be? These kinds of questions are important for 
primarily because of the dollar slide people are examining alternatives to the dollar. The 
author sees the euro as a possibility and nothing as a backup; the speed of currency 
calculation in may ways forestalls the need for reserve currency. As in lead 24, this lead 
discusses the end of the dollar as a primary component of international trade. For the 





 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
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Impact 
-0.2 -0.3 -2 
Upper 0.45 0.55 0.6 





55: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: Democrats Threaten NAFTA, but Pact Is Here 
to Stay. 
 
While some politicians talk tough about reopening NAFTA, in reality there is very little 
any President could do. Checks within the system, consisting of Congress and NAFTA 
partners, would help to stop any reopening of the treaty. According to this, no matter 
anyway if NAFTA were reopened, it would not help the people most affect by the loss of 
manufacturing jobs anyway. A slowdown of NAFTA, perhaps, but not a rollback, 
thwarting the protectionist attitude. NAFTA is an important aspect of the US economy. 
An expansion of NAFTA and the avoidance of protectionist attitudes will help increase 
the economies of all states involved, including the US. Embracing NAFTA, I believe, 






 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
0.03 0.04 0.6 
Upper 0.76 0.8 0.8 
Lower 0.7 0.75 0.75 
56: C1: Hegemonic Economic Power: The Yin and Yang of US Debt: Growing 
American debt has consequences for both lenders and borrowers 
The flow of foreign credit and investment fueled tremendous economic expansion in the 
US in recent years, but it also contributed to lower interest rates that helped to create the 
housing bubble. Financing – with the purchase of US Treasury, Agency and mortgage-
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backed securities – by foreign investors has created a glut of funds allowing US 
consumers to spend more money than they actually have. Americans grew accustomed to 
living beyond their means. If foreign financiers took their money elsewhere, US citizens 
would struggle to sustain their current standard of living and the government would have 
difficulty maintaining its current level of spending. Ashok Bardhan and Dwight Jaffee, 
economists based at the University of California, Berkeley, offer insights into which 
countries hold US debt – and why the investors might find it difficult to diversify into 
new investments. The supply of creditworthy debt instruments does not meet the demand 
from global savers looking to invest. So, Bardhan and Jaffee predict that, for better or 




 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
Upper 0.8 0.8 0.85 
Lower 0.75 0.75 0.8 
 
C2: Hegemonic Military Power 
 
 
4: C2: Hegemonic Military Power:  US budget request for increased defence spending 
masks squeeze on procurement and R&D 
 
The US Budget request for defense has gone up, but Research and Design has been 
squeezed. However, overall there will be additions to the force, seven new Navy vessels 
and additional support for ground forces. Several high-end weapons programs have been 
scaled back or cut altogether. The military power of the US is seeing the economic effects 






 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
-.00002 -.0001 -.00025 
Upper 0.95 0.95 0.9 
Lower 0.9 0.9 0.85 
 
18: C2: Hegemonic Military Power: The U.S. Military Index for March/April, 2008 
 
The Military index put together by Foreign Policy rates the health of the US Military. 
This particular one puts the US Military as an organization that is stretched thin, which in 
turn affects the readiness of the forces that, in turn, places stain on war fighting 
operations. Without a clear victory in sight for either Afghanistan or Iraq, the US is 
stretched to its breaking point. An increase in ground forces in general and Special Forces 
in particular is needed to help rejuvenate the military. As we see a draw-down in Iraq (in 
the next five years) I believe that the status of the US military will change for the positive 
in the next five years.  
  
Source: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4198 
Date: March/April, 2008 
 
 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
-.0009 -.00011 -.00015 
Upper 0.85 0.95 0.9 




21: C2: Hegemonic Military Power: U.S. Land Forces Draw Concern 
Both the US Army and the USMC are concerned about the ability of the forces to 
maintain an acceptable level of readiness. The over emphasis on counter-insurgency 
training had decreased the ability of certain types of units, namely non-infantry units such 
as Artillery and Air Defense, to pursue their primary mission as they are diverted to ―in-
lieu-of‖ missions that support counter-insurgency operations. Iraq is both cited and 
denied as a cause of this problem, many within the forces believe that Iraq is only a 
minimal factor at best. Within five years the concerns stated in the article are valid. Like 
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Vietnam however the military will be forced to evaluate and re-organizes; an activity that 





 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
-.009 -.006 -.0009 
Upper 0.9 0.9 0.85 




22: C2: Hegemonic Military Power: Joint Strike Fighter Program Still Improving; Still 
in Crosshairs. 
 
The JSF program aims to build a high-tech, versatile fighter that can be spread across not 
only US forces but available for purchase to select US allies, such as Australia. This 
program has become not only increasingly expensive but subject to inter-service rivalry 
and squabbling. Even so, foreign interest and US interest remains high, but this will be 
subject to debate as the imposed costs on the project, partly from economic measures and 
partly from increased service demand, diminish the advantages that make the JSF such an 
attractive package. Institutional momentum will most likely keep the JSF going and this 
lead shows that even with economic difficulties many advanced weapons programs will 






 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
.00005 .00009 .00012 
Upper 0.9 0.85 0.85 
Lower 0.85 0.8 0.8 
 
 
26: C2: Hegemonic Military Power:  Is Our Robot Army Ready for Combat? 
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The goal for the land forces of the US Army is to have robots, combat deployable robots, 
to supplement the men on the ground. Ideally the robots will serve as ―point man‖ for 
combat patrols, especially in urban areas. While a robot army is still science fiction, robot 
supplements will improve the combat capability of the US forces. The use of robots will 
be important for both force projection and political goodwill. A more extensive use of 




 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
.00009 .00012 .00015 
Upper 0.75 0.8 0.8 




27: C2: Hegemonic Military Power (And F1: Hegemonic Followers): Raytheon Wins 
Big Bucks for Missile Radar Move 
 
Raytheon has received a contract to move a missile defense site from the Marshall Islands 
to the Czech Republic. The primary purpose for this site is to work in conjunction with a 
similar site in Poland to defend Europe against potential attacks from Iran. Another lead 





 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
.00009 .00009 .00009 
Upper 0.95 0.95 0.85 
Lower 0.9 0.9 0.8 
 
 




The Counter-Sniper (C-Sniper) program's goal is to detect and neutralize enemy snipers 
before they can engage U.S. Forces. An objective of the program is to deliver a field 
testable prototype system suitable for operational experimentation as an integrated part of 
the DARPA Crosshairs system, already under development. The purpose of the 
Crosshairs system is to detect enemy bullets, RPGs, and mortars fired at U.S. military 
vehicles and to prevent them from striking the vehicle. The C-Sniper system will enhance 
this capability by identifying threats before they can fire. 
 
Note: I have mainly used this as an example of some of the research that DARPA is 
doing that will, in my work at least, directly affect the way the US forces handle 




 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
.000009 .000019 .00003 
Upper 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Lower 0.9 0.9 0.9 
 
 
35: C2: Hegemonic Military Power:  FCS Launch System Tested at White Sands 
 
The Future Combat System is a non-line of sight artillery and missile delivery system that 
represents a portion of the Army‘s next generation of war fighting. NLOS-LS consists of 
a highly deployable, platform-independent weapon system that provides networked, 
extended range, precision strike capability for combat commanders. The NLOS-LS is 
capable of unattended/unmanned operations under all weather conditions. Armed with 15 
Precision Attack Missiles, the NLOS-LS is capable of engaging a host of varied targets 
on the modern and future battlefield. The development of the FCS is another feather in 
the hat for an advanced US military. Again, the more advanced and automated the less 
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42: C2: Hegemonic Military Power:  In push for drones, Gates 
labors to change Pentagon 
 
The US Forces see the Unmanned Drones as ―force multipliers‖ to increase recon and 
surveillance functions. The Secretary of Defense is trying to build bureaucratic 
momentum on the use of drones in combat zones, such as Iraq. This article stresses that 
the Pentagon is concerned with getting UAVs to the troops as part of an overall increase 
in technology. This is seen as integral to keeping the US military at the top of the war 
fighting pile.   
 
Source: Christian Science Monitor: http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0428/p03s03-
usmi.html 
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57: C2: Hegemonic Military Power:  May 10 airpower summary for Coalition 
Airpower in SW Asia. 
 
I use this article as an example of the military might, particularly airpower, of US forces 
in SW Asia. Combined with Coalition numbers, these present an impressive summery of 
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59: C2: Hegemonic Military Power:  Poisoned Chalice? The Crisis in National 
Security Planning, Programming, and Budgeting. 
 
The crisis in US national security planning, programming, and budgeting is not the fault 
of any one Administration, and has often been shaped by the mistakes of the US congress 
and key military commanders. It has accelerated sharply over the last eight years, 
however, and will be a major burden for the next President. The real cost of national 
security spending is likely to be 20-30% higher that is estimated in current baseline 
budget requests. There is no clear or coherent plan, program, or budget that reflects the 
fact the nation is at war and no credible mix of force plans, modernization plans, and 
procurement plans for the future. The future may look bright for combat capabilities, but 
the administration is in trouble. Like the planning after Vietnam I believe that it will take 
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C3: Hegemonic Cultural Power 
 
33: C3: Hegemonic Cultural Power:  Only in America: America's particularities will 
survive George Bush 
 
Even in an age of retreat, American still emphasizes the exceptionalism that defined the 
20th century. Several think tanks have authored reports confirming that, indeed, America 
is special. The big change coming is not the end of American exceptionalism but the end 
of American triumphalism. Winning the cold war left many Americans intoxicated with 
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power. Even Bill Clinton boasted about America as the ―indispensable nation‖—a 
country that stood taller and saw farther than its rivals. The mood is very different today. 
The main challenge facing the next president will not be to blunt American 
exceptionalism, but to make sure that American triumphalism is not replaced by a 
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47: C3: Hegemonic Cultural Power: South Asia, A New Center of 
Democracy? 
 
This article talks about the recent growth spurt of Democracy in South Asia, a spurt that 
has been successful, especially in Pakistan, initially at least. The long term may prove to 
be something different and this success needs US support to stay afloat.  Despite the 
bleak outlook, we must not dismiss the others. If these new democracies do not hold, then 
in many cases the consequences could be devastating, returning their citizens to the 
longstanding conflicts from which they have only recently emerged. Instead, the West 
should take hope that in Pakistan, over 40 percent of the population came out to vote. 
And, in Nepal, 60 percent. And this, despite the insecurity and/or illegitimacy of the 
elections. It is this section of the population — those interested in building democracy — 
the West should engage. Democracy is spreading even further; the primary cultural 
export of America. The more democracy, the better for the hegemonic order.  
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54: C3: Hegemonic Cultural Power:  Can democracy save the planet? 
 
This article arose from a conference in London, asking the question ―does democracy 
enable sustainable development, or get in the way?‖. While problems do exist for 
democracy, the coupling of market interests to politics among them, overall democracy is 
crucial and necessary for decent and equitable sustainable development, but is currently 
coupled tightly to the established "growth model" - to a degree that raises deep questions 
about whether it can deal with the risks stemming from the excesses of that model. 
 
Source: http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/can_democracy_save_the_planet 
Open Democracy  
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D1: Hegemonic Political Power 
 
 
7: D1: Hegemonic Political Power: Whether it is Clinton, McCain or Obama, the 
world will still quarrel with America's foreign policy. 
 
A Bush-less American foreign policy is expected to get an immediate pop from the 
international community, thus improving America‘s standing and hegemonic credentials. 
However, there is little that can be done that will have a major impact. The legacy of the 
Bush years will persist for some time after he leaves office and it will take much work to 
turn around opinion on American foreign policy; that is, if the next administration WILL 
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9: D1: Hegemonic Political Power: Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic 
Nationalism 
 
Americans generally belittle the role of ethnic nationalism in politics. But in fact, it 
corresponds to some enduring propensities of the human spirit, it is galvanized by 
modernization, and in one form or another, it will drive global politics for generations to 
come. Once ethnic nationalism has captured the imagination of groups in a multiethnic 
society, ethnic disaggregation or partition is often the least bad answer. Ethnic 
nationalism is a roadblock to hegemonic policy. No matter what America does in certain 
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29: D1: Hegemonic Political Power:  A Battalion’s Worth of 
Good Ideas 
 
The author argues that a separate branch of US military advisors that can offer up 
assistance to allies in not only the current war on terror but any future conflicts where a 
US presence may be desirable but not in the form of operational combat forces. Nagl 
believes that such a boost in advisory capacity will effectively learn from previous 
successful advisory experiences, namely that local forces will ultimately win the war. 
Such a strategy will prove not only effective in achieving US aims, but also cost effective 
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as well. Political power derives from military power and US advisors have been a staple 
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58: D1: Hegemonic Political Power:  Is the U.S. doing enough to 
alleviate the world food crisis? 
 
The question posed by the title of this piece is a mixed result. While the 1 billion in aid 
promised by the Bush administration will be welcomed world-wide it will not be until 
2009 that the money and aid will begin to flow, and even that could be stopped by 
changes in US domestic agricultural policy. Whatever the point, this demonstrates that 
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51: D1: Hegemonic Political Power: Shell pulls out of Iran gas deal 
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Shell pulled out of a deal that partnered with Iran on a planned gas project due to US 
influence and US concern for Iran‘s nuclear program. Possible replacement partners 
include Russian and Chinese companies, however neither have the same experience with 
this particular type of project that Shell has. US influence made policy occur in the 
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50: D1: Hegemonic Political Power: Frustrated Senators See No Exit Signs 
 
General David Petraeus, commander of forces in Iraq went before a Senate panel hearing 
on withdrawal dates from Iraq. He had none, and danced around the question for hours. 
What does this mean? It means that either no plan exists (unlikely) or that the situation is 
simply too fluid to put any existing plan into place. Whatever the point, the US is most 
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E1: International Hegemonic Order 
 
1: E1: International Hegemonic Order: UK report urges action to 
restore NATO's credibility 
 
The UK urges action to restore the credibility of NATO as an ―indispensable alliance‖ 
that is a central pillar of European and UK defense policy. In order to not decline and 
become irrelevant NATO needs to define its role and purpose far more clearly and should 
agree a new Strategic Concept explaining that role as a matter of priority. Success in 
Afghanistan should be at the top of the NATO agenda.  NATO is a linchpin of the 
hegemonic order and an action to restore credibility is important, especially coming from 
a more senior partner like Great Britain.  
 
Source: http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdw/jdw080325_1_n.shtml  
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5: E1: International Hegemonic Order: British Face Rising Cost of Living, Credit 
Crunch 
 
British citizens have faced a rise in the cost of living that sees cheap credit disappearing 
and bankruptcy on the rise. This article is an example of how domestic American 
economic woes are spreading throughout the order is occurring. More importantly, will 
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10: E1: International Hegemonic Order:  The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence 
of the Predatory State 
 
After decades of historic gains, the world has slipped into a democratic recession. 
Predatory states are on the rise, threatening both nascent and established democracies 
throughout the world. But this trend can be reversed with the development of good 
governance and strict accountability and the help of conditional aid from the West. The 
order will be affected by a loss of states that slip back from democracy. However, as 
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20: E1: International Hegemonic Order: Argentina’s Political and Commercial 
Relationship with America.   
 
Argentina is a state with serious issues, both economic and political. Many Argentineans 
believe that a combination of the IMF and the US caused the economic meltdown that 
resonates throughout the country. While Argentina is not quite a malcontent, they are also 
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no friends of the US. Rapprochement with Chavez and a decided progressive trend in 
Government has set Argentina apart from the American sphere. While Brazil may be 
considered the closest partner of Argentina, Brazil‘s rise in the international arena has 
unbalanced this relationship. Essentially, Argentina is suffering domestic crises 
associated with the lack of value of the most important exports, namely foodstuffs. 
Without sufficient demand the economy has suffered, a blow to an already devastated 
financial landscape. Argentina needs to invest in manufacturing and the associated 
education and infrastructure. The important point is that recovery is rooted in domestic 
issues rather than international. This lead is an example of the problems some hegemonic 
followers have with the hegemon and the order that leads them to become malcontents. 
Argentina is a prime example of a state that blames many of its problems on America.   
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38: E1: International Hegemonic Order: Why Islamists Don't 
Win Elections 
 
This article outlines the fact that when election time comes in Islamic countries the 
promise to ―make an Islamic state‖ seems to turn voters off. From Asia to the Middle 
East, including Iran, the platforms that include Islamic law and principles are being 
defeated for secular parties. Why do Islamists fail to do better in elections in Muslim 
countries? There are many answers. The one I prefer comes from Turkish President 
Abdullah Gùl: ―Most Muslims like to live in an Islamic society with a secular state.‖ 
 
Source:  http://www.feer.com/features/2008/april/why-islamists-dont-win-elections 
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40: E1: International Hegemonic Order:  The Debate on Biofuels: Between Food 
Security and the Price of Oil 
 
According to this piece, the spike in food prices is caused by a combination of factors, 
among them: the 58 percent rise of fertilizer prices in the last year, the high cost of oil, 
and the actions of ―speculators‖ looking for ―opportunities‖ in markets of raw materials. 
Latin American, where this piece is based on, has 30 percent more food than it needs to 
feed its populace. The problem is also about how this is organized and who controls 
production and the distribution of the profits. According to this piece, it‘s likely that the 
huge demand for biofuels shares responsibility for the rise in food prices. But it‘s not true 
that biofuels are wholly responsible for an entire fifth of the world‘s population is going 
hungry. 
 
Source: North American Congress on Latin American:  
http://www.nacla.org/node/4591 
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41: E1: International Hegemonic Order:  Price shock in global 
food: Riots over grain prices call for a rethink of global 
stability based on better farming. 
 
The food shortage is real, while some media hype is not. In reality, the food shortages are 
starting to affect the rich West: a sure sign that it is deeper than thought. The rush to 
Government control and the putting up of trade barriers will hurt, rather than help, in the 
long run. Food riots signal the need to rethink global stability and the critical role of those 
who till the land and feed us all. The prosperity that built the post-Second World War 
order is slipping. This will ease as alternative are found, but in the short term the order 
will be weakened.  
 
Source: The Christian Science Monitor:  http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0407/p08s01-
comv.html 
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44: E1: International Hegemonic Order: Iceland’s Deep Freeze 
 
Iceland is a victim of the global credit crunch for a simple reason: it depended on foreign 
investment and capital to fuel its astounding growth spurt in the last decade (4% 
annually). Iceland, a seemingly insignificant player, is an example of just how connected 
the international markets are and despite the fact they were successful, the global 
situation has made a dramatic impact on a local economy. Again, this lead is 
representative of how the order is affected by the poor economic situation, even a small 
state that had little to do with the problem.   
 
Source: http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2008/04/21/080421ta_talk_surowiecki 
The New Yorker, May 12th, 2008 
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48: E1: International Hegemonic Order:  Europe's unlikely attempt to renew a 
"partnership" with Russia. 
 
Even as Russia violates Icelandic airspace with routine bomber missions the EU has reopened 
talks for a long dormant partnership. This idea is tied to Russia‘s energy bullying of smaller East 
European EU members, as well as Poland. Russia ties political demands to energy deliveries, a 
sort of partnership may relieve such tensions, but this is doubtful with Putin still continuing to 
play a significant role in Government, despite his position change.  Of course, there is no New 
Cold War, and that is fine. The problem is that what has replaced it, while no replica, 
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F1: Hegemonic Followers 
 
 
3: F1: Hegemonic Followers: NATO expected to further Balkan enlargement 
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NATO has sent signals that it will invite Albania, Croatia and Macedonia into the 
alliance. These three states have done enough to merit an invite, according to a senior 
European diplomat. This lead demonstrates that the followers of the hegemon and order 





 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
.0009 .005 .008 
Upper 0.6 0.65 0.9 






8: F1: Hegemonic Followers: The Canadian Connection in the Caribbean 
 
Canada is exploiting and increasing its presence in the Caribbean, from finance to 
business to policeman to reorganize chaotic local departments. While the Canadian 
presence is not large, the simple fact is that it is increasing. Canada is beginning to 
expand outward, but how far will it expand is the question. Canada is an important 
member of the hegemonic order. This lead demonstrates that they are trying to break out 
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14: F1: Hegemonic Followers: The NATO Alliance at War 
 
While some cite the lack of full participation of some NATO members, the organization 
was always a multilayered partnership. NATO is still hugely relevant and is involved in 
many places, Afghanistan, Kosovo, etc. Basically, NATO is not going away, nor losing 
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19: F1: Hegemonic Followers: Canada, 2008: Winter of (Mild) Discontent 
 
Canada has strong ties to the US and a weakening US leads to a possible stronger 
Canada, especially in regards to international affairs. Domestically the Canadians have a 
minority government, something that is not granted to stay around. With the departure of 
the minority government comes the possible withdrawal from Afghanistan and other 
NATO operations that Canadians see as superfluous to their interests. The Canadians 
have a rather chilly political climate, something their Southern neighbors are lacking. 
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36: F1: Hegemonic Followers: Out of Area and Very Much in 
Business? NATO, the U.S., and the Post-9/11 International 
Security Environment 
 
This paper seeks to determine why the United States chose to bypass NATO after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the relative strengths and weaknesses of alliance 
and coalition operations, through an examination of NATO's missions in Bosnia and 
Kosovo and U.S.-led coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the United 
States emerged from NATO's two Balkans missions with a belief that its operational 
freedom and flexibility had been hampered by operating within alliance constraints, 
coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq raised key questions about whether ad hoc 
coalitions are the most appropriate mechanisms for conducting such operations. NATO's 
contributions to post combat reconstruction and stabilization also highlighted some of the 
core advantages to be derived from working through the alliance. If NATO can follow 
through on the transformation agenda it has undertaken since the 2002 Prague Summit, 
the indications are that the United States is more likely to turn to NATO for future 
operations and that NATO's days as a "toolbox" may well be numbered. NATO may be 
playing a far stronger role in the hegemonic order than anytime in its past if Prague is 
adhered to.   
 
Source: Comparative Strategy, Volume 27, Issue 1 January 2008 , pages 65 - 78 
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60: F1: Hegemonic Followers: U.S.-Australia Alliance Goes 
Back to Business First with Kevin Rudd 
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The new Australian PM has taken John Howard‘s support for the US and reinforced it, 
emphasizing the Australia/China/US strategic triangle and making Australia an active 
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F2: Hegemonic Malcontents 
 
 
6: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents:  Pakistani PM vows to fight 
terror 
 
Yusuf Raza Gillani, the Pakistani Prime Minister, claims the first priority for his country 
is to find peace and fight militants. Among other actions the ban on student and trade 
unions has been lifted and steps toward integrating the lawless tribal areas into the rest of 
the country, along with full rights for the inhabitants, have been discusses and enacted. 
Pakistan is beginning to fight their war on terror their way, through positive steps that 
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11: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: An Empty Revolution: The Unfulfilled Promises of 
Hugo Chávez. 
 
Even critics of Hugo Chávez tend to concede that he has made helping the poor his top 
priority. But in fact, Chávez's government has not done any more to fight poverty than 
past Venezuelan governments, and his much-heralded social programs have had little 
effect. A close look at the evidence reveals just how much Chávez's "revolution" has hurt 
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12: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: Staying Alive: Why North Korea Will Not Change 
 
Despite international calls for reform, the North Korean government is doing its best to 
maintain the domestic status quo -- and with good reason, at least from its perspective. 
Still, change is coming in very slow motion thanks to international aid and illegal 
exchanges with the outside world, which are eroding Pyongyang's legitimacy. North 
Korea is determined to keep its status as an enemy of the US. The need for assistance will 
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15: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: A Balancing Act in Pakistan 
 
Pakistan‘s new government has made it clear that the cooperation enjoyed with 
Musharraf is going to end. The new PM and government will begin to undertake 
strategies that limit US freedom for military operations, negotiations with militants as a 
counter strategy and serious concerns about civilian deaths in the war against extremists.  
Basically the US will have to balance diplomacy and negotiation with a government that 




Type:  Passive-Aggressive 
 
 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
-.009 -.0002 -.0003 
Upper .45 .25 .35 
Lower .35 .2 .29 
 
 
16: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: Seeing Iran’s Shadow in Iraq Unrest 
 
There is no doubt Iran has vested interests in Iraq. From economic to political ties, Iran is 
involved in many aspects of Iraq. The most concern for the US is how deep Iranian 
influence is in relation to the insurgency. Not only that, but the question of exactly why 
Iran is so involved is also unresolved. Keeping the Sunnis out of power, inspiring a sort 
of managed chaos in Iraq to suit Iran‘s needs; all could be motives. What it all leads back 
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23: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: Hearts and Minds in Pakistan 
 
The new Pakistani Government is aiming for a truce with the Islamic militants who stage 
attacks and suicide bombings all over Pakistan. While a dialogue will hopefully help curb 
the attacks and save Pakistani lives, American policy makers are nervous at what a truce 
could do to the hunt for terrorists, which has been intensifying as of late. The author 
concludes that the united Pakistani-US front, no matter how superficial, is ending without 
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39: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: All the way? The evolution of German military 
power 
German strategic decision-makers have to reconsider their approach to the use of force. 
In Afghanistan, the Bundeswehr is faced with the challenge of a growing insurgency. 
This situation requires a willingness to provide combat forces for the NATO-led 
International Security Assistance Force. Hence, the conviction in German domestic 
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politics that the Bundeswehr should only be employed for the purposes of stabilization 
and reconstruction is increasingly challenged by a changing operational reality in 
Afghanistan, and allies‘ reluctance to continue to accept German policy. In essence, the 
issue is about German participation in counterinsurgency operations. This article argues 
that while military force in recent years has become an integral part of German foreign 
policy to pursue national interests, political decision-makers in Berlin and the broader 
German public will still have to come to terms with the reality of a new security 
environment in Afghanistan. For the German government the ‗small war‘ in northern 
Afghanistan is a very politically exhausting undertaking. Both politically and militarily 
Germany seems ill prepared to sustain such an operation. Its political and strategic culture 
still promotes an aversion to involvement in war fighting. Still, there are indicators that 
the changing operational reality in Afghanistan might lead to a significant evolution of 
the German approach to the use of force. 
Source: International Affairs: Volume 84 Issue 2 Page 211-221, March 2008 
Type: Benign 
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45: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: Trouble in paradise: Venezuela 
spreads oil on tropical waters. 
 
 Venezuela is attempting to outflank the US in the Caribbean, 
which includes a Venezuelan run oil refinery in the Dominican 
Republic. Pending environmental impact studies this has been 
committed to. This is a part of the alternative trade pact inspired by 
Chavez, the Alternative for the Americas. With this Chavez hopes 
to nick some of the influence of the US away from it in the 
Caribbean region. Environmentally the refinery could be a disaster 
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53: F2: Hegemonic Malcontents: Iran's Oil Industry: A House of Cards? 
 
On paper Iran has the potential to be an energy super power, but in reality the 
infrastructure that drives that potential is described as a house of cards, crumbling and in 
poor shape. Oil may be Iran's greatest strength, but it is also Iran's greatest weakness. As 
such, the debate in the West on how to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons 
should focus less on the risky military option, or the seemingly ineffective diplomatic 
option, and more on a comprehensive economic warfare strategy that targets Iran's energy 
sector. With oil exports accounting for half the government's budget and around 80 to 90 
percent of total export earnings, the surest strategy to bring down Tehran's Islamic regime 
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F3: Hegemonic Challengers 
 
13: F3: Hegemonic Challengers: China and India Go to Africa: New Deals in the 
Developing World 
 
Economic activity between Africa and Asia, especially China and India, is booming like 
never before. If the problems and imbalances this sometimes creates are managed well, 
this expanding engagement could be an unprecedented opportunity for Africa's growth 
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25: F3: Hegemonic Challengers:  Asia's 'Rising Elephant' 
Stumbles 
 
India, which has been sustained with a booming economy, has experienced a slow down, 
to around 5.3 percent. The rupee has begun to fall against the dollar again, and the stock 
market has taken a few good hits. While India will not stop, it will slow down to a crawl. 
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The Government is taking measures such as improvement of infrastructure, improvement 
in education and tax measures. It is hoped that these efforts will jump start the flagging 
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30: F3: Hegemonic Challengers:  China's inflation worries: High prices for food, fuel 
and other goods are troubling. 
Inflation in China had led to decreased consumer spending, stricter price controls by the 
government, and a strengthening currency against the dollar.  Despite the headlines 
Chinese inflation is currently attracting, the Economist Intelligence Unit expects the year-
on-year rate of inflation to fall rapidly in the second half of 2008. The key factor will be a 
cyclical fall in pork prices from the high base in 2007, helped by a restocking of China's 
pig herds. However, surging global food prices are likely to mean that the deceleration in 
inflation will not be as swift or deep as we previously expected. We have consequently 
increased our inflation forecast for 2008 to 5.9% (from 5% previously). 
Short-term grain price inflation remains to a large extent dependent on the 
weather, and there is a risk that a major drought in China could cause price growth to 
accelerate rapidly. In the longer term, a falling supply of agricultural land, water 
shortages, and rising fuel and fertilizer costs will put upward pressure on food prices. 
However, inflation in the cost of manufactures will remain low, owing to intense 
competition and massive investment. Inflation should slow further in 2009, averaging 
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32: F3: Hegemonic Challengers: China and EU address trade issues. 
 
China is taking its trading relationship with the EU more seriously than at anytime in the 
past. This is the EU response to continued Sino-American dialogue and China‘s 





 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
-.005 -.009 -.10 
Upper 0.75 0.8 0.95 




34: F3: Hegemonic Challengers: Military Power of the People’s 
Republic of China 
 
This is a Department of Defense report on the status of the Chinese military. While the 
US welcomes a stable, prosperous partner the future of the People‘s Liberation Army is 
uncertain. The Chinese have increased their technology with foreign purchases and 
combined with the size of the forces it is evident that the balance of power will change in 
Asia. Further, the PLA is slowly increasing its capability to project its power farther ands 
farther away; this also contributes to the significant change in the balance of power. 
Limited knowledge combined with increased capacity makes China a potential enemy of 





 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
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Impact 
-.006 -.010 -.19 
Upper 0.7 0.7 0.75 
Lower 0.5 0.6 0.7 
 
46: F3: Hegemonic Challengers: It Is Time for the Pentagon’s 
PLA Report to Grow Up 
 
Essentially calling for a revision of the China Military power report, this article details 
the need for greater transparency of China in its military capabilities. Such concealment 
is in response to Chinese perceptions of opposition to military goals. This article 
advocates a more detailed report, designed to convince the Chinese to be more open 
about their capabilities in the name of cooperation. It also stresses that the report needs to 




 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
0.00001 .000001 .000009 
Upper 0.2 0.2 0.3 








49: F3: Hegemonic Challengers: NATO Summit In Bucharest: A Glass Half-Empty 
Or Half-Full? 
 
Three themes seem to prevail within NATO after Bucharest, the continued Russian 
obstinance against NATO and the encroachment the organization is undertaking right to 
Russia‘s doorstep, a possible return of France to NATO as the organization plays an ever 
 222 
greater role as the defense arm of the EU, and the increased commitment of member 
states to Afghanistan. The return of France may very well signal a major change in the 





 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Impact 
0.4 0.8 2 
Upper 0.8 0.85 0.85 






Appendix 2: The Results of the Futures Analysis Exercise 
 
 
C1: Hegemonic Economic Power 
 
Lead #  5 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
2 -0.0006 0.65 0.75 -0.00039 -0.00045 
17 -0.009 0.15 0.2 -0.00135 -0.0018 
24 -0.014 0.3 0.6 -0.0042 -0.0084 
31 -0.0012 0.5 0.55 -0.0006 -0.00066 
37 0.0005 0.8 0.85 0.0004 0.000425 
43 0.000002 0.9 0.95 1.8E-06 1.9E-06 
52 -0.2 0.4 0.45 -0.08 -0.09 
55 0.03 0.7 0.75 0.021 0.0225 
 
 
Lead #  10 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
2 -0.005 0.75 0.85 -0.00375 -0.00425 
17 -0.005 0.25 0.3 -0.00125 -0.0015 
24 -0.009 0.35 0.65 -0.00315 -0.00585 
31 -0.0014 0.55 0.6 -0.00077 -0.00084 
37 0.00009 0.6 0.75 0.000054 6.75E-05 
43 0.000005 0.9 0.95 4.5E-06 4.75E-06 
52 -0.3 0.5 0.55 -0.15 -0.165 
55 0.04 0.75 0.8 0.03 0.032 
 
 
Lead #  20 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
2 -0.0045 0.75 0.8 -0.00338 -0.0036 
17 -0.00009 0.25 0.3 -2.3E-05 -2.7E-05 
24 -0.009 0.6 0.75 -0.0054 -0.00675 
31 -0.0016 0.8 0.85 -0.00128 -0.00136 
37 0.00007 0.75 0.8 5.25E-05 0.000056 
43 0.4 0.9 0.95 0.36 0.38 
52 -2 0.55 0.6 -1.1 -1.2 
55 0.6 0.75 0.8 0.45 0.48 
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C2: Hegemonic Military Power 
 
 
Lead #  5 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
4 -0.00002 0.9 0.95 -1.8E-05 -1.9E-05 
18 -0.0009 0.8 0.85 -0.00072 -0.00077 
21 -0.009 0.85 0.9 -0.00765 -0.0081 
22 0.00005 0.85 0.9 4.25E-05 0.000045 
26 0.00009 0.7 0.75 0.000063 6.75E-05 
27 0.00009 0.9 0.95 0.000081 8.55E-05 
28 0.000009 0.9 0.95 8.1E-06 8.55E-06 
35 0.00009 0.75 0.8 6.75E-05 0.000072 
42 0.00008 0.86 0.9 6.88E-05 0.000072 
 
 
Lead #  10 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
4 -0.0001 0.9 0.95 -0.00009 -9.5E-05 
18 -0.00011 0.9 0.95 -9.9E-05 -0.0001 
21 -0.006 0.85 0.9 -0.0051 -0.0054 
22 0.00009 0.8 0.85 0.000072 7.65E-05 
26 0.00012 0.75 0.8 0.00009 0.000096 
27 0.00009 0.9 0.95 0.000081 8.55E-05 
28 0.000019 0.9 0.95 1.71E-05 1.81E-05 
35 0.00012 0.8 0.85 0.000096 0.000102 
42 0.00009 0.9 0.95 0.000081 8.55E-05 
 
 
Lead #  20 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
4 -0.00025 0.85 0.9 -0.00021 -0.00023 
18 -0.00015 0.85 0.9 -0.00013 -0.00014 
21 -0.0009 0.8 0.85 -0.00072 -0.00077 
22 0.00012 0.8 0.85 0.000096 0.000102 
26 0.00015 0.75 0.8 0.000113 0.00012 
27 0.00009 0.8 0.85 0.000072 7.65E-05 
28 0.00003 0.9 0.95 0.000027 2.85E-05 
35 0.00015 0.9 0.95 0.000135 0.000143 




C3: Hegemonic Cultural Power 
 
 
Lead #  5 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
33 0.000009 0.6 0.75 5.4E-06 6.75E-06 
47 0.0002 0.75 0.8 0.00015 0.00016 
54 0.00007 0.45 0.5 3.15E-05 0.000035 
 
 
Lead #  10 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
33 0.000009 0.75 0.8 6.75E-06 7.2E-06 
47 0.0004 0.8 0.85 0.00032 0.00034 
54 0.00009 0.6 0.75 0.000054 6.75E-05 
 
 
Lead #  20 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
33 0.000009 0.75 0.85 6.75E-06 7.65E-06 
47 0.0006 0.8 0.85 0.00048 0.00051 






















D1: Hegemonic Political Power 
 
Lead #  5 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
7 0.0006 0.75 0.9 0.00045 0.00054 
9 -0.00005 0.65 0.75 -3.3E-05 -3.8E-05 
29 0.0007 0.6 0.9 0.00042 0.00063 
50 -0.09 0.6 0.75 -0.054 -0.0675 
51 0.00007 0.85 0.9 5.95E-05 0.000063 
58 0.9 0.6 0.65 0.54 0.585 
 
 
Lead #  10 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
7 0.0000001 0.85 0.9 8.5E-08 9E-08 
9 -0.00003 0.75 0.8 -2.3E-05 -2.4E-05 
29 0.0009 0.75 0.9 0.000675 0.00081 
50 -0.0008 0.8 0.85 -0.00064 -0.00068 
51 0.00003 0.8 0.85 0.000024 2.55E-05 
58 0.03 0.7 0.75 0.021 0.0225 
 
 
Lead #  20 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
7 0.00000001 0.8 0.9 8E-09 9E-09 
9 -0.00002 0.75 0.85 -1.5E-05 -1.7E-05 
29 0.0012 0.85 0.9 0.00102 0.00108 
50 -0.0006 0.8 0.85 -0.00048 -0.00051 
51 0.00001 0.7 0.75 0.000007 7.5E-06 














E1: International Hegemonic Order 
 
Lead #  5 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
1 0.0005 0.6 0.75 0.0003 0.000375 
5 -0.00003 0.75 0.8 -2.3E-05 -2.4E-05 
10 -0.0008 0.45 0.5 -0.00036 -0.0004 
20 -0.00005 0.85 0.9 -4.3E-05 -4.5E-05 
38 0.0002 0.55 0.65 0.00011 0.00013 
40 -0.003 0.8 0.85 -0.0024 -0.00255 
41 -0.09 0.9 0.95 -0.081 -0.0855 
44 -0.002 0.8 0.85 -0.0016 -0.0017 
48 -0.0002 0.75 0.8 -0.00015 -0.00016 
 
 
Lead #  10 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
1 0.00045 0.75 0.8 0.000338 0.00036 
5 -0.000035 0.65 0.7 -2.3E-05 -2.5E-05 
10 -0.0005 0.5 0.55 -0.00025 -0.00028 
20 0.00002 0.85 0.9 0.000017 0.000018 
38 0.00004 0.65 0.7 0.000026 0.000028 
40 -0.0004 0.8 0.85 -0.00032 -0.00034 
41 -0.008 0.85 0.9 -0.0068 -0.0072 
44 -0.0002 0.8 0.85 -0.00016 -0.00017 
48 -0.0005 0.8 0.85 -0.0004 -0.00043 
 
 
Lead #  20 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
1 0.00035 0.75 0.8 0.000263 0.00028 
5 -0.000037 0.8 0.85 -3E-05 -3.1E-05 
10 -0.0001 0.5 0.55 -0.00005 -5.5E-05 
20 0.00008 0.8 0.85 0.000064 0.000068 
38 0.00006 0.65 0.7 0.000039 0.000042 
40 -0.0002 0.85 0.9 -0.00017 -0.00018 
41 -0.0002 0.75 0.85 -0.00015 -0.00017 
44 -0.00002 0.85 0.9 -1.7E-05 -1.8E-05 





F1: Hegemonic Followers 
 
Lead #  5 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
3 0.0009 0.5 0.6 0.00045 0.00054 
8 0.0003 0.8 0.85 0.00024 0.000255 
14 0.0001 0.9 0.95 0.00009 0.000095 
19 0.0002 0.7 0.75 0.00014 0.00015 
36 0.0002 0.85 0.9 0.00017 0.00018 
60 0.00004 0.9 0.95 0.000036 0.000038 
 
 
Lead #  10 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
3 0.005 0.55 0.65 0.00275 0.00325 
8 0.0004 0.7 0.75 0.00028 0.0003 
14 0.0002 0.9 0.95 0.00018 0.00019 
19 0.0005 0.85 0.9 0.000425 0.00045 
36 0.0004 0.75 0.8 0.0003 0.00032 
60 0.00005 0.85 0.9 4.25E-05 0.000045 
 
 
Lead #  20 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
3 0.008 0.85 0.9 0.0068 0.0072 
8 0.0005 0.69 0.7 0.000345 0.00035 
14 0.0003 0.8 0.85 0.00024 0.000255 
19 0.0009 0.9 0.95 0.00081 0.000855 
36 0.0005 0.7 0.75 0.00035 0.000375 













F2: Hegemonic Malcontents 
 
Lead #  5 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
6 0.0001 0.3 0.35 0.00003 0.000035 
11 0.00008 0.6 0.65 0.000048 0.000052 
12 0.00001 0.002 0.004 2E-08 4E-08 
15 -0.009 0.35 0.45 -0.00315 -0.00405 
16 -0.00005 0.5 0.75 -2.5E-05 -3.8E-05 
23 -0.0009 0.8 0.9 -0.00072 -0.00081 
39 -0.00004 0.3 0.5 -1.2E-05 -0.00002 
45 -0.06 0.4 0.9 -0.024 -0.054 
53 0.005 0.2 0.4 0.001 0.002 
 
 
Lead #  10 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
6 0.0005 0.35 0.39 0.000175 0.000195 
11 0.00015 0.65 0.7 9.75E-05 0.000105 
12 0.00009 0.02 0.12 1.8E-06 1.08E-05 
15 -0.0002 0.2 0.25 -0.00004 -0.00005 
16 -0.00002 0.8 0.85 -1.6E-05 -1.7E-05 
23 -0.0012 0.85 0.9 -0.00102 -0.00108 
39 -0.0003 0.2 0.4 -0.00006 -0.00012 
45 -0.0005 0.3 0.6 -0.00015 -0.0003 
53 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.49 0.63 
 
 
Lead #  20 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
6 0.0008 0.39 0.4 0.000312 0.00032 
11 0.0003 0.5 0.6 0.00015 0.00018 
12 0.0003 0.8 0.9 0.00024 0.00027 
15 -0.0003 0.29 0.35 -8.7E-05 -0.00011 
16 -0.000009 0.7 0.75 -6.3E-06 -6.8E-06 
23 -0.0009 0.85 0.9 -0.00077 -0.00081 
39 -0.002 0.7 0.9 -0.0014 -0.0018 
45 -0.0003 0.2 0.4 -0.00006 -0.00012 





F3: Hegemonic Challengers 
 
Lead #  5 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
13 -0.0005 0.6 0.9 -0.0003 -0.00045 
25 0.0002 0.75 0.8 0.00015 0.00016 
30 0.0008 0.5 0.9 0.0004 0.00072 
32 -0.005 0.7 0.75 -0.0035 -0.00375 
34 -0.006 0.5 0.7 -0.003 -0.0042 
46 0.00001 0.09 0.2 9E-07 0.000002 
49 0.4 0.79 0.8 0.316 0.32 
 
 
Lead #  10 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
13 -0.0009 0.7 0.9 -0.00063 -0.00081 
25 -0.0001 0.8 0.85 -0.00008 -8.5E-05 
30 0.0005 0.2 0.8 0.0001 0.0004 
32 -0.009 0.75 0.8 -0.00675 -0.0072 
34 -0.01 0.6 0.7 -0.006 -0.007 
46 0.000001 0.09 0.2 9E-08 2E-07 
49 0.8 0.8 0.85 0.64 0.68 
 
 
Lead #  20 years    
 Impact Low Prob. Up Prob. LEI UEI 
13 -0.02 0.8 0.9 -0.016 -0.018 
25 -0.0003 0.8 0.85 -0.00024 -0.00026 
30 0.0002 0.85 0.9 0.00017 0.00018 
32 -0.1 0.9 0.95 -0.09 -0.095 
34 -0.19 0.7 0.75 -0.133 -0.1425 
46 0.000009 0.07 0.3 6.3E-07 2.7E-06 






John began university at Bowling Green State University in 1995, graduating with a 
Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and History. Continuing with his education at 
BGSU, he earned a Master‘s of Public Administration in 2003 while working as a 
Teaching Assistant to Dr. Neal Jesse. After a stint teaching at a Community College in 
Toledo, John decided that it was time to finish with his terminal degree and applied, and 
was accepted, to the University of Tennessee in 2004. While pursuing his degree he has 
had the good fortune to continue working with Dr. Jesse on several projects. Further is 
assistantship with the Arts and Sciences Advising Services has helped him learn the 
nooks and crags of the Administration process within a University setting, as well as 
extensive contact with a wide variety of students.  In addition to a perverse joy in 
Political Theory, particularly Marxism, and Dark Ages Britain, John enjoys historical 
reenactment, collecting British militaria and watching Battlestar Galactica.  
 
